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In August of 2000 the United Nations Sub-Commission on Human Rights approved Resolution 2000/7
-l declared, in part, that there was a primacy ofhuman rights over economic policies. While Resolution
H was focused on potential conflicts between human rights goals, such as education, and economic
ies reflected in domestic economic policies and the TRIPS agreement, subsequent commentary on
■lution 2000/7 suggests a much broader meaning; specifically, a legal obligation under international law to
de for these human rights to those in need and the exclusion of certain economic human rights such as a
or's right to material gain from his creation
This paper addresses the misunderstandings created by Resolution 2000/7, specifically with regard to
right, through an historic, legal and economics analysis. First, the paper examines the aspirational nature
n-fundamental human rights, such as education. Next, it examines the inclusion of the right to material
from a creation as a human right. Additionally, this paper examines the history of economic policy in the
ion of the United Nations and modern human rights law. Further, the paper explores the
:onnectedness of economic policy and human rights with regard to education by analyzing the history of
right in the domestic and international context. Finally, solutions are explored with particular focus on a
icing approach instead of the absolute priority suggested by Resolution 2000/7.
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Whatever is generally said ofme by mortal men, and I'm quite well aware that [economic
policy] is in poor repute. ..I am the one - and indeed, the only one - whose divine powers
can gladden the hearts ofgods and men.1
Perhaps it is folly to argue on behalf of economic policy; a term whose mere
mention suggests at least one of the seven deadly sins, avarice. But economic policy is a
much maligned term recently placed in ill-repute as the avaricious factor in the conflict
between intellectual property and other human rights. The inclusion of intellectual
property in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") through the Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS") agreement has generated a
flurry of commentary, United Nations resolutions and reports focused on the perceived
conflict between intellectual property law and the realization of some human rights such
as the right to an education. The moral and material interests in a creation , sometimes
realized through domestic copyright laws, is also a human right but conflicts with other
human rights such as the right to an education4 to the extent it blocks access to
educational materials. This access block is the result of increased costs for copyrighted
educational materials. Some commentators explain the conflict by assuming copyright's
primary function is to protect the moral and material interests5 of authors while human
1
ERASMUS, PRAISE OF FOLLY 1 (Betty Radice trans., Penguin 1993) (1509).
2 Material rights include economic benefits such as the sale price and royalties. See
Goran Melander, Article 27, in THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY 431 ( Asbjorn Eide et al. eds., 1992).
3 The Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights, art. 27, GA. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3rd
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); the International Convention on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, 16 Dec. 1966, art. 15, S.Exec. Doc. D, 993 UNTS 3.
4 Id.
5 Moral rights consider the expression as an extension of self justifying rights to
attribution, reputation and preservation. These rights are often collectively referred to as
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rights focus on access,6 that is, on making the products of intellectual property available
at an affordable price. To that end, there is a trend to phrase the debate in terms of
intellectual property laws restricting access due to an economic profit focus and human
rights promoting access. This oversimplification is further exacerbated by the suggestion
that human rights have an absolute priority over economic policy.7 This paper asserts
that access to educational materials and the protection of moral and material interests of
creators are not doomed to eternal conflict and that economic policy and human rights are
interconnected in an historical and practical manner. To segregate the two and give
priority to either in an absolute fashion is folly. Copyright reflects this integration with
the dual goal ofmoral and material rights on the one hand and access on the other.
Still, there may be times when there is a conflict between the right to education
and the moral and material interests of creators. In such a case what is to be done when a
author's rights. Russell J. DaSilva, Droit Moral and the Amoral Copyright: A
Comparison ofArtists ' Rights in France and the United States, 28, No.l BUL. OF THE
COPYRIGHT SOC. 1, 2-8 (1980); Note, VisualArtists 'Rights in a Digital Age, 107
HARV. L. REV. 1977, 1981-86 (1994); Cheryl Swack, SafeguradingArtistic Creation
and the CulturalHeritage: A Comparison ofDroitMoral Between France and the United
States, 22 COLUM.-VLA J. L. & ARTS 361, 365-66 (1998);Carl H. Settlemyer III,
Between Thought and Possession: Artists' "MoralRights " and Public Access to Creative
Works, 81 GEO. L. J. 2291, 2303-06 (1993).
6 Access is multidimensional; it includes the availability of a creation to the public at a
reasonable price as well as encouragement to create that which has not yet been created.
It is this second aspect of access, to dream of things that never were and ask why not, that
is often referred to as the economic incentive to create. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE
FUTURE OF IDEAS "THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED
WORLD" 86-92 (2001); GEORGE BERNARD SHAW, BACK TO METHUSELA,
(1921).
7 Sub-Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2000/7, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/7 (17
August 2000) (hereinafter "Resolution 2000/7.") Economic policy encompasses "the
views, resolutions, regular decisions, acts of state, which it applies for influencing the
economy to achieve its social-political goals." J. VEREES, GAZDASAGPOLITIKA
(ECONOMIC POLICY) 17 (1999); Gabor Saghi, What is Economic Policy For,
Periodica Polytechnica Ser. Soc. Man. Sci., v. 10, No. 2, 199, 200 (2002).
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state fails to achieve certain basic human rights goals such as an education? This is
certainly the situation we face today with many states failing to achieve basic human
rights objectives. The most utilized response to the international educational crisis is
foreign and international aid but reliance on such a fix is less than desirable due to several
reasons including uncertainty. Accordingly, to infuse certainty into the equation some
commentators have argued that the human right to certain basics, such as an education, is
a fundamental human right creating a legally binding obligation on developed states to
provide aid to developing states. Such a position does not negate the premise of this
paper that human rights and economic policy are intertwined in such a fashion that there
can be no absolute priority of one over the other. Rather, it supports this premise by
attempting to create a legally binding obligation on states to modify their domestic
economic policy so as to achieve human rights goals domestically and in other states.
However, there are many problems with this theory. As discussed in Chapter 2,
the main problem with this theory is that it fails to provide any basis in international law
to support such a conclusion that there is a legally binding universal obligation regarding
aspirational human rights such as education. While it is true that some human rights have
arisen to a universal acceptance of a legally binding position, they are limited primarily to
a prohibition against genocide, torture slavery and discrimination. Many veiy important
human rights including the right to an education have not become legally binding under a
theory of customary international law but may be legally binding as to states that have
ratified a treaty that recognizes a legal duty to provide such rights.
Another problem with the theory of a legally binding obligation to provide
aspirational human rights, such as the right to an education is that the proponents of this
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theory fail to address the fact that the main reason such social and economic rights,
including education and the moral and material interests in creators, were designated as
aspirational was due to the recognition that many developing states would not be able to
achieve these goals due to domestic economic conditions. If, as most agree, the primary
responsibility for achieving these human rights goals resides with the state in question
and if they are legally binding, what obligations or, perhaps more accurately political
opportunities, may be imposed to induce those states to meet their obligations?
Obviously, the sovereignty of developing and developed states could well be eroded
under this proposition particularly with respect to domestic economic policy.
Another alternative proposition to resolve this conflict is discussed in Chapter 3,
to wit: that the moral and material interests of creators are not human rights or,
alternatively, are subservient human rights. Indeed, in order to make this segregationist's
argument viable one would have to articulate a way to avoid the nasty problem ofmoral
and material interests of creators being provided the status of a human right in human
rights documents such as the Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights ("UDHR") and the
International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR".) Once
this is satisfactorily achieved the argument would flow as follows:
1. Human rights take a priority over economic policy.
2. Moral and material interests in creators is not a human right but if it is it is
subservient to other human rights such as the right to an education.
3. Moral and material interests in creators are a part of domestic economic policy.
4. Education takes priority over moral and material interests in creators.
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The only part of this argument that rings hue is part 3; moral and material
interests in creators is a part of domestic economic policy. The major premise here, part
2, is simply not true to the extent it attempts to assert that the moral and material interests
of creators are not human rights. As discussed in Chapter 3, the moral and material
interests of creators are protected under the UDHR as well as the ICESCR. This
assertion that moral and material rights of authors, in essence copyright, are human rights
is, no doubt, subject to much debate today. But the same arguments against such a
classification were made during the drafting of the UDHR and the ICESCR and yet these
rights were included. To ignore this basic fact is not a mere matter of interpretation;
rather it is an attempt to amend without consensus.
As for the subservient alternative, this is based upon a distinction between what
are generally recognized as human rights, such as education, and a right that is created by
the state as with copyright. But if such a distinction rings true than other human rights
created by the state such as marriage and property rights would be subservient. In any
event, the main problem with the subservient position is that it ignores the accepted view
that human rights do not have a pecking order. Certainly, circumstances may dictate
priorities but flexibility and balance, not a rigid hierarchy, is necessary to meet the variety
of circumstances faced in the domestic and international context. This is so because of
the interconnectedness of economic policy and human rights. Simply put, neither
education nor the moral and material interests of creators could be realized without
economic policy and, at times, education is enhanced by protection of the moral and
material interests in creators.
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The history of the creation of the United Nations, discussed in Chapter 4,
exemplifies this interconnectedness between economic policy and human rights. The
human tragedy experienced during World War II enlightened the Allied powers of the
need for economic and political stability on a domestic level to avoid the recurrence of
those horrible events. To that end it was believed by many that international
organizations that promote economic and political stability domestically would enhance
international peace and prosperity. Given the notoriety ofNazi Germany's acts of
genocide, suppression of civil rights such as free speech and press and educational
indoctrination it was a logical extension of the desire to enhance economic and political
stability to address human rights issues. Indeed, the ground work for the creation of the
United Nations and the ultimate ratification of the United Nations Charter was the birth
ofmodern international human rights.8
Despite good intentions and historical events providing an incentive to act there
was the problem of sovereignty. Many states would not agree to participate in an
international organization, such as the United Nations, if it meant allowing such an
organization to dictate domestic policy. This concern was not simply a matter of those in
positions of power refusing to relinquish their power; there were some fundamental
philosophical differences regarding the means to achieve the goals advanced. Thus, in
This does not mean to imply that the birth of the United Nations was the birth of human
rights in general. Historically, there are examples of human rights documents on the
domestic level such as the French Declaration ofthe Rights ofMan arid ofCitizens
(1789) and the United States Constitution (1789) both of which were utilized as a
template in the creation of the Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights. Additionally,
there were attempts at international human rights such as the Hague Convention of 1907
on Certain Restrictions With Regard to the Exercise of the Right to Capture in Navel
War, 36 Stat. 2396, T.S. No. 544 but these were limited issues ofwar and diplomacy
leaving the general civilian population to fend for itself.
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order to build consensus it was agreed that sovereignty would be respected regarding
essentially domestic issues while still acknowledging that many essentially domestic
issues would have an impact on the international community. In terms of the human
rights agenda, this meant that many human rights ultimately articulated in the UDHR,
including moral and material interests of creators and education would be aspirational
and that each state would be primarily responsible for implementing domestic policy,
including economic policy, to achieve those rights.
Accordingly, domestic economic policy is critical to the realization ofmany
human rights including the right to an education. But domestic economic policy does not
limit its effects to a particular state's borders; there are some external effects. This is not
a recent observation as those who were involved in the drafting and passage of the United
Nations Charter and subsequent human rights documents were well aware of this fact.
Still, to the extent that domestic economic policy does not violate legally binding human
rights obligations this compromise was acceptable in order to obtain consensus. Perhaps
there was some hope that the negative external effects with respect to copyright could be
minimized due to the history of copyright law and by political pressure from the
international community.
In Chapter 5 this paper addresses the history behind the West's realization of the
human right to moral and material interests in one's creation by implementing copyright
legislation. This legislation was based upon a blending of philosophical beliefs including
a natural law philosophy expressed in the right to treat a creation and its copy as a
property right and a utilitarian philosophy premised upon the belief that the public good,
such as education, must be considered with respect to access to creations. The natural
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law property right is an ancient concept which can be traced back to the ancient Greeks
and Romans. Here we see the treatment of a creation as a property right; the treatment of
a creation as "mine" and the use of a creation by another without permission as a theft.
While there was little concern with issues of access this is primarily because the ancient
period in the West reflected an oral tradition culture.
During the medieval period we start to see commodification of creative
expression through the sale or assignment of the creation to disseminators in the
manuscript trade; another indication of the belief in a property right. But it was the
introduction of the printing press in the West when we first obtain evidence of the
treatment of the right to copy as a property right. This is initially expressed in terms of
the Crown's right to assign the right to copy as a property right. The right to copy was
further enforced by state approved printing guilds such as the Stationers Company in
England. As the printing guilds gained power, they too claimed a property right in and
treated the right to copy as a property right.
The absolute property right to copy, or a perpetual copyright, came under attack
during the seventeenth century due to abuses. This was the period of the Enlightenment
and the utilitarian philosophy, including the public good to access, was gaining
prominence. Censorship, enforced by the printing guilds and the state, was seen as a
hindrance to education. A free press and the right to build upon the creations of others
started to gain favour. Still, the notion of a property right in a creation, that concept of
"mine" was deeply rooted. The ultimate resolution was a compromise allowing for a
property right for a limited term of years to encourage creation but at the expiration of
that term the creation would be available for others to copy, sell and build upon. This
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would, theoretically, encourage education as it would allow less expensive copies to
become available at the end of the term, encourage competition in the re-print industry,
provide for the access to new creations by building upon the works of others and still
allow a reasonable return on investment to the printing trade and creators by the limited
monopoly right granted. This was the course of action reflected in the Statute ofAnne
which passed in the United Kingdom in 1709. History leaves little doubt that the Statute
of Anne was a commercial law passed to accommodate a balance between the moral and
material interests in authors and the need for access to enhance education. It reflected the
United Kingdoms economic policy to protect the printing trade while at the same time
promote education.
Certainly, the example of the United Kingdom, a developed state, regarding the
evolution of a property right in copyright law reflects thousands of years of development,
philosophical beliefs and economic considerations that are focused on domestic concerns.
The current international problem regarding a conflict between education and the moral
and material interests of creators may be resolved through an historical understanding of
copyright law in the West and must take into consideration the needs and concerns of
developing states as well. In Chapter 6 the example of the United States when it was a
developing state provides some insight as to the concerns of developing states. When the
United States was first drafting its Constitution, the issue of copyright came up and was
subject to some debate. The philosophical beliefs in the United States tended to reflect
those of the United Kingdom due to their common history. There was the concern about
granting an absolute property right in the right to copy due to limiting access for
education but also the recognition in the utility of granting some rights as an incentive to
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create. Thus, the natural law, property right, theory and the utilitarian theory were
reflected in the debate and ultimate agreement to provide Congress the power to enact
legislation on copyright for a limited term of years.
But the early copyright law in the United States did not provide protection for
foreign authors. Indeed, it was not until 1891, a hundred years after Congress passed the
first copyright legislation, that some limited protection for foreign authors was passed by
the United States Congress. This history reflects the economic policy in the United
States to protect and encourage its infant printing industry and to promote education
through inexpensive access to foreign, primarily British, works.
The philosophical battle in the West between natural law and utilitarian theories
in the copyright context did not end with the enactment of the Statute ofAnne. Indeed, it
does not appear to have ended even to this day. Chapter 7 addresses the attempts to
regain a perpetual copyright at around the time that the first term under the Statute of
Anne was about to expire under a common law theory in the United Kingdom. That
attack failed as did a similar tactic in the United States. But the economic incentive
expressed in terms of return on investment (primarily for disseminators) continued to
gamer attention along with the fact that economies in the West were becoming more
dependant on the copyright industry. As this economic imperative increased, the access
imperative decreased in Western economic policies. This phenomenon is the crux of the
international concern today regarding the negative effects of domestic economic policy in
the area of copyright laws conflicting with other states attempts to realize human rights
goals. For as states like the United States became more economically dependant on the
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copyright industries they sought to protect this interest abroad by encouraging (some may
say extorting) developing states to enact domestic copyright laws.
Examples of the West's increased economic dependence on copyright industries
and shift back to de facto natural law philosophies are discussed in Chapter 8. First, term
extensions, while initially reluctantly granted, are now granted with little to no economic
analysis as to whether they are actually needed as an incentive to create. Further, fair
dealing, an exception to copyright protection for certain uses such as education, has
become more restricted. The problem with term limits revolves around a market failure
analysis: term limits that are too short or too long may result in market failure if the term
does not address the economic incentive aspect of copyright and look to see what the
market can bear. Specifically, if a market can bear higher prices for a longer period of
time a term extension may make sense in that market. Conversely, if the market can not
bear such prices a shorter term of protection may be desirable.
As for fair dealing, more liberal fair dealing laws may be desirable in a market
where a high price can not be tolerated and the need for education is more critical. The
United States as a developing country is a classic example of this economic policy.
However, indiscriminately liberal fair dealing may result in market failure if allowed in
markets where a fair price could be paid without significant impact on education.
Accordingly, due to varying economic conditions domestic copyright laws are preferable
to a harmonized copyright law approach. But in the international copyright law area we
see attempts to harmonize through an emphasis on the moral and material interests of
creators reflecting a natural law philosophy approach.
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Chapter 9 examines the historical development of international copyright law and
contrasts it with domestic experiences. For example, while domestic economic policy
shifted in the West and evolved from a natural law philosophy emphasizing moral and
material interests to a utilitarian philosophy with an emphasis on access based upon
domestic needs international copyright law has remained rigidly focused on moral and
material interests of creators. Some fair dealing may be allowed and, certainly, there is
room for a balance approach but international copyright law has always emphasized the
natural law protection of moral and material interests of creators imperative. This creates
a problem for developing states in that their internal needs for access may be stifled due
to political pressure exerted upon them to implement domestic copyright laws that do not
reflect their current economic condition.
While the West has be allowed to develop its own economic policies regarding
copyright premised upon a property right and education, other parts of the world have not
seen such a phenomenon. Chapter 10 addresses non-Western cultures and the lack of a
philosophical belief in a property right for an individual in a creation let alone a right to
copy a creation. There is some notion of a right to a material gain from a creation and,
perhaps, some communal interest but not a Western notion of a property right. These
historic and philosophical differences coupled with the different economic realities
between developed and developing states has contributed to the problem identified in
Resolution 2000/7; namely how to balance the right to a material gain from a creation
with the right to education. In developing states the need for inexpensive or free
educational materials is much greater than in developed states. However, if a developing
state is required to meet the standards set out by TRIPS in order to obtain trade rights it
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may not be able to create an economic policy that reflects its interests. Conversely,
developed states have legitimate concerns regarding market failure issues stemming from
the free rider9 problem especially given modern technology and the phenomenon of
decentralized infringement.10
The solution to the problem of a conflict between the human right to education
and the human right to moral and material interests in creators is not absolute priorities,
strained legal concepts or even a persistent infusion of foreign aid; it is balance. A
balancing in domestic economic policies to encourage both education and creation
through incentives, as exemplified in history, with certain exceptions to the moral and
material interests in creators such as fair dealing. This balancing test may also be applied
by international tribunals, such as the WTO dispute resolution panel, given the fact that
international conventions dealing with the copyright issue allow for the application of
something akin to fair dealing."
A balancing test utilizing the fair dealing doctrine and market failure analysis
would allow for the domestic and international flexibility necessary to meet the varying
economic conditions we face today. In a state where there is a need for educational
9 "The free-rider problem is defined as: 'A situation commonly arising in public goods
contexts in which players may benefit from the actions of others without contributing
(they may free ride). Thus, each person has incentive to allow others to pay for the public
good and not personally contribute.'" Mark F. Testa, Ph.D., The Quality OfPermanence
- Lasting Or Binding? Subsidized Guardianship And Kinship Foster Care As Alternatives
To Adoption, 12 Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 499, fn.81 (2005).
10 Decentralized infringement is "[t]he phenomenon of falling reproduction costs
resulting in widening dispersal of reproduction activities." Joshua H. Foley, Comment:
Enter The Libraiy: Creating A Digital Lending Right, 16 Conn. J. Int'l L. 369, fn.179
(2001).
11 Berne Convention Protection of Literary and Artistic Works ( hereinafter "Berne")
art. 10, (9 Sept. 1886), 828 UNTS 221; Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (hereinafter "TRIPS") arts. 9 and 13(15 Apr., 1994), 1869
UNTS 299 (1995)
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materials but a lack of economic ability to meet the need a more liberal application of fair
dealing may be justified. This is particularly true where there exists market failure due to
economic conditions limiting an ability to pay. Under such conditions the material
interests in creators is reduced because there is, in fact, no market. Conversely, in a state
where there is less need for educational materials, a market with the ability to pay a
higher price for those materials and an economic dependence on the copyright industry a
less liberal application of the fair dealing doctrine could be warranted. Under such a
system it would be domestic economic policy that would be invoked to realize human
rights as domestic economic policy is and always has been interconnected with the
realization of human rights goals.
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CHAPTER 1
BACKGROUND TO THE CURRENT DEBATE ON THE
CONFLICT BETWEEN COPYRIGHT AND
THE HUMAN RIGHT GOAL
OF EDUCATION
[Human rights] abstract perfection is theirpractical defect.12
Few would argue with the general proposition that all of humanity would benefit
from the elimination ofwant especially regarding education; a basic tool necessary to
obtain the essentials of life and the eradication ofpoverty. But unless we achieve a
practical approach to the realization of human rights this abstract perfection will prove to
be more of a defect. Thus, the quandary lies in the method to obtain such goals. With
regard to intellectual property and other human rights we see today a debate taking shape
expressed in terms of a priority of human rights objectives over economic policies. For
copyright the discourse has been phrased in terms of the human right objective of
inexpensive or free access to existing creative works for educational goals as a priority
over an economic policy ofmaterial gain.13 This reflects the historic debate in the West
12 EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE,
SELECTED WORKS OF EDMUND BURKE 152 (1999).
13 Infoethics 2000, Universal Access to Information in the Twenty-First Century:
Ethical, Legal and Societal Challenges ofCyberspace, available at
http://webworld.unesco.ora/infoethice2000/documents/proceedings.html; see generally,
Progress Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education, Katarina
Tomasevski, Submitted in Accordance with Commission on Human Rights Resolution
1999/25, 1 Feb. 2000, GE.00-10458 E, W/CN.4/2000/6.
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regarding domestic copyright law in the nature of a public interest in access for education
versus a property right in a creation.
There is some appeal to the argument in favour of inexpensive access for the sake
of education. This is particularly true when one considers the fact that in the West the
material gain primarily goes to disseminators, usually corporations, and to states in terms
of increased employment and tax revenues. With such unsympathetic beneficiaries it is
no wonder that there is an emerging trend to argue that there is in fact a legal obligation
under international human rights law upon developed states, business entities and
individuals14 to provide the tools for education to developing states such as inexpensive
or free access to creative works. While, in the abstract, this may have some appeal the
practical reality is that creating such a legal obligation risks access for the future by
killing the tree from which the fruit has fallen.
Three events placed intellectual property on the human rights agenda. First, the
perception of a connection between the realization of human rights goals regarding health
and intellectual property law was gaining attention especially due to the AIDS epidemic;
second, the assertion of the rights of indigenous people; and third the expiration of the
transitional arrangements set forth in the TRIPS agreement.15 One of the results of the
placement of intellectual property on the human rights agenda was the United Nations'
14 DUTIES SANS FRONTIERES: HUMAN RIGHTS AND GLOBAL SOCIAL
JUSTICE, THE INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY
(hereinafter "Duties"), 3 (2003); Mary Robinson, Shaping Globalization: The Role of
Human Rights, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1 (2003) (hereinafter "Robinson.")
15 Laurence Heifer, Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Conflict or Coexistence, 5
MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 47, 51-52 (2003)(hereinafter "Conflict or Coexistence. ")
The transitional arrangements in TRIPS (Articles 65-67) allowed various delays in
implementing TRIPS to developing states from four to ten years from the date of
application in order to accommodate their developing status.
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Economic and Social Council's ("ECOSOC") Resolution 2000/7 which states that there
is a priority of human rights over economic policy. There are several problems with
Resolution 2000/7 and subsequent commentary on this subject addressed in this paper;
first, the use of terms such as "fundamental human rights" in connection with certain
social human rights such as the right to an education16 has been suggested by some as
creating a legally binding obligation on all to provide these "fundamental" rights.
Second, subsequent commentary regarding Resolution 2000/7 asserts that the priority of
human rights over economic policies articulated therein implies that copyright is not a
human right. Finally, the priority stated in Resolution 2000/7 of human rights over
economic policies is not practical from a human rights perspective because the realization
of human rights is dependant upon domestic economic policies. While Resolution
2000/7 and access advocates certainly have laudable goals, the means to achieve these
goals are problematic in that they risk doing more harm than good.
A. Background Regarding in the Adoption ofResolution 2000/7.
In 1999, around the time that the transitional arrangements provided for in Article
65 of TRIPS started to expire,17 ECOSOC, the United Nations agency responsible for the
oversight of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR"), the International
16 Healthcare and food are also claimed to be fundamental human rights. Duties, supra
note 14 at 28-29.
17 The language in Article 65 of TRIPS provides: 1. Subject to theprovisions of
paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, no Member shall be obliged to apply the provisions ofthis
Agreement before the expiry ofa general period ofoneyearfollowing the date ofentry
into force ofthe WTO Agreement. 2. A developing country Member is entitled to delay
for a furtherperiod offouryears the date ofapplication, as defined in paragraph 1, of
the provisions of this Agreement other than Articles 3, 4 and 5.
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Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR") and the International
Convention on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"), was being petitioned by certain
non-governmental organizations ("NGO's") regarding the impact of globalization on
human rights. In response to the NGO's and the Commission on Human Rights' (the
"Commission") requests, the ECOSOC Sub-Commission undertook a study on the issue
of globalization and its impact on human rights.18 In August of 1999 the ECOSOC Sub-
Commission adopted a resolution that recommended Mr. J. Oloka Onyango,19 and Ms.
20
Deepika Udagama be appointed Special Rapporteurs to undertake a study on the issue
of globalization and its impact on the full enjoyment of all human rights. The
• 91 99
appointment was approved and a report issued on 15 June 2000. The report discussed
the changing environment in international human rights and trade, stressing that states are
no longer the only players in this field; powerful multinational enterprises are involved as
23well. Additionally, the report was particularly harsh in its criticism of the World Trade
Organization ("WTO") accusing the WTO of a lack of human rights concerns with
respect to trade practices by developed states. There was no reference to any human
rights and trade problems with respect to developing states.24 The report concluded with
18 E/CN.4/RES/1999/59 (28 April 1999.)
19 Who submitted a working paper on globalization in the context of increased incidents
of racism, racial discrimination and xenophobia, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/8.
20 •Who co-wrote a working paper with Mr. Oloka Onyango on human rights as the
primary objective of international trade, investment, finance policy and practice,
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/11.
21 E/CN.4/RES/2000/2.
22 J. Oloka Onyango and Deepika Udagama, The Realization ofEconomic, Social and
CulturalRights: Globalization and its Impact on the Full Enjoyment ofHuman Rights,
Final Report of the U.N. Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection ofHuman
Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/13 (2003) (hereinafter "E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/13").
23 Id. at THfl2 and 14.
24 Id. at HI 7.
24
the assertion of the primacy of human rights law over other regimes of international law
as a basic fundamental principle.25
Subsequent to the report on globalization and its impact on the full enjoyment of
all human rights, in late July, 2000 the Lutheran World Fund submitted a report by Peter
Prove in the form of a joint statement with two other NGO's including Habitat
International Coalition and the International NGO Committee on Human Rights. This
report urged action on TRIPS by reasserting the primacy of human rights obligations over
96
commercial and profit driven motives in agreements such as TRIPS. The joint
statement further argued for the primacy of human rights over all other regimes of
97
international law. It stated that TRIPS is, ironically, market intervention and regulation
rather than trade liberalization.28 Additionally, it noted Professor Peter Drahos'
observation that information has become the prime resource in economic modern life
and, because of the nature of intellectual property regimes providing exclusive rights over
information, there is going to be a conflict with other rights.29 While the joint statement
acknowledged copyright as a human right under the ICESCR it claimed, again supported
by Professor Drahos, that the emphasis in the ICESCR is on the "diffusion of
knowledge."30 The human rights conflicts pointed out in the Lutheran World Fund
25 E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/13 at1J63.
26 David Weissbrodt and Kell Schoff, Human Rights Approach To Intellectual Property
Protection: The Genesis AndApplication OfSub-Commission Resolution 2000/7, 5
MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 1, 26 (2003) (hereinafter "Weissbrodt.")
27 Globalization and Human Rights, Joint oral Statement by Lutheran World Federation,
Habitat International Coalition and International Commission of Jurists to the Sub-
Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 8 August 2000
(hereinafter "Lutheran World") UN DOC. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/NGO/14 at 1(2.
28 Lutheran World, supra note 27 at 1]6.
29 Id. at H7.
30 Id. at H8.
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Report included, among other things, impeding transfer of technology to developing
states and the right to scientific progress benefits and development.31
The joint statement concluded that, although intellectual property rights could be
used to advance human rights they are currently in the province of a small exclusive
32
group. Thus, a binding legal framework of human rights obligations in the form of a
code of conduct for transnational corporations was suggested.33
Prove found a friend on the ECOSOC Sub-Committee in Asbjorn Eide from
Norway. Eide proposed Resolution 2000/7 criticizing intellectual property regimes. No
one had anticipated this resolution so there was little opposition. Indeed, the WTO and
the World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") were surprised by and did not
agree with Resolution 2000/7.34 This apparent lack of an open debate regarding the
points set forth in Resolution 2000/7 helped to push through Eide's proposal.35 While,
subsequent to the announcement ofResolution 2000/7, ECOSOC sought input from
various sources regarding the issue of intellectual property and other human rights
perhaps, in the interest of transparency, it would have been advisable to take such action
prior to adopting the resolution.
B. The Use of Terms Like "Fundamental Human Rights" in Relation to
Education Improperly Suggests a Binding Legal Obligation.
Resolution 2000/7 uses the term "fundamental" regarding all human rights.
Specifically, it states:
31 Id. at 119.
32 Id. at If 10.
33 Id. at till 1-12.
34
WEISSBRODT, supra note 26 at 30.
35 Id. at 26-27 (citing to U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/NGO/14 (2000).)
26
2. Declares, however, that since the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement does not
adequately reflect thefundamental nature and indivisibility ofall human rights,
including the right ofeveiyone to enjoy the benefits ofscientific progress and its
applications,..., there are apparent conflicts between the intellectualproperty rights
regime embodied in the TRIPS Agreement, on the one hand, and international human
rights law, on the other;36 (Emphasis added)
The use of the term "fundamental" has caused some confusion. The term "fundamental
human rights" has generally been limited to jus cognes37 and thus only applicable to
prohibitions of an act of genocide, torture slavery and discrimination.38 The universal
recognition of the legal responsibility for such actions has engendered general acceptance
for the fundamental nature of these human rights. Conversely, "incoherent" human rights,
the so-called rights to the necessities of life such as an education, are considered by many
to be aspirational. This is due, in part, to the recognition that some developing states
were not in an economic position to immediately implement them and to require
developed states to pay for it amounted to a redistribution of privately held resources.39
Despite this dichotomy, some have interpreted the use of the term "fundamental" in
Resolution 2000/7 as support for the proposition that there is a legally binding obligation
to provide certain economic and social human rights, such as education.40
36 Resolution 2000/7, supra note 7. (Emphasis added.)
Peremptory norms of international law accepted by the international community and
are nonderogable. IAN BROWNLIE, THE PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 514-17 (4th ed 1990).
38 MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 97 (4th ed 1997); Barcelona
Traction (Belgium v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 32 (5 Feb. 1970).
39 rrn
Anthony D'Amato, The Concept ofHuman Rights in International Law, 82 COLUM.
L. REV. 1110, 1128-29(1982).
40
Robinson, supra note 14 at 15, 19; Duties, supra note 14 at 35-41. See The
Realization ofEconomic, Social and Cultural Rights: The Realization of the Right to
Education Including Education in Human Rights: The Content of the Right to Education,
Working Paper Presented by Mr. Mustapha Mehedi, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/10 (8 July 1999)
27
Resolution 2000/7 is not the first attempt we see to place certain aspirational
rights within the parameters of legally binding obligations. For example, in the
educational field the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization's
("UNESCO") World Declaration on Education For All of March 1990 described
education as a fundamental human right:
Preamble
Recalling that education is a fundamental rightfor allpeople, women and men, of
all ages, throughout our world; 41
In further perpetuating the notion of a legally binding nature of all human rights
reflected in Resolution 2000/7 the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
("CESCR") adopted a 17-paragraph statement on intellectual property and human
• 4°
rights. " This statement asserted:
Human rights are fundamental, inalienable and universal entitlements belonging
to individuals, and in some situations groups of individuals and communities....4'
Additionally, on 16 August 2001, the ECOSOC Sub-Commission issued resolution
2001/21 whereby protection of human rights in conformity with the United Nations
Charter was declared to be the first responsibility of governments. In addressing the
(hereinafter "E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/10 ") at fflj 1 and 39 describing the right to an education
as a fundamental right linked to an obligation.
41 World Declaration on Education For All, available at
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/skills/recomm/publ/036.htm.
42 Substantive Issues Arising In The Implementation OfThe International Covevant On
Economic, SocialAnd Cultural Rights, Follow-Up To The Day OfGeneral Discussion
On Article 15.1(C), Monday, 26 November 2001, Human Rights And Intellectual
Property, Statement By The Committee On Economic Social And Cultural Rights,
E/C.12/2001/15, 2 (14 December 2001) (hereinafter "Statement 26 Nov., 2001.)
43 Id. at 3.
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alleged conflict between intellectual property economic rights and other human rights the
right to education was stated to be a legally binding obligation:
[T]he right to protection ofthe moral and material interests resulting from any
scientific, literary or artisticproduction ofwhich one is the author is a human
right, subject to limitations in thepublic interest. The need to clarify TRIPS, in
particular articles 7 and 8 regarding objectives to ensure they do not contradict
binding human rights obligations. Actual orpotential conflicts exist where there
could be a conflict with the realization ofeconomic, social and cultural rights
and, in particular, the right to ...education, and in relation to transfers of
technology to developing countries44
In these three examples we see an attempt assert a general proposition that human
4
rights, such as the right to an education, are a legally binding obligation. According to
these assertions any copyright regime that makes it more difficult for a state to comply
with a human right to education is inconsistent with legally binding obligations of the
state party.4" This attempt at articulating as legally binding obligations certain social and
economic human rights has further induced some to identify education as a "fundamental
human right"46 requiring additional aid from the developed states to improve the
standards of "fundamental human rights" in the developing states.47 For example, Mary
Robinson, the former High Commissioner for Human Rights has interpreted Resolution
2000/7 as a definitive statement that education has been declared a "fundamental human
44 Resolution 2000/7, supra note 7; also see Intellectual Property and Human Rights,
Sub- Commission On Human Rights. E/CN.4/Sub.2.Res/2001.21 (August 16,
2001)(hereinafter "Resolution 2001/21").
45 Statement 26 Nov., 2001, supra note 42 at 5; Weissbrodt, supra note 26 at 36-37.
46
Robinson, supra note 14 at 15.
47
Robinson, supra note 14 at 19; Weissbrodt, supra note 26 at 5. However, this
argument that developed states have a legal obligation to fulfill fundamental human rights
goals such as education does pre-date Resolution 2000/7. See E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/10,
supra note 40 at ^[78.
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right" requiring additional aid from developed states to improve the standards for
education in the developing states.49 Additionally, the Geneva based International
Council on Human Rights Policy prepared a report entitled Duties sans Frontieres -
human rights and global socialjustice ('Duties") which attempts to define global
responsibilities for human rights. Duties addressed the issue ofwho is responsible for
ensuring the fulfillment of human rights, such as education, in a state where the
government is unable, unwilling or incompetent. It acknowledges that national
governments are primarily responsible for ensuring that human rights are met.50
However, Duties also asserts that richer states have an obligation under international
human rights law to assist poorer states through international co-operation and, within
their means, to achieve protection ofwhat has been recently termed as fundamental
human rights including education.51 Duties goes on to argue for a legally binding
obligation upon developed states, corporations and individuals to provide more economic
and technical assistance even in situations where the primary state responsible has failed
or even refused to meet its obligations to provide for its own people.52
The use of terms such as "fundamental," "entitled" and "obligated" suggests a
legal requirement and, indeed, it is asserted that there is a legal requirement based upon
customary international law evidenced by the United Nations Charter, the UDHR, the
ICESCR, the ICCPR, The Convention on the Rights of the Child, United Nations
resolutions, the Millennium Declaration, the Monterrey Consensus and the Barcelona
AO
Robinson, supra note 14 at 15.
49 Id. at 19,
50 Id. at 20-21; Duties, supra note 14 at 35-41.
51
Duties, supra note 14 at 35-41.
52 Id.
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Traction case.53 The problem here, as discussed below, is that much of the evidence
relied upon to make the argument of a legal obligation is either not binding in nature or
not binding on major developed states due to a lack of ratification. As for customary law,
while there may be evidence of custom through these documents Duties admits that there
is no consensus regarding the alleged legal obligation, thus negating the theory of
customary law.54
The creation of a legally binding obligation to fulfill economic and social human
rights goals, such as education, domestically (internal realization) or outside of ones'
borders (external realization) is, admittedly, problematic in implementation. Even
assuming, arguendo, that states, corporations and individuals have an obligation or duty
to act and assist to realize human rights in the field of education, how must they act? If
the government of the people who need help is unable or unwilling to achieve human
rights goals due to internal policies do other states have an obligation to remove such
obstructions? This suggests possible aggression or, at least, conditionalities akin to the
International Monetary Fund's ("IMF") controversial conditions for loans.55 If, as Duties
suggests, democracies have less difficulty in achieving human rights goals, are non-
democracies an obstacle that assisting states are obligated to remove?56 And if
intervention is to be limited to acts approved by the United Nations, how is one to obtain
Duties, supra note 14 at 9, 23, 26, 27, 29, 30 and 31. For an earlier report reaching
the same conclusion see Vladimir Kartashkin, Review ofFurther Developments in Fields
With Which the Sub-Commission Has orMay be Concerned, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/29 (15
June 1999).
54
Duties, supra note 14 at 42 and 63.
55
Duties, supra note 14 at 22, 25 and 45.
56 Even those who advocate a fundamental nature of all human rights recognize this
point. See Duties, supra note 14 at 12-13.
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consensus? The United Nations has been, to say the least, notoriously unable to act
decidedly with consensus regarding such intervention.57
Ultimately, the position taken that human rights are "fundamental" fails to build a
legal obligation for developed states to provide developing states with the tools for giving
their people an education. Further, the suggestion of a legal obligation to provide
economic and social human rights is neither practical nor desirable due to the corollary
obligation to remove obstacles in the way of achieving such goals. It certainly will not
convince developed states that they have a legal obligation to provide more assistance to
developing states. This, as with IMF conditionalities, would also not be acceptable to
most developing states due to the interference with essentially domestic concerns such as
economic policy. What it does do is provide some legal arguments as well as moral
arguments that may be helpful in exerting political pressure on developed states to refrain
from insisting that developing states implement laws which force a change in their
internal domestic economic policies that may conflict with their ability to realize other
human rights, such as education. It may also induce developed states to provide more aid
to assist in achieving economic and social human rights goals. Still, despite these
attempts to create legally binding obligations, the fact remains that the right to education
is historically and legally aspirational.
57 For example, the United Nations failure to take action to stop genocide in Rwanda.
See Alicia L. Bannon, The Responsibility To Protect: The U.N. World Summit and the
Question ofUnilateralism, 115 YALE L.J. 1157 (2006); Drury Stevenson, Symposium:
Women and War Book Reviews- Madam Secretaiy, 12 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L
467, fn 55 (2006).
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C. The Attempt to Prioritize Human Rights Over Economic Rights
Improperly Creates the Appearance that Authors' Rights Are Not
Human Rights.
A second problem with an attempt to prioritize is that some have interpreted
Resolution 2000/7 as actually segregating out authors' rights from the umbrella of human
rights. This is problematic because it ignores agreed upon human rights and, in the
instant case with copyright, disregards a critical economic component necessary for
creation and, hence, access. The concern that Resolution 2000/7 attempted to separate
out intellectual property economic rights from human rights does not rest on mere
inferences from responses to Resolution 2000/7; the WTO response to Resolution 2000/7
pointedly expresses this concern when it argued that Art. 15.11 of the ICESCR makes the
right to "protection of the moral and materi al interests resulting from any scientific,
literary or artistic production ofwhich he is the author" a human right.58 Additionally,
the Max Planck Institute's ("MPI") response indicated that Resolution 2000/7 gave the
impression that intellectual property rights are not human rights.59
In furthering this appearance of dissociating authors' rights from human rights,
the terminology of commentators, and some United Nations organizations, evidences a
segregationist treatment. For example, Dr. Chapman's paper on Resolution 2000/7 treats
intellectual property rights as outside of the realm of human rights by placing an
58
Implementation Of The International Covenant On Economic, Social And Cultural
Rights: Protection Of Intellectual Property Under The Trips Agreement (Background
Paper Submitted By The Secretariat Of The World Trade Organization), E/C.12/2000/18
(29 Nov. 2000), available at
www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/385c2add1632f4a8c 12565a9004dc311/2928641978
(hereinafter WTO Paper) at 2.
59 Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights,
Report of the Secretary-General, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/12 (14 June, 2001) (hereinafter SG
Report) at 17.
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emphasis on access and using terms like a "human rights" approach to intellectual
property.60 This emphasis and terminology makes access appear like a human right but
not moral and material interests.61
Additionally, on 27 June 2001 the High Commissioner on the Commission on
Human Rights issued a report attempting to distinguish intellectual property rights and
place them outside the umbrella ofprotection under the UDHR.62 Specifically, the report
stated that article 15 of ICESCR and article 27 of the UDHR could be said to require
states to design intellectual property systems that strike a balance between promoting the
interest the public has in accessing knowledge as easily as possible and protecting the
interests of authors and inventors. But where to strike the balance? According to the
High Commissioner, it should be struck with the primary objective of promoting and
protecting human rights,63 thus implying that the moral and material interests of creators
are not human rights. It does so by segregating out the economic rights of intellectual
property from human rights by noting the differing characteristics of intell ectual property
rights and human rights. Specifically, the High Commissioner opined that intellectual
property rights are a privilege granted by the state. They can be licensed, revoked and
expire. Human rights are inalienable and universal. They are not granted by the state,
60 See generally, Dr. Audrey R. Chapman (American Association For The Advancement
Of Science), Implementation OfThe International Covenant On Economic, Social And
Cultural Rights, E/C/. 12/2000/12, 3 Oct. 2000 (Discussion Paper) (hereinafter
"Chapman.")
61 Id. at 4.
62
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Impact of the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights on Human Rights, Report of the High
Commissioner- Commission on Human Rights, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13 ( 27 June, 2001)
(hereinafter "HC Report") 3; Weissbrodt, supra note 26 at 38.
/r
HC Report, supra note 62 at 5 (citing to the Vienna Declaration and Programme of
Action of the World Conference on Human Rights A/CONF. 157/23, art. 1, which states
that "human rights are the first responsibility ofGovernments.)
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they are recognized.64 Further, the High Commissioner opined that there might be a
means of operationalizing TRIPS and Article 15 of the ICESCR so long as the grant and
exercise of those economic rights promotes and protects human rights.'" Again, here is a
suggestion that economic rights are not human rights.
On 2 August 2001 a report to the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
Commission discussed tensions between intellectual property and human rights.66 It does
acknowledge that the UDHR and ICESCR makes "broad mention" of intellectual
property rights but goes on to say their status is in debate with respect of other rights
mentioned in these documents.67
Finally, the 26 November 2001 statement by ECOSOC recognized the incentive
aspect of intellectual property rights although it segregates this incentive motive from the
field of human rights:
Human rights are fundamental, inalienable and universal entitlements belonging
to individuals, and in some situations groups ofindividuals and
communities ....Intellectualproperty rights ...are instrumental... they are a means
by which States seek to provide incentives for inventiveness and creativityfrom
which society benefits....68
64 HC Report, supra note 62 at 6.
65 Id.
66
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Globalization and Its Impact on the Full
Enjoyment of Human Rights, Progress Report Submitted by J. Oloka-Onyango and
Deepika Udagama, in Accordance With Sub-Commission Resolution 1999/8 and
Commission on Human Rights Decision 2000/102, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/10 (2 Aug.
2001)(hereinafter Report of 2 Aug. 2001) at^|19.
67
Report of 2 Aug. 2001, supra note 66 at ^fl 9.
68 Statement 26 Nov. 2001, supra note 42 at 3.
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Thus, as with the High Commissioner's report. ECOSOC attempts to segregate moral and
material interests of creators inherent in intellectual property laws out of the human rights
arena.
D. In Suggesting an Absolute Prioritization Approach Regarding Human
Rights Over Economic Policy Rather Than a Balanced Approach
Resolution 2000/7 Lacks the Flexibility Necessary to Address Various
Domestic Economic Conditions.
The final problem with Resolution 2000/7 addressed in this paper is the
prioritization it suggests regarding human rights over economic policies. Resolution
2000/7 states, in pertinent part:
Noting further that actual orpotential conflicts exist between the implementation
ofthe TRIPSAgreement and the realization ofeconomic, social and cultural
rights in relation to, inter alia, impediments to the transfer of technology to
developing countries,...
1. Affirms that the right to protection ofthe moral and material interests resulting
from any scientific, literacy or artisticproduction ofwhich one is the author is, in
accordance with article 2 7, paragraph 2, ofthe Universal Declaration ofHuman
Rights and article 15, paragraph 11, ofthe International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, a human right, subject to limitations in thepublic
interest;
3. Reminds all Governments oftheprimacy ofhuman rights obligations over
economic policies. ,..69
Certainly, a reasonable interpretation of these provisions could be that a balanced
approach to intellectual property takes into consideration the social benefits of access and
Moral and material interests, rather than emphasizing a purely profit motive. As a
general proposition this may be a reasonable statement. The problem, however, arises in
the implication in Section 3 that human rights can somehow be separated from economic
69 Resolution 2000/7, supra note 7.
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policies. As will be discussed in more detail below, there is interconnectedness
between human rights and economic policies in general and there certainly is a link
between intellectual property and economic policies.
Because of the interconnectedness of human rights and economic policies, it is a
mistake to suggest an absolute priority of some non-fundamental rights, such as
education, over other non-fundamental human rights, such as copyright.71 For example,
to assert that people have a fundamental human right to an education and, accordingly,
inexpensive or free access to educational materials is required ignores the access
enhancement component of the economic policy to provide an incentive to create.
Authors' rights, in particular the right to material interests resulting from creations,
generates an income so authors may spend more time in their endeavors and an incentive
to create. As for other rights holders, such as disseminators, the right to a profit provides
research and development funding, employment, and an increased tax basis to provide for
other social needs. This, in turn provides more access through an increased number of
scientific, literary and artistic creations. Finally, as we shall see below, material interests
provide a significant portion of some states Gross National Product ("GNP") thus
providing an income for consumers in states to purchase goods from other states enabling
the exporting states to invest in their own needs.
The incentive aspect of authors' moral and material interest in copyright has been
recognized in domestic laws in the West as a basis for the promotion of science and the
useful arts as articulated in the United States Constitution and Continental Europe's
70 For example, see Statement 26 Nov. 2001, supra note 42 at 3; HC Report, supra note
62 at 6; Chapman, supra note 60 at 4.
71
Duties, supra note 14 at 12.
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72moral rights. Additionally, it has long been recognized in the international community
that an author has a right to make a living by exploiting his creation. 0 However, it is true
that recent trends constraining the diffusion of knowledge, for example by extending term
limits for protection, and underscores the need for an approach that maintains a balance
between access and moral and material interests. According to the Center for
International Environmental Law ("CIEL"), the balance between private and public
interest is shifting to private as evidenced by the increase in duration and scope of
intellectual property protection.74 Certainly, there needs to be an effective counterweight
to these economic interests.75 But the nature of the problem is not a recent
commercialization changing the nature of intellectual property incentives from research
and investment to an incentive of a protectionistic nature as some have suggested.76
Rather, it is the emphasis on commercial gain due to economic dependence as reflected in
GNP that has created the problem. From the earliest days of laws relating to copyright
issues it was commercialism and self-interest not altruism that reigned supreme. The
altruistic aspiration of access for education was nothing more than a "blanket of
respectability to cover naked commercialism."77 While, at times, access for education
seemed to gain public and political support, commercial interests expressed in terms of
authors' rights has always been a powerful force. The only difference today is that new
77
SG Report, supra note 59 at 17-18 (Max Plancket Institute response to Resolution
2000/7.).
73 SG Report, supra note 59 at 17-18; BERNE, supra note 11.
74 SG Report, supra note 59 at 10.
75
Chapman, supra note 60 at 3.
76 Id. at 17.
77 JOHN FEATHER, PUBLISHING, PIRACY AND POLITICS (AN HISTORICAL
STUDY OF COPYRIGHT IN BRITAIN) 12 (1994).
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technologies have increased the economic dependence of some states on intellectual
property to generate revenues thus inducing more enactments of protectionist measures.
Knowledge, creative works, and scientific discoveries are a central asset in an
information-based economy. For example, some estimates ofmore than 25% of the
exports of the United States rely on intellectual property.78 Further, it is true that some
governments use intellectual property laws as a means to improve a state's competitive
economic advantage.79 In this regard, states that are heavily dependent on exporting
intellectual property may use agreements such as TRIPS as a tool to extract concessions
from developing states thus making it more difficult for developing states to set
intellectual property standards to fit domestic economic conditions and protect other
OA
human rights. But most of the commentaries in response to Resolution 2000/7 do not
recognize the need to balance the human right goal of education with the human right to
moral and material interests in a creation to fit the domestic economic conditions of states
with economies that are heavily dependant on intellectual property.81 Such an omission
ignores the economic realities of the situation and is not practical because a rational state
will not allow a major component of its GNP to be undermined.
Human rights, which include economic rights and, thus economic policies that
enhance those rights, should not be prioritized in an absolute fashion due to the
interconnectedness of these rights.82 This is particularly true with respect to social and
economic rights which, of necessity, require flexibility to meet the various conditions of
70
Chapman, supra note 60 at 2.
79 Id. at 5.
80 Id. at 6.
81 See generally, Chapman, supra note 60; SG Report, supra note 59; HC Report, supra
note 62; Report of 2 Aug. 2001, supra note 66.
82 For the "interdependence" aspect of human rights see Duties, supra note 14 at 12.
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each state. With regard to copyright, some states may require stronger authors' rights due
to a philosophical belief or domestic economic dependence. Other states may require
weaker authors' rights due to an underdeveloped dissemination infra-structure and a need
to stimulate access.83 Ultimately, flexibility and balance are needed, not unrealistic
priorities.
SUMMARY
Resolution 2000/7 is yet another example of the age old debate regarding the
conflict between moral and material interests of creators and access. There is, however,
an important difference in that Resolution 2000/7 addresses this conflict on an
international as well as a domestic level. As the history of domestic copyright
establishes, access to creative works is critical for many reasons including education. It
is also apparent that education is important for the eradication ofpoverty and other vital
human rights goals. Thus, the resolution of the conflict between moral and material
interests of creators and access will have a significant impact on the realization of other
human rights, such as education. However, the failure ofResolution 2000/7 to recognize
the interconnectedness between human rights and economic policies is its practical
defeat. The history of human rights in general and copyright in particular shows a
remarkable willingness to ensure flexibility to achieve success; this flexibility is lacking
in any attempt to create leally binding international obligations in the social/economic
arena, exclude certain human rights or prioritize human rights over economic policies in
an absolute fashion.
83
Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy, Report of the
Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, 106-08 (2002) (hereinafter "OPR.")
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In order to achieve the goal of access for education a balanced approach is
required. This balance must take into consideration the interconnectedness of economic
policies and human rights. One size here does not fit all for an economic policy proper
for a developed state often will not be proper for the needs of a developing state. That
said, developed states have their own needs and desires to achieve internal human rights
goals through domestic economic policy. But to minimize the negative effects of
domestic economic policies balance not prioritization in an absolute fashion is required.
Indeed, this balance is the only practical solution to the abstract pronouncements of
aspirational human rights given the lack of recognition of a universally binding legal
obligation and the inclusion of moral and material rights of creators as a human right.
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CHAPTER 2
THE ASPIRATIONAL NATURE OF NON-FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS
Law is the wisdom ofthe old,
The impotent grandfathersfeebly scold;
The grandchildren put out a treble tongue,
Law is the sense of the young.
Law, says the priest with a priestly look,
Expounding to an unpriestlypeople,
Law is the words in mypriestly book,
Law is mypulpit and my steeple.
Law, says thejudge as he looks down his nose,
Speaking clearly and most severely,
Law is as I've toldyou before,
Law is as you know I suppose,
Law is but let me explain it once more,
Law is The Law.84
The law of human rights is the subject of much debate. Certainly, in the field of
certain social and economic rights, such as the right to an education, there is the desire to
argue for a legally binding obligation due to the critical nature of such a right. There is a
moral high ground appeal to such an argument in the abstract. But, to argue that the
realization of certain human rights, such as the right to an education, is a binding, legal
obligation is counter-productive to the goal of education through enhanced access. First,
84 W. H. AUDEN, COLLECTED POEMS 208 (1976 Edward Mendelson ed.) (Law
Like Love.)
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such a position lacks historical evidence to substantiate the claim. Second, it lacks
consensus to validate the claim. Finally, it attempts to allow interference in domestic
economic policy; a sovereignty issue of critical importance to many states. It is therefore
necessary to define, for the time being, the human right to an education as aspirational in
order to focus on workable solutions.
The drafting history of the UDHR leaves little doubt to the assertion that the
human right to education was intended to be aspirational. First, as a legal matter the
document utilized for these human rights, a declaration, is not legally binding. Further,
as a practical matter, a non-binding recognition of these human rights was necessary due
to political, economic, social and philosophical differences. The intent seemed to be to
get states to recognize the goals set forth in the UDHR in their domestic legislation.
Some argue that the UDHR may not have initially been intended to be binding but that it
has evolved into customary international law. However, the lack of consistency and
generality of practice with respect to many provisions in the UDHR negates any legal
obligation based on customary international law.
Further, while there are binding conventions such as the ICESCR these
conventions are not customary international law and are only binding on states parties to
such conventions. Accordingly, there is no universally binding obligation to provide
education under human rights law. Accordingly, the need for access to promote
education does not create a legally binding obligation on states to adjust their domestic
economic policy regarding copyright to meet internal or external access needs.
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A. The UDHR is Not, as a Whole, Legally Binding Nor Has it Become
Legally Binding Under the Doctrine of Customary International Law.
The United Nations Charter mentions but does not define human rights due to
time constraints and a concern about consensus.85 Accordingly, after the United Nations
Charter was approved a sub-committee was appointed by the Economic and Social
Council ("ECOSOC") in 1945-1947 to address the issue of what were these "human
rights" specified in the United Nations Charter. The result of the sub-committee's work
was loosely articulated in the UDHR from proposals that came from many states.86
John Humphrey, an international lawyer from Canada, prepared the first draft of
the UDHR.87 Humphrey gathered materials from all over the world in preparing what
would be the first working draft.88 The drafting group received the Humphrey draft in
OQ
June of 1947. Rene Cassin, the delegate from France, was assigned the task of revising
the Humphrey draft in June, 1947.90 A working group then took the Cassin draft and
made revisions producing what has been termed the Geneva Draft in December, 1947.91
The Geneva draft received comments and the Human Rights Commission drafting
85 See infra 73-74.
86 Robinson, supra note 14.
87 MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW 43, 48 (2001); HENRY J.
STEINER AND PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CONTEXT: LAW POLITICS MORALS 138 (2nd ed. 2000) (hereinafter "STEINER");
JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
2, 5-6 (1999).
88
GLENDON, supra note 87 at 49-50.
89
GLENDON, supra note 87 at 54, 58; MORSINK, supra note 87 at 5.
90
GLENDON, supra note 87 at 61; MORSINK, supra note 87 at 8-9.
91
GLENDON, supra note 87 at 79-94; MORSINK, supra note 87 at 9-10.
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committee met again in early May, 1948 to revise the Geneva draft.92 The entire
Q->
committee met to further revise the Geneva draft in June of 1948.
Through out the drafting process there were admonitions to avoid creating a
document that reflected an emphasis on a particular culture, religion, socio-economic
system, political or philosophical beliefs.94 To avoid claims of bias and build consensus
the drafters created a document that was envisioned as common standards not rigid
uniform practices.95 Still, some believe the provisions contained in the UDRH are legally
binding.96 Other comments indicate a belief that the UDHR is merely morally binding.97
For example, the United States consistently objected to any attempt to create a binding
document.98 Its position was that the UDHR should be a declaration of goals that states
were asked to strive for. This statement reflected the United States' delegate's concern
that giving legally binding effect to the aspirations set forth in the UDHR would meet
with failure in any attempt to get such document ratified in the United States Senate.99
The UDHR passed 10 December 1948 with 48 in favour and 8 abstentions. There
were no negative votes. Honduras and Yemen were absent.100 The provision of the
UDHR that relates to education is:
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GLENDON, supra note 87 at 107; MORSfNK, supra note 87 at 10-11.
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GLENDON, supra note 87 at 111-119; STE1NER, supra note 87 at 139; MORSINK,
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GLENDON, supra note 87 at 38-43, 68-70, 73-78, 89-92, 140-42, 161, 222-23;
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ARTICLE 26
B. Eveiyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the
elementary andfundamental stages. Elementary education shall be
compulsory. Technical andprofessional educa tion shall be made generally
available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis
ofmerit.
In Article 26(1) education is understood to be in a broad sense, the right to a free,
fundamental education.101 This fundamental education curriculum was probably to be
left to the states to determine.102 Elementary education is to be compulsory but there is
• 103
no clear distinction between fundamental education and elementary education. Most
likely elementary education includes such things as reading, writing, arithmetic and other
basic needs to function in a society.104
Article 26(2) deals with the content of education. Among other things, it requires
that the education:
[SJhallpromote understanding, tolerance andfriendship among all nations,
racial or religious groups, and shallfurther the activities ofthe UnitedNations
for the maintenance ofpeace.
This seems to require, at a minimum, an education that does not contradict the UDHR
and other international covenants dealing with human rights.105 Accordingly, one could
argue that states providing aid for education should ensure that the aid is not being used
in a system that runs afoul of these requirements. This may require a curriculum review
and, perhaps, conditionalities being placed on such financial aid. Finally, Article 26 is
101 THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY
(Ed. by Asbjorn Eide, Pentti Arajarvi, Gudmundur Alfredsson, Goran Melander, Lars
Adam Rehof and Allan Rosas, with collaboration of Theresa Swinehart 408 (1992))
(hereinafter "COMMENTARY").
102 COMMENTARY (Pentti Arajarvi), supra note 101 at 408.
103 Id. at 408-09.
104
COMMENTARY, supra note 101 at 409.
105 Id. at 409.
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phrased as a right, reflecting the concerns of some not to dampen initiative while other
articles are phrased as entitlements reflecting a greater need for state involvement.106
There have been attempts to assert that the UDHR is legally binding under
international law through various mechanisms. Arguments based upon treaty law and
customary international law are the most prominent. Several parts of the UDHR are
regarded by some commentators to have become customary international law but the
extent of this is in dispute.107 Declarations, such as the UDHR, do not have the force of a
treaty or convention but some core provisions of the UDHR may be considered
customary and, thus, potentially binding.108 In order to analyze the binding or non-
binding nature of the UDHR it is necessary to discuss some basic international law
concepts.
B. The UDHR is Not Legally Binding as it is Not a Treaty or a Covenant.
International law is currently found in treaties, custom and general principles of
law.109 First, the UDHR is not a treaty. A treaty is:
an international agreement concluded between States in written form and
governed by international law...
106
GLENDON, supra note 87 at 187. For example, Article 7 provides an entitlement to
equal protection of the law; Article 10 provides an entitlement to a full and fair public
hearing before an impartial tribunal whenever criminal charges are brought against an
individual. UDHR, supra note 3.
107
GLENDON, supra note 87 at 178; See generally, J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of
Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 449 (2000); See HUMAN RIGHTS
AND CIVIL PRACTIC 224 (Leigh-Ann Mulcahy ed. 2001).
108 YEARBOOK OF THE UNITED NATIONS, SPECIAL EDITION UNITED
NATIONS FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY 1945-1995, Dept. of Public Information, United
Nations, N.Y. (1995) 295. Customary provisions would include: Article 2 (to the extent
that it is a prohibition on racial discrimination; Article 4 (slavery prohibition); and Article
5 (torture prohibition).
109 Statute of the International Court of Justice, 26 June 1945, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055,
T.S. 993, 3 Bevans 1153; RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
§102(1) (hereinafter "RESTATEMENT") (regarding United States law.)
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and intended to be legally binding.110 A covenant, like a treaty, must be capable of legal
enforcement."1 The UDHR, as with all United Nations declarations, does not meet this
definition, as it was not intended to be legally binding.112 The term "declaration" has
officially been defined by the United Nations Secretariat as:
aformal and solemn instrument, suitablefor rare occasions when principles ofgreat
and lasting significance are being enunciated.113
Several commentators have utilized the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in an
attempt to interpret the UDHR. While this is useful, it must be remembered that the
Vienna Convention is limited to treaties. The Vienna Convention defines "treaty" as:
an international agreement concluded between states in written form and
governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two
or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation.114
United Nations declarations do not meet this definition of a treaty as they carry no
independent force of law although continued adherence to the declaration may give rise
to customary law.115
Article 2(2) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, however, states:
110 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 2(l)(a), 23 May 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331; RESTATEMENT §301(1).
111 MARIA GREEN, DRAFTING HISTORY OF THE ARTICLE 15(l)(c) OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL
RIGHTS, §18, E/C. 12/2000/15 (9 October 2000).
112
Georgeana K. Roussos, Protections Against HIV-Based Employment Discrimination
in the United States andAustralia, 13 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 609, fn 279
(1990); GLENDON, supra note 87 at 84, 161, 236; HERSCHAL LAUTERPACHT,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 425 (1950).
113
GLENDON, supra note 87 at 174 (citing to E/CN.4/L.610.)
114 Vienna Convention, supra note 110 at art. 2( 1 )(a).
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Roussos, supra note 112 at fn 279.
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the provisions ofparagraph 1 regarding the use of terms in the present
Convention are withoutprejudice to the use ofthose terms or to the meanings
which may be given to them in the internal law ofany State."6
Accordingly, a state may, by its domestic laws, recognize the term treaty to include
declarations117 and, indeed regarding the UDHR France, Australia and Canada have done
™ 118SO.
The United States has not ratified the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
so the proper treaty inteipretation for United States courts would be United States law.
The Restatement of the Law of Foreign Relations ("Restatement") is recognized in the
United States as persuasive authority on treaty interpretation.119 The Restatement
summarizes treaty law and, similar to the Vienna Convention, looks at good faith, object
and purpose.120 Additionally, the subsequent agreement of the parties regarding
inteipretation and the parties practice may be taken into account.121 This rule of
interpretation basically follows the Vienna Convention.122 However, under the
Restatement terms are to be interpreted by giving ordinary meaning to the terms used and
i yi
the travaux preparatories are considered. The Vienna Convention does not encourage
116 Vienna Convention supra note 110.
117
Roussos, supra note 112 at fn 279; GLENDON, supra note 87 at 177.
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Roussos, supra note 112 at fn 279.
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Auguste V. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 142 (3rd Cir. 2005).
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RESTATEMENT, supra note 109 at §325; Vienna Convention, supra note 110 at
Art. 31; Lori Fisler Damrosch, Interpreting U.S. Treaties in Light ofHuman Rights
Values, 46 N.Y.L.SCH.L.REV. 43, 45 (2002-2003).
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RESTATEMENT, supra note 109 at §325(2).
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RESTATEMENT, supra note 109 at comment to §325.
123 Id. (citing toAir France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243 (1984).)
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the use of travaux preparatories to shed light on the meaning of a treaty124 but the
International Court of Justice has conflicting authority on the subject.125 The United
• 176
States courts have used travaux preparatories for treaty inteipretation.
Finally, under the Restatement particular attention is given to the views of the
executive branch of government regarding treaty inteipretation.127 This is so as it helps
to establish the parties' intent and understanding at the time the treaty was negotiated.
Under a United States analysis the conclusions most likely would be similar to the
conclusions reached under the Vienna Convention; that is that the UDHR is not legally
binding.
C. The UDHR Provision Regarding the Right to an Education is Not Legally
Binding Under the Doctrine of Customary International Law.
More commonly, it is asserted that the UDHR has achieved the status of
1 7R
customary international law. Custom connotes a sense of a legal obligation; opinion
124 Vienna Convention, supra note 110 at Arts. 31 and 32; RESTATEMENT, supra note
109 at comment to §325; Ruth Okediji, Toward an International Fair Use Doctrine, 39
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 75, 121 (2000).
125
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Mar. 1950) and Reservations To The Convention On The Prevention And Punishment Of
The Crime OfGenocide, 1951 I.C.J. 15 (28 May 1951).
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juris. It is evidenced by numerous sources such as diplomatic correspondence, policy
statements, press releases, the opinions of official legal advisors, official manuals on
legal questions, comments by governments on drafts, recitals in treaties and other
international instruments, a pattern of treaties in the same form, practices of international
organs, judicial decisions and United Nations resolutions.130 Although no particular
duration of a practice is required to establish custom, a longer duration may help establish
consistency and generality of the practice, which is required.131 With respect to
consistency of the practice, substantial uniformity is required.132 As for generality, this
compliments consistency and looks to the conduct of a state such as acquiescence.133
However, a state may contract out of custom in the process of its formation as a persistent
i • 134
objector.
Declarations may develop into custom and may be evidence of custom.135 For
example, a memorandum of the Office of Legal Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat
states:
In view of the greater solemnity and significance ofa "declaration, " it may be
considered to impart, on behalfof the organ adopting it, a stronger expectation
that Members of the international community will abide by it. Consequently,
129
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insofar as the expectation is graduallyjustified by State practice, a declaration
may by custom become recognized as laying down rules binding upon States.'36
However, at least with respect to the United Kingdom and the United States many aspect
of the UDHR are not considered customary. While some human rights have arguably
reached the level of customary, consistency and generality of practice has limited them to
war crimes articulated in the Geneva Conventions,137 the prohibitions of torture,
1 TR
genocide, slavery, and the principle of non-discrimination. The right to an education
as well as the moral and material rights reflected in copyright laws have not risen to the
level of customary international law. Not only is there a dearth of authority to indicate
such customary international law, there is no general and consistent practice particularly
with respect to inexpensive or free access to copyrighted materials for educational
136
RESTATEMENT, supra note 109 at comment to §102, v.I, p.28 (citing
E/CN.4/L.610 - 34 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. No.8, p.15, U.N. DOC. E/3616/Rev.l (1962).)
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nullum crimen sine lege requires that the international tribunal should apply rules of
international humanitarian law which are beyond any doubtpart ofcustomary law. . .
Thepart ofconventional international humanitarian law which has beyond doubt become
part of international customaiy law is the law applicable in armed conflict as embodied
in: the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949for the Protection ofWar Victims; the
Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs ofWar on Land and the
Regulations annexed thereto of 18 October 1907; the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment ofthe Crime ofGenocide of9 December 1948; and the Charter ofthe
InternationalMilitaiy Tribunal of8 August 1945."
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purposes. Indeed, it was the lack of a consistent practice stemming from intellectual
property law in general that prompted Resolution 2000/7.139
Even assuming the right to an education, and thus access to creative works, has
risen to the level of customary international law the United States has persistently
objected to any binding effect of the UDHR undermining the argument that it is
customary international law as to the United States,140 which is a major producer of
books and other literary material; an important component in any plan for the realization
of the human right to education.141
While United Nations resolutions, such as Resolution 2000/7, may also be
evidence of custom they are not binding.142 Thus, a resolution in and of itself cannot
make customary international law because to allow such an effect would be to change the
status of resolutions from non-binding to binding. Accordingly, United Nations
Resolutions deeming the right to an education as a "fundamental" right may not, without
more, change the nature of the right from aspirational to legally binding.
139 Resolution 2000/7, supra note 36.
140
BROWNLIE, supra note 37 at 10; SHAW, supra note 38 at 71-72;
RESTATEMENT, supra note 109 at § 102 (comment d).
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Finally, jus cogens, or peremptory norms, is a principle under international law
whereby a state may not abrogate certain inalienable, fundamental rights.143 Jus cognes
is premised on a natural law philosophy144 and is a component of customary international
law.145 Examples ofjus cogens include the United Nations Charter prohibiting the use of
force,146 genocide, slave trading and piracy.147 There is no clear understanding regarding
1 A O
other human rights areas.
Based upon the foregoing, customary international law, including jus cogens,
does not appear to include the right to an education. The primary problem for the
assertion that the right to an education has risen to such a level is the lack of consensus.
D. The International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights is
Only Binding on States Parties to the Convention and Has Not Evolved to
the Level of Customary International Law.
Recognizing the aspiration as opposed to binding nature of the UDHR there was a
move to propose a binding treaty addressing the goals stated in the UDHR. It was urged
by some that it would be best to create two separate treaties; one addressing economic
rights and another addressing political rights.149 This was the course taken by the Sub-
Committee and the drafting of the 1CESCR and the International Convention on Civil and
Political Rights ("ICCPR") commenced shortly after the passage of the UDHR. The fact
143
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that it took so long for these two treaties to come into effect reflects, again, the lack of
consensus that the UDHR was binding.150
The provisions in the final version of the ICESCR that relate to the right to an
education are:
Preamble
Recognizing that, in accordance with the Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights, the
ideal offree human beings enjoyingfreedomfromfear and want can only be achieved
ifconditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his economic, social and
cultural rights, as well as his civil andpolitical rights,
Article 13
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right ofeveryone to
education....
It is interesting to note the absence of the term "fundamental" from the provision of the
ICESCR regarding education.151 The ICESCR has specified the right to be free from
hunger as a fundamental right.152 Thus, the right to food may have achieved a legally
binding status on states parties to the ICESCR but the lack of the term "fundamental"
leaves such an interpretation regarding education in doubt.
It should be noted here that the primary responsibility to achieve the human right
to an education identified in the ICESCR under article 13 are state parties but other actors
are responsible as well including corporations.153 With respect to social and economic
150 Effective 1979. See STEINER, supra note 87 at 136.
151
ICESCR, supra note 150 at art. 13.
152 Id. at art. 11(2).
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Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Status of the International Covenants on
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rights, as opposed to political and civil rights, flexibility had to be allowed to take into
i • 154
account the varying economic circumstances.
While some argue that there is an increasing call for the recognition of the
ICESCR to be deemed customary, thus binding non-party states,155 the same legal and
political impediments are applicable as with the UDHR. True, many customary rules of
international law began as provisions in treaties.156 Both positivist and naturalist writers
of international law include as custom law that derived from treaties.157 At about the turn
of the twentieth century, however, several English publicists, including Lassa Oppenheim
and William Edward Hall, put forth the view that treaties simply laid down contractual
obligations for the parties and could have no legal effect on those states that are not
1 58
parties to the treaty. While this is the position taken by the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties159 there seems to be a trend to argue for customary international law
based upon the numerous treaties and declarations dealing with a particular subject.160
That said, the trend has not changed, for now, the requirement of consensus to establish
customary international law.161 As neither the UDHR nor the ICESCR are, in total,
customary the responsibilities of states that have not ratified the ICESCR with regard to
realizing the human right to education is rather vague.
154
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The United Nations' Charter does requires co-operation in promoting and
encouraging human rights162 but any definition of co-operation must take into account
that the rights granted to one may, necessarily take away the rights of another. In the
copyright context, with regard to the right to access creative works that may take away
the right to moral and material rights of the author,163 tax revenues for a state or place a
financial burden on consumers of a state that are the victims ofprice differentials164
depending on implementation methods.165 Further, there is a risk of less access due to the
reduction in the incentive to create. Finally, it also takes away the right to own property
and to economic prosperity guaranteed under Article 17 of the UDFIR and Articles 1 and
25 of the ICESCR.
The ICESCR is a treaty and, thus, is binding on state parties. There are,
however, several problems with attempting to utilize this treaty as a means of prioritizing
access. First, the United States has not ratified this treaty so it is not binding as to the
United States, a major producer of books and other educational materials.166 This would,
thus, fail to capture access to a significant segment of educational materials. Second, it
contains the same conflicting obligations regarding authors' rights167 and access as does
the UDHR.168 Finally, the agencies responsible for supervising compliance, the
162 United Nations Charter at Ch. 1, Art. 1, §3.
163
UDHR, supra note 3 at art. 27; ICESCR, supra note 150 at art. 15.
164 Price differentials occur when a producer sells a product in one state for a higher
price than in another state in order to adjust for the fact that consumers in some states can
pay market prices or more while consumers in another state cannot. See Peter J.
Hammer, Differential Pricing ofEssential Aids Drugs: Markets, Politics and Public
Health, 5 J. INT'L ECON. L. 883, 883-84 (2002).
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Commission on Human Rights and the Economic and Social Council,169 have no power
to take any action.170 Thus, at best it provides legally binding obligations on state parties,
inconclusive evidence of customary law and no coercive powers to enforce.
SUMMARY
Despite the solemn nature of a declaration, the UDHR does not have the same
force and effect as a treaty or convention; thus it is not legally binding under treaty
analysis. Additionally, there is no generality of practice regarding many of the social and
economic rights set forth in the UDHR which is required for customary international law.
Of course the same analysis would hold true for the aspirational nature of the moral and
material interests of creators. We are thus left with aspirational human rights that may, at
times, come into conflict. In domestic economic policy this conflict has been addressed
by many states through a balancing of interests. As discussed further below, such a
balancing approach is the only practical solution to this problem in the international
context.
As for the ICESCR, while it is a convention it is only binding on states party to
the convention and it has the same problems as the UDHR regarding whether it has
achieved the status of customary international law. Even for states party to the ICESCR
there is the problem of a conflict within its terms between authors' rights and access
rights, both ofwhich may be legally binding for state parties. Again, a balanced
approach should be implemented here not an absolute priority.
169
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It is conceivable that the right to an education as well as many other social and
economic human rights may, one day, become legally binding obligations but that day
has not yet arrived. There is consensus that the right to an education is an aspiration all
states should strive to achieve for their own people. But to make it a legal obligation
would require intervention into the internal economic policies of a state; something many
states clearly do not want nor anticipated when creating this new world order.
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CHAPTER 3
MORAL AND MATERIAL INTERESTS OF CREATORS ARE HUMAN RIGHTS
Facts are stubborn things. Whatever may be our wishes, our inclinations, or the dictates
171
ofourpassions, they cannot alter the state offacts, and evidence.
For better or worse the moral and material interests of creators were included in
the UDHR and the ICESCR. This fact can not legitimately be denied despite the
questionability of the appropriateness for the inclusion of such rights as a human right.
Indeed, during the drafting of these documents the possible conflicts that could arise due
to the inclusion of such rights was, briefly, discussed. Resolution 2000/7 recognizes the
realization of the conflict between certain human rights, such as education, and economic
policies that protect other human rights such as authors' rights.
In an attempt to reconcile the conflict between authors' rights to material gain and
access some have asserted that author's rights are not human rights. Assuming the most
benevolent motive to this position, it is put forth in an attempt to require the moral
imperative to tip the balance in favour of access. But even such benevolent motives can
not overcome the reality that access is harmed if economic policy is not invested with the
charge to stimulate creativity. As this chapter establishes, authors' rights, like the right to
an education, are an aspirational human right.
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John Adams, Argument in defense of the British soldiers in the Boston Massacre
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While Resolution 2000/7 recognizes that authors' rights are human rights,172
subsequent United Nations documents and other commentaries relating to Resolution
2000/7 have suggested a segregation of authors' rights and other aspirational human
rights.173 The recognition of authors' rights, specifically the protection ofmoral and
material interests in scientific, literary or artistic creations, in the UDHR and the ICESCR
may be to some a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma174 and yet they are there.
To be sure, the history of the drafting of the authors' rights provisions in the UDHR and
the ICESCR is rife with instances of inclusion and exclusion of the provisions;
disagreements and debates regarding the propriety of the authors' rights provisions but in
the end they were included. There is no qualifying language indicating any priority
between authors' rights and other aspirational human rights; no clarification as to their
scope. As with many other human rights, such as the right to education, they are just
vaguely yet unquestionably included as a human right.
A. Article 27 of the UDHR Specifies That the Moral and Material Interests
of Authors' Are a Human Right.
While the history of the drafting of the UDHR indicates some reluctance to
include protection ofmoral and material interests of creators as a human right they were
ultimately included. Rene Cassin, the delegate from France who was assigned the task of
revising the Humphrey draft of the UDHR in June, 1947 included a provision protecting
authors' rights.175 A working group then took the Cassin draft and made revisions
172 Resolution 2000/7, supra note 7.
173 Luthem World, supra note 27; SG Report, supra note 59; HC Report, supra note 62.
174 SirWinston Spencer Churchill, Radio Broadcast 1 October 1939, FAMILIAR
QUOTATIONS, JOHN BARTLETT, 743 (17).
175
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61
producing the Geneva Draft in December, 1947.176 In this draft the authors' rights
provision was deleted. The Geneva Draft received comments and the Human Rights
Commission drafting committee met again in early May, 1948 to revise the Geneva
Draft.177 The entire committee met to revise again in June, 1948 and added back the
authors' rights provision.178
There was not much disagreement regarding the right to enjoy the benefits of
179scientific advances to be included in article 27(1) of the UDHR. There was more
debate regarding the issue of authors' rights contained in what became article 27(2). The
French delegation proposed including moral and material interests but was more
concerned with moral rights.180 The French argued that, in addition to remuneration, an
author should retain a right over his work that would not disappear even after the work
1 O 1
entered the public domain. The Chinese delegate, Peng-Chun Chang, later stated that
this moral right was not merely to protect the artist but also the public to ensure that the
work was available in its original form.182
Although the Human Rights Commission rejected the provision, it passed the
Third Committee though objections were raised that these moral and material interests
176
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were not, properly speaking, a basic human right.183 Some delegates from the Third
Committee voted for this provision with the moral rights issue in mind and others voted
for it in the hope that it would be a step towards internationalization of copyright.184 So,
at best, we see mixed motives for this provision but no clear intent that these rights were
not to be considered as human rights. The UDHR was approved in 1947.
The provision of the UDHR that relates to copyright is:
ARTICLE 27
(1) Eveiyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the
community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its
benefits.
(2) Everyone has the right to the protection ofthe moral and material interests
resultingfrom any scientific, literaiy or artistic production ofwhich he is the
author. 85
Article 27(1) addresses enjoyment rights relating to the arts and scientific benefits
and can be interpreted as applying to both groups and individuals.186 However, it is
limited to the enjoyment of arts and scientific benefits of the community and it is unclear
if this means the domestic community or the international community. It is also unclear
if these rights are to be interpreted as requiring free enjoyment, inexpensive enjoyment or
just nondiscriminatory enjoyment. This is the section that is associated with the access
quotient in the copyright balance.187 Indeed, in addressing the apparent conflict between
183
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access and authors' rights several commentators point to Article 27(1) for the proposition
that it requires access to knowledge.188
Article 27(2) is a declaration that authors' rights relating to moral and material
interests have been given the rank of a human right.189 It is an individual right delegated
to states and, as such, is more similar to a civil and political right and has certain
similarities with property rights.190 It imposes on states restrictions on creating obstacles
to impede the ability of individuals to obtain these rights and has some similarities to the
right to freedom of expression, freedom of thought, conscience and religion which are
also civil and political rights.191
Rene Cassin observed in 1960 that Article 27 (2) was still "shrouded in
penumbra."192 He claimed that the UDHR and the ICESCR mark the apex of the French
vision of literary and artistic property.193 Such a statement gives an improper implication
of a dominate philosophical view in these documents which runs counter to the travaux
preparatories expressing the desire to create, at least with respect to the UDHR, a
document of a universal nature.194 Still, Cassin was correct in asserting that Article 27(2)
was then as it is now unclear regarding the reason for its inclusion. The language of
Article 27(2) is, however, clear in granting authors' moral and material interests the
status of human rights.
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GLENDON, supra note 87 at 65, 69.
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B. Article 15 of the ICESCR Specifies That the Moral and Material Interests
ofAuthors' Are a Human Right.
In drafting the ICESCR the moral and material interests provision found in Article
15(1)1 was explicitly excluded from several drafts and only made its way into that
document during the debate of the Third Committee of the General Assembly in 1957,
three years after the Commission on Human Rights had completed its work and five years
after it had last been debated.195
With respect to article 15(1) I of the ICESCR, there was some dissention
regarding having its provisions dovetail the UDHR. In particular, the United States
delegate, Eleanor Roosevelt, stated that the documents should not be a mirror image as
these documents had very different legal effects. Again there seemed to be little
dissention over a provision that granted people the right to benefit from the advances of
science,196 but authors' rights were more contentious. UNESCO and the French
supported the inclusion of authors' rights. The UNESCO representative, Havet, stated
that its inclusion would help to harmonize national and international legislation and
practice in this field.197 The French delegate argued that its inclusion stressed that the
moral and material interest of creators should be safeguarded.198 The United States
delegate, Roosevelt, speaking in opposition, pointed out that UNESCO was studying the
issue of copyright and that until the study of the complexities of the subject had been
completed it would be impossible to include the provision as a general principle.199 The
Chilean delegate, Hernan Santa Cruz, also voiced opposition with the concern that this
195
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was not a question of a fundamental human right.200 The provision was rejected at this
point 7 to 7 with 4 abstentions.201
A year later, in May of 1952 the issue again came up with the United States, the
United Kingdom and Yugoslavia against the inclusion of the authors' rights provision for
the reasons articulated a year before by the United States. France and UNESCO were
still in favour of its inclusion.202 The Chilean delegate, Valenzuela, articulated his state's
concern in voting against the provision that the rights of the author should not be
protected without safeguards for the under-developed states that would be harmed by
such a monopoly as the developed states controlled a significant amount of the technical
knowledge.203 The French delegate did not believe such protection presented a "grave
danger" and that, in any event, the absence of such protection was not a solution for
under-developed states.204 The representative from the United Kingdom, Hoare, was not
in favor of the inclusion of such rights but observed that the Chilean delegate's remarks
shed a new light on his interpretation of the provision relating to the rights of all to the
benefits of scientific advancements. IfMr. Valenzuela was reading that provision as in
conflict with the proposed authors' rights, and, hence, reading it as an unqualified right,
such a reading was far beyond the scope of the covenant and one to which the United
Kingdom could not subscribe.205 There appears to be no record of further discussion on
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The Commissions final draft, without the provision protecting author's rights, was
sent to the General Assembly and then to the Third Committee for review. The Third
Committee further reviewed the authors' rights proposal in October-November 1957.
Again there was no dissent regarding the rights to enjoy the benefits of science. As for
authors' rights, the French delegate, Juvigny, argued for its inclusion but did not make
the proposal. This time it was made by the Uruguay delegate, Tejera.207 Tejera argued
that the rights of the public and the author were not contradictory but complimented each
other. For example, protecting the author would ensure the authenticity of the work.208
Chile was now in favor of the provision as were Sweden, Israel, the Dominican Republic
and UNESCO. Indonesia and the United Socialist Soviet Republic were opposed for
reasons already stated by the United States delegate to the Human Rights Commission.
Saudi Arabia and Czechoslovakia also expressed concerns against its inclusion such as
the fact that the provision seemed to protect individuals when much scientific work was
completed by team effort and that such a delicate subject should not be included in haste
without full debate and with an unsatisfactory text that could be misinterpreted.209 In the
end the provision was voted in by a vote of 39 to 9 with 24 abstentions.210 The provision
in the final version of the ICESCR that relates to the copyright issue is:
Article 15
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right ofeveryone:
(a) To takepart in cultural life;
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(b) To enjoy the benefits ofscientific progress and its applications;
I To benefitfrom theprotection ofthe moral andmaterial interests resultingfrom
any scientific, literaiy or artisticproduction ofwhich he is the author.
Given the vague language in Article 15 and the lack of attention paid to the issues of any
conflict of authors' rights and access, it was unlikely that the drafters imagined the key
9 11
role intellectual property would play in the fields of trade, development or education."
Still, such lack of foresight does not negate the fact that authors' were included as a
human right in the ICESCR.
Judging from the recorded exchange, it appears that the main concerns regarding
the inclusion of authors' rights in a binding covenant was associated with the lack of a
full study of the issue, a meaningful debate, the granting ofmonopoly rights when
developed states controlled most of the technology and a potential conflict with the right
to enjoy the benefits of the arts and science. The debate regarding this provision and
concerns relating to monopoly rights indicate that the drafters were fully aware that they
were including, in essence, copyright as a human right.
C. Despite the Inclusion of Copyright Interests Reflected as Authors' Rights
as Well as Access Rights in the UDHR and the ICESCR There is a
Persistence to Argue That Copyright is Not a Human Right Due to
Differing Characteristics or That There is a Priority of Access Rights
Over Authors' Rights.
Two main arguments emerge from commentary subsequent to Resolution 2000/7
relating to the proposition that access takes a priority over authors' rights; first, that
211 HC Report, supra note 62 at 22, note 4 (citing to Report to the Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights by Maria Green, Drafting History of Article 15
(l)(c) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, October 9,
2000 (E/C. 12/2000/15).)
212 But see GREEN, supra note 111 at ^J43 where she argues that the main concern m
including this provision was to protect authors freedom from state intervention.
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copyright is not a true human right due to differing characteristics; and second, that even
if copyright is a human right, the human right to access for education should take a
priority over authors' rights. The segregation of copyright out of the umbrella of human
rights is premised upon the theory that copyright and other human rights human rights
have differing characteristics. For example, recall that the High Commissioner's report
segregates out the economic rights of intellectual property from human rights by noting
213the differing characteristics of intellectual property rights and human rights. The
differences noted by the High Commissioner included the observation that intellectual
property rights are a privilege granted by the state, they can be licensed, revoked and
expire. Human rights are inalienable and universal. They are not granted by the state,
they are recognized.214 This attempt to carve out copyright from the defined human
215
rights based upon differing characteristics has been echoed by some academics.
The problem with this distinction is multifaceted. First, it ignores the basic fact
that protection for authors' rights is granted in the UDHR and the ICESCR and that the
drafters of these documents were cognizant of the point that what they were doing was
providing for a basic recognition, subject to state implementation, of copyright as a
human right. The question ofwhether such a right belonged in documents addressing
human rights was addressed and debated. To continue along this path of discourse, while
fascinating, is not productive. Additionally, what other rights articulated in the UDHR
and the ICESCR should we exclude from the classification of a human right based upon
213 HC Report, supra note 62.
214 HC Report, supra note 62 at 6.
215
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the differing character test? The philosophical basis for almost all property rights in
some states are a privilege granted by the state.2'6 Many can be licensed, revoked and
expire.217 Accordingly, perhaps Article 17 of the UDHR is not really a human right.
And what about marriage under Article 16 of the UDHR? Is there not some aspect of the
granting of a privilege; some license and regulation?
A further problem with this differing characteristics distinction is the assertion
that human rights are inalienable and universal. These terms are not defined but ifwe
utilize a common dictionary meaning we see that inalienable means that the right cannot
^ j o O 1 Qbe transferred or taken away. Universal is defined to mean applicable to all. There
is no reason why copyright laws cannot meet these criteria. Moral rights are not defined
in the UDHR nor the ICESCR but many of the moral rights recognized in domestic
copyright laws, such as attribution, are not to be transferred or taken away under
domestic copyright laws.220 Further, when an author sells his creation and any copyright
interests thereto he is not transferring his material interest, he is realizing it.
216 For example, in the United States property rights are often described as a privilege
granted by the state. Gaiy D. Libecap defines property rights as "the social institutions
that define or delimit the range ofprivileges granted to individuals to specific assets,"
identifying a number ofspecific rights that can be seen as so many sticks bundled
together: "[pjrivate ownership . . . may involve a variety ofrights, including the right to
exclude nonowners from access, the right to appropriate the stream ofrents from use of
and investments in the resource, and the right to sell or otherwise transfer the resource to
others." Morgan Oliver Mirvis, Allocating andManaging Property Rights on
Manhattan's Lower East Side, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 543, 563 (2004).
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Alternatively, and in line with Resolution 2000/7, it has been argued that a human
rights approach to intellectual property requires a prioritization of human rights (access)
over economic policy. For example, the Green paper relied upon by the Human Rights
Commission in addressing Resolution 2000/7 concludes with the observation that a
human rights approach to intellectual property would require looking at economic
policies related to research and development policies, price regulation, marketing rules,
international trade and investment agreements plus other policy decisions to determine if
they adequately protect the right to benefit from scientific progress.22' In justifying this
position the Green paper states that "[w]e face a world with issues that the drafters of the
ICESCR could never have envisaged.. ,."222 This is not completely accurate as it seems
that the Chilean delegate, Valenzuela, and the United Kingdom delegate, Hoare, touched
upon this theme during the Commissions discussion back in May of 1952.223 While the
exchange by the delegates may suggest that they did not focus on the tension between
author's rights and public rights to the benefits of scientific advances this is likely due to
the fact that the balance of these two rights were to be left to domestic legislation. What
the drafters apparently failed to envisage was the possibility that domestic economic
policy could become subject to outside interference under the authority of human rights
law.
Furthermore, Resolution 2000/7, along with other authorities, recognizes the fact
that human rights are indivisible, thus suggesting an interconnected approach not a
224
priority. In the case of a true conflict between human rights, a balancing approach
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utilizing a rule of reason not a per se priority would better serve this recognition of
indivisibility. This is so because, in the copyright case, economic policy may seek to
promote education and access through incentives if implemented properly.
Finally, it has been suggested that the fact that the rights for authors' was included
at the last minute, the right to benefit from scientific progress was included in the
beginning with no dissent, and that Article 15(1) I of the 1CESCR does not seem to be
written as a limit to the benefit may be factors to consider in prioritizing.225 However,
such an observation ignores the United Kingdom's expressed concern that this was not its
understanding of the benefits provision back in 1951226 nor does it take into consideration
the fact that this conflict garnered little discussion indicating that the delegates did not
pay much attention to the problem.227 Further, it does not address the fact that the United
States, a major producer of intellectual property has not ratified the ICESCR precisely
because it did not want to be legally bound by such vague terms.228
D. When There is a Conflict Between Provisions of a Document a Balancing
Test Should be Applied.
In creating provisions within the UDHR and then, again, within the ICESCR
which at times are in unavoidable conflict it should be assumed that the parties intended
some sort of compromise and accommodation to be reached. Accordingly, each
provision should be interpreted in a flexible manner, recognizing that neither can be
225
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229absolute in its terms and effect when it is in conflict with the other. In applying these
principles, a balancing approach, weighing the various interests involved, is preferable to
ascribing absolute priorities.
This is particularly true when it is recognized that there can be no priority of
human rights over economic policy as the two are interconnected. To say, for example,
the human right to education may require access to copyrighted material at little or no
cost due to an inability to pay ignores the fact that economic policy may increase access
through incentives. Similarly, economic policy may reduce costs, as it did in the United
States in the nineteenth century when domestic copyright laws offered little protection to
foreign authors to enhance access and protect the domestic printing trade. Thus,
domestic economic policy should balance the conflicting interests expressed in the
UDHR and the ICESCR to arrive at an optimal level of protection that will encourage
additional creation and provide access to the domestic populace as well as the
international community.
SUMMARY
The history behind the drafting of the UDHR and the ICESCR indicates that the
drafters of these documents were fully aware that they were providing for the moral and
material interests of creators protection akin to the type of protection provided for under
domestic copyright laws. While there was little debate regarding access rights, concerns
over the moral and material interests of creators limiting access, especially to developing
states, was addressed. Accordingly, understanding UDHR Article 27 and the ICESCR
Article 15 as including basic notions of copyright as an aspirational human right is an
229 Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741 F.2d 538 (3rd Cir. 1984).
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accurate interpretation. While there may be differing characteristics between copyright
and other human rights there are also some similarities such as with the human right to
own property. At most what we have now as we did when the UDHR and the ICESCR
were being drafted is a dispute as to whether copyright should have been included as a
human right in the first place. But that debate is done with respect to the UDHR and the
ICESCR. The fact of the matter is that the moral and material interests of creators were
provided the status of a human right.
As for prioritization of access over moral and material interests of creators, such
attempts to do so on a global level are improper and misguided. They are improper
because they interfere with domestic economic policies. Sovereignty over domestic
economic policies has not yet been completely ceded under any of the relevant
international charters, conventions or declarations.230 An absolute priority of access over
the moral and material interests of creators on a global basis is misguided because it does
not recognize the domestic economic differences of states. Any priority should be left to
domestic legislatures to determine based upon that states own internal needs first and
then international needs. The focus of international efforts to assist in the realization of
human rights should be on balanced economic policies that minimizes the negative
external effects of certain domestic economic policies while at the same time
acknowledge the need for internal realization of human rights through economic policy.
230 ...There is little dispute that there is some voluntary waiver of sovereignty under
agreements such as the WTO agreements. William J. Davey, The Wto: Looking
Forwards, 9 J. INT'L ECON. L. 3 (2006); Ari Afilalo and Dennis Patterson, Statecraft,
Trade and the Order ofStates, 6 CHI. J. INT'L L. 725 (2006). But see, Joshua Meltzer,
State Sovereignty and the Legitimacy ofthe WTO, 26 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 693




THE HISTORY OF THE CREATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS REFLECTS THE
INTERCONNECTEDNESS OF ECONOMIC POLICY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
From the foldings of its robe, it brought two children; wretched, abject, frightful,
hideous, miserable.... "Spirit! are they yours? " Scrooge could say no more. "They are
Man's, " said the Spirit, looking down upon them. "And they cling to me, appealingfrom
theirfathers. This boy is Ignorance. This girl is Want. Beware them both, and all of
their degree, but most ofall beware this bov, for on his brow I see that written which is
231
Doom, unless the writing be erased."
The history of the creation of the United Nations is remarkable in that it
establishes a shift from a destructive self-interest international community to a desire of
enlightened self-interest. An acknowledgement that the best was to preserve peace,
which was in everyone's interest, was to eradicate ignorance and want. This desire is
reflected in the decision to include a reference to human rights in the United Nations
Charter. Additionally, this history shows that the parties creating the United Nations
recognized interconnectedness between economic policy and the realization of human
rights goals. However, the history of the creation of the United Nations is also illustrative
of the limited role international organizations have regarding domestic economic policies.
First, in creating the United Nations issues of sovereignty were carefully
preserved because if sovereignty were ignored there was a risk of disrupting the delicate
binding for international order; second, accountability in the form of a legal obligation
231 CHARLES DICKENS, CHRISTMAS BOOKS 72-73 (1843) (From A Christmas
Carol).
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was limited to extreme civil and political acts such as genocide; third, there was no
agreement nor even a general consensus that developed states had a financial obligation
with respect to developing states; and fourth, economic stability, including the economic
stability of developed states, was the major premise underscoring the creation of the
current international order. Accordingly, domestic economic policy was left to the
individual states but economic stability was augmented by cooperation and coordination
through international organizations that specialized in economic issues.
With respect to any assertion that there is a primacy of human rights over
economic policies it is critical to note that from the inception of the belief that an
international organization had to be created to avoid conflict and the atrocities ofwar
economic considerations were at the forefront of motives. The global effect ofmodern
warfare with its horrific toll on human life and destabilizing impact on the international
economic order made states realize that an international forum established to resolve
disputes in a peaceful manner was desirable. Such a forum would open the lines of
communication alleviating the ignorance inherent in conflicts and reduce the want of
humanity which fosters economic instability. While the first attempt to establish such an
organization with the League ofNations ended in failure, a subsequent effort in the form
of the United Nations has met with more success.
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A. The International Order Prior to the Creation of the League ofNations
Was a System of Destructive Self-interest.
Prior to the creation of the League ofNations in 1919 the international order was
2^2 233 234
a patchwork of bilateral and multi-lateral agreements with scant customary law-
and general principles of law.235 The focus of international law resided in the concept of
state sovereignty and the international economic order reflected this with an exploitation
system reinforced by colonialism. Investments by developed states were protected by
military means and streamlined by a centralized system in the form of the colonial system
and multi-national agglomerations such as the Austro-Hungarian Empire. This
rudimentary international economic system was not rational; rather it operated on an
overriding policy of destructive self-interest.236 With hindsight it is perhaps not
surprising that this system would implode but, at the time, few predicted the devastation
that would occur during World War I.
Economically and psychologically exhausted from the conflict ofWorld War I,
the world leaders of the developed states realized the value of a more coherent
international order and with this realization came the birth of the League ofNations.
232 A bilateral treaty is an agreement between two states and has been analogized as
being similar in function to a contract. See, SHAW, supra note 38 at 74. But see
BROWNLIE, supra note 37 at 638-39.
233 A multilateral treaty is an agreement between more than two states, often many
states, and has been analogized as being in the nature of law-making. See, SHAW, supra
note 38 at 74. But see BROWNLIE, supra note 37 at 638-39.
2j4 In the international context, customary law is law recognized by States to be
obligatory (legally binding.) To establish such recognition there must be evidence of a
sufficient duration to establish a consistency and generality ofpractice and a recognition
by states that such practice is obligatory (opinion juris.) BROWNLIE, supra note 37 at 4-
7; SHAW, supra note 38 at 56-73.
2"?<; .. . .
General principles of law are common legal principles recognized in most municipal
laws. BROWNLIE, supra note 37 at 15-19; SHAW, supra note 38 at 77-82..
236 GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, ECONOMIC WORLD ORDER? 8-15 (1970).
77
Unfortunately, a reluctance to cede sovereignty coupled with an element of retribution
reflected in the reparation payments demanded ofGermany sowed the seeds of failure
from the start. The United States, concerned over issues of sovereignty, refused to ratify
the Treaty ofVersailles. Ironically, the League ofNations, a provision contained in that
treaty, was included at the insistence of the then President of the United States, Woodrow
Wilson.
The League of Nations focused on the reduction of armaments237 and attempted to
preserve the status quo with respect to territorial claims.238 Economic concerns were
limited to development under a paternalistic system of tutelage.239 Although the League
ofNations established the Permanent Court of International Justice240 the de facto reality
was that the League ofNations had little power or influence to ensure compliance and the
maintenance of peace. Thus, while there were some successes such as the border
disputes between Bulgaria-Greece (1925), Iraq-Turkey (1925-26) and Poland-Lithuania
(1927), the League ofNations ultimately failed to stop the disputes leading to World War
II.
B. The Economic Imperative and the Creation of the United Nations.
The events leading up to World War II were significantly influenced by economic
conditions of the time.241 The international economic upheaval caused by the global
depression of the 1930's created an environment in Germany where it was possible for
237 Covenant of the League ofNations (10 January 1920), art.8.
238 Id. at arts. 10-16.
239 Id. at art 22.
240 Id. at art. 14.
241 WILLIAM L. SHIRER, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE THIRD REICH 192
(1959).
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the Nazis to assume power. While there are numerous interplaying factors that lead to
World War II the Allied powers believed that economics played a significant role in
destabilizing peace. The concept of emphasizing economic rights in an agreement
creating another international organization was based on the belief that the previous two
world wars were caused, in a large part, by economic stresses.242 This belief is reflected
in pre-United Nations documents generated during World War II such as the Atlantic
Charter (1941), the Bretton Woods Agreement (1944), and the Dumbarton Oaks
Agreement (1944). These agreements, in part, formed the basis of the United Nations
Charter.243
The Atlantic Charter was a statement issued by the Prime Minister of the United
Kingdom, Winston Churchill, and the President of the United States, Franklin D.
Roosevelt, as a result of their secret meeting in August of 1941. Although the United
States was not, at this time, involved in WorldWar II the two leaders were in constant
contact regarding the international situation prior to the United States involvement in the
war.244 The Atlantic Charter reflects the belief that economic security was necessary for
lasting peace in its fifth paragraph, which states:
GLENDON, supra note 87 at 10, 14, 18-19, 70, 238.
243 See Anthony Clark Arend, The United Nations, Regional Organizations, and Military
Operations: the Past and the Present, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 3, 15 (1996);
Margaret E. McGuinness, Multilateralism and War: A Taxonomy of Institutional
Functions, 51 VILL. L. REV. 149, fn307 (2006); Peter M. Gerhart, The World Trade
Organization and Participatory Democracy: the Historical Evidence, 37 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 897, 907-08 (2004).
244 JON MEACHAM , FRANKLIN AND WINSTON: AN INTIMATE PORTRAIT OF
AN EPIC FRIENDSHIP (2003).
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[The] desire to bring about thefullest collaboration between all nations in the
economicfield with the object ofsecuring, for all, improved labour standards,
economic adjustment and social security;...245
In July of 1944 the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference was held
at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire. Forty-five states were represented at this conference
with the goal of creating an international economic order that would avoid the recurrence
of the conditions that contributed to the depression of the 1930's, which helped to
establish Nazi rule in Germany.246 The agreement from the Bretton Woods conference
established the IMF to deal with the international monetary system and promote free
trade. It also established the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the
"World Bank") to expedite redevelopment after the war and encourage foreign
investment in developing states.
Finally, the Dumbarton Oaks Agreement of October, 1944 specified that an
international organization, the United Nations, should be created to maintain peace
through, among other things, economic and social cooperation. This document
inextricably tied economic concerns with human rights:
Section A. Purpose and Relationships. 1. With a view to the creation ofconditions
ofstability and well-being which are necessaiyforpeaceful andfriendly relations
among nations, the Organization shouldfacilitate solutions ofinternational
economic, social and other humanitarian problems andpromote respectfor
human rights andfundamentalfreedoms. Responsibilityfor the discharge ofthis
function should be vested in the General Assembly and, under the authority of the
General Assembly, in an Economic and Social Council.247
245 The Atlantic Charter, ^|5, available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/atlantic.htm
246
SHIRER, supra note 241.
247 The Dumbarton Oaks Agreement, §A.
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Thus, humanitarian issues were under the auspice of a United Nations council that
addressed economic issues due to the collective experiences leading up to the carnage of
World War II.
The Nuremburg trials were held after Germany's defeat in World War II. The
shock of the atrocities of Nazi concentration camps and other inhuman conduct during
the war was an impetus for the Nuremburg trials248 which, for the first time in history,
formally held individuals accountable for their war crime conduct. A new philosophy of
international intervention in the internal conduct of states towards their people was
developing. No longer could a state claim, as the Nazi government did to the League of
Nations, that certain internal conduct such as genocide was a sovereign right regardless of
how oppressive it may be.
But it was not considered sufficient to hold individuals accountable for their
conduct after the fact; economic and political stability was necessary to prevent the
conduct in the first place and promote peace. For these reason, it was considered
necessary to create an international human rights regime that promoted and protected,
among other rights, economic rights. Developing states were involved in this debate and,
for the most part, agreed that economic rights were a necessary part of a human rights
regime. However, their motivation was different. The developing states were concerned
about issues of self-determination; independence from colonial rule and reparations for
past exploitation.249 Certainly, some developed states saw the benefit in redevelopment
248 Daniel R. Coquillette, The Legal History ofthe Twentieth Centmy, 31 INT'L J.
LEGAL INFO. 211, 229 (2003).
249 Diane Orentlicher, Seoaration Anxiety: International Responses to Ethno-Separatists
Claims, 23 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 40-41 (1998).
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monies flowing to developing states but there was no consensus that there was a legal
right to such monies. Rather than creating an international welfare state, developed states
seemed to be working on a modified premise of sovereignty and enlightened self-interest;
namely, cooperation in providing aid on a voluntary basis in the belief that more
economic and political independence would promote peace and, thus, increase trade.
Here we see the divergent perspectives on the new international world order on the macro
scale which will manifest itself on the micro scale with respect to copyright; namely a
legal obligation on developed states to finance development in developing states versus
financing developing states on a voluntary basis with enlightened self-interest as a motive
but no legal obligation attached.
The very idea of such legal obligations was of great concern due to sovereignty
issues which ultimately contributed to the failure of the League of Nations. Similar
matters were addressed regarding the creation of the United Nations and were ultimately
overcome by a willingness to obfuscate the issue through vague language and allowing
parties to leave the negotiating table with varied understandings as to what they had
committed to. The history of the development of the United Nations and the Charter of
the United Nations, indicates that sovereignty is not an issue to be ignored; especially
with regards to matters that are of an essentially domestic economic and social rights
nature, such as the right to an education, as compared to matters of an essentially civil
rights nature, such as protection against genocide, slavery, discrimination, torture and
piracy.
The economic stability which caused great concern to the Allied powers inducing
the creation of the United Nations was premised upon the experience with Nazi
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Germany; a developed state that faced considerable economic problems afterWorld War
I. It was the economic instability caused by speculative investments, redevelopment
needs in Europe and cries for reparations from Germany after World War I that was on
the minds of the Allied powers during and after World War II; not a belief in economic
stability premised on a redistribution ofwealth to developed states.
C. The Adoption of the United Nations Charter Reflects Vague Human
Rights Due to a Lack of Consensus.
Accountability, or, as we shall see below, legal obligations with respect to an
economic or social right, such as a right to an education, has neither an historic nor legal
precedent. Nuremberg offers no precedent given its limited scope and political
9 ^0
peculiarities. Nuremberg only offers a precedent for victorious powers at the
conclusion of a conflict to create an international tribunal to try individual accused ofwar
9 S1
crimes and crimes against humanity. In the Nuremberg example the power vacuum
resulting from the removal of the former political power structure is filled by the victor
thus eliminating the need for coercive powers from an international organization.
Further, there is international consensus regarding the penal nature of crimes against
humanity. Conversely, there is neither precedent nor consensus regarding accountability
for the failure to provide for economic or social human rights, such as education.
250 MARGARET THATCHER, STATECRAFT: STRATEFIES FOR A CHANGING
WORLD, 256-58 (2002).
251 While war crimes are limited to international armed conflicts, the substance ofwar
crimes and crimes against humanity are generally the same: killing, torture or rape
committed as a part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population
on national, ethnic, racial, religious or political grounds. SHAW, supra note 38 at 472;
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Annex to United Nations
Security Council Resolution 955 (1994), 8 November 1994, Article 3.
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This lack of consensus reflects the divergent economic, political and social
philosophies which were well known just prior to and during the creation of the United
Nations Charter and UDHR. These differences were consciously avoided by the drafting
of vague documents that most everyone could agree upon. For example, the United
Nations Charter, adopted in 1945, was deliberately vague on the human rights issue, as it
was believed that a consensus would never be reached in the short time period allotted at
the San Francisco Conference to adopt the Charter.252 Accordingly, all that was stated on
the issue was:
Preamble: WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS DETERMINED...
to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the
human person, in the equal rights ofmen and women...
Chapter 1, Article 1, The Purposes of the UnitedNations are: ...
3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of[a]
...humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respectfor human
rights...
Chapter IV, Article 13, The General Assembly:
1. The GeneralAssembly shall initiate studies and make recommendationsfor the
purpose of:
b. assisting in the realization ofhuman rights....
Chapter IX, International Economic and Social Co-operation
Article 55
With a view to the creation ofconditions ofstability and well-being... the United
Nations shallpromote: ...
c. universal respectfor, and observance of, human rights...
252
GLENDON, supra note 87 at 5.
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Chapter IX, Composition of the Economic and Social Council.
Functions and Powers
Article 62
D. It may make recommendations for the purpose ofpromoting respectfor, and
253observance of, human rights....
From this vague language we see that the concept of human rights was not an
operative principle of the United Nations Charter when that document was created.
Rather, it was a desideratum of the Charter as opposed to a legal obligation.254 For
example, the United Nations Charter is silent on identifying particular rights as human
rights. Rather, it sets up an organization, ECOSOC, to investigate, report and make
recommendations but clearly not to make binding decisions. Still, despite the vague
language in the United Nations Charter there is some general consensus that economic
rights, considered in conjunction with human rights, were important for world peace.255
Further, there was no prioritization regarding economic rights and other human rights. In
fact, if any prioritization is indicated with respect to the language utilized in the United
Nations Charter it should be noted that in almost every instance the term "economic"
comes first.256 While this particular organization may have no special significance, such
organizational arguments based upon a supersedes theory have been put forth with
respect to the UDHR and the structure of access rights being placed before author's
253 United Nations Charter, available at http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/.
254 See POMERANCE, supra note 142 at 9.
255
For example, United Nations Charter, supra note 253 at Preamble, articles 1, 2, 7, 13
and 55.
256 United Nations Charter, supra note 253 at Preamble; Chapter I, art. 1, §3; Chapter
IV, art. 13, § 1 (b); Chapter IX, arts. 55 and 62.
85
rights.257 At the very least, this organization of terms reflects the concerns that some
world leaders had regarding economic instability being the primary cause for political
instability and breaches of peace; and it is preventing breaches of peace that is the focal
258
point of the United Nations Charter in terms of its primary purpose and its most
259
extensive powers.
The language utilized in the United Nations Charter relating to human rights is not
only vague, it is non-committal. The terms most frequently used are "promoting" and
"co-operation."260 Nowhere are binding terms such as "obligated," "required" or "legally
bound" utilized regarding these rights. Conversely, such terms are used with respect to
Chapters VII (dealing with breaches of peace and acts of aggression) and XIV
(addressing the creation of the International Court of Justice) indicating that the drafters
deliberately used aspirational terms relating to non-fundamental human rights.
The vague language in the United Nations Charter relating to human rights reflects
the primary concern regarding sovereignty; specifically, the extent of intervention in
domestic affairs by the United Nations or any of its agencies. This is expressed in a
Report to the President of the United States on the Results of the San Francisco
Conference where it was stated that:
there is to be no intervention in matters that are essentially domestic with one
exception; Chapter VIIfor violations that breach peace.26'
257
GREEN, supra note 111 at T) 46.
-jro
United Nations Charter, supra note 253 at art. 1(1).
259 Id. at arts. 33-51.
260 Id. at Preamble; Chapter I, art. 1, §3; Chapter IV, art. 13, § 1 (b); Chapter IX, arts. 55
and 56.
261 26 June 1945, U.S., D.S., Pub. 2349, Conference Series 71, pp. 42-45.
86
The term "essentially" was used instead of "solely" as it was recognized that very little is
without external repercussions.262Accordingly, the possibility that ECOSOC could
interfere directly with the domestic economy, social structure, or educational
arrangements was determined to be excluded.
Indeed, the powers bestowed on ECOSOC through the United Nations Charter are
both vague and narrowly limited. They are vague in that the terms used are "promote"
and "co-operation."264 These terms do not reflect any legally binding authority bestowed
upon ECOSOC. They are limited in that ECOSOC may only make or initiate studies and
reports, make recommendations to the General Assembly, prepare draft conventions and
call conferences related to economic, social, cultural, educational or health concerns.265
This vague language coupled with limited, non-coercive powers again reflects the
concern some world leaders had with respect to an international organization interfering
with essentially domestic affairs. Matters of economic, social, cultural, educational and
health concerns reflected then, as they do now, certain underlying philosophical beliefs
that could not be universalized. These were matters of an international concern to the
extent that they had, in the past and in an extreme form, contributed to a breach of the
peace. But they were also matters few states would willingly cede sovereignty over.
Accordingly, rather than create an international organization where some states may not
agree to submit disputes essentially domestic matters were left to the various states
despite the fact that it was recognized that there would be an impact on the international
262 CASES AND MATERIALS ON UNITED NATIONS LAW, 588 (Louis B. Sohn ed.,
1956).
263 Id. at 586-588.
264 United Nations Charter, supra note 253 at Chapter IX, arts. 55 and 56.
265 United Nations Charter, supra note 253 at Chapter IX, art. 62.
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community through some domestic decisions. ECOSOC would attempt to alleviate these
problems by promoting co-operation in these matters. The only coercive tools that were
to be utilized here would be international political pressure.
The UNESCO constitution provides more detailed analysis with respect to the
educational goal; however, the language is still vague and creates no legally binding
obligations. For example, UNESCO is charged with encouraging mutual assistance and
collaboration to encourage the free exchange of ideas and knowledge,266 advance
knowledge and the free flow of ideas,267 maintain, increase and diffuse knowledge by
conservation, protection, co-operation and access to printed materials268 but may not
intervene in matters that are essentially domestic.269 The language here reflects the
history behind the decision to include education in an international agreement of this
nature. That history was a stifling of the exchange of ideas and knowledge and the
propaganda used by the Nazi government to indoctrinate school children. Yet, it was also
a history of reluctance on the part of all states to cede sovereignty over social and
economic human rights which are, to this day, viewed as essentially domestic concerns.
SUMMARY
There is no doubt that the history of the creation of the United Nations provides
evidence of the desire to eradicate ignorance and want; to take heed of the warning of the
ghost of Christmas Future. But this history also establishes a belief that the realization of
these goals would be achieved through economic policy. The success of peace and
266 UNESCO Constitution, (16 November 1945) at Preamble, available at
http://www.icomos.org/unesco/unesco_constitution.html..
267 Id. at art. 1, §2(a).
268 Id. at art. 1, §2(c).
269 Id. atari. 1, §3.
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human rights was believed to be, to a large extent, dependant upon economic policy and
economic policy was to remain an essentially domestic concern in order to obtain
consensus.
It is difficult to justify statements like the primacy of human rights over economic
policies when, historically, it was economic policy that created the modern human rights
apparatus. A primacy of human rights over economic policies is not only historically
incorrect; it is impossible as a practical matter. One should not dictate the other; rather,
due to the interconnectedness of the two when there is a conflict a balancing of interests
should occur. Such an approach would not only recognize the historical fact that
economic policies and human rights are to be integrated, particularly with regard to issues
such as the right to an education and the moral and material interests of creators, but it
would also force an analysis of problems resulting in better, long term, solutions.
Further, the history of the United Nations underscores not only a lack of a legal
obligation to provide an education for people, internally and externally, it in fact
evidences a concern by some states that the United Nations not be allowed to interfere
with essentially domestic internal decisions such as economic policy. Additionally, there
was a concern expressed by some states to avoid creating an international welfare state.
Accordingly, the history of the United Nations indicates that there has never been any
consensus that there was a legal obligation on states implement an economic policy to
provide social and economic human rights goals. Yet, if the right to an education is
deemed a fundamental human right in the sense of creating a legal obligation then we are
creating a system where economic policy is no longer essentially domestic. Rather, we
89
will have a system where domestic economic policy relating to research and
development, price regulation, marketing, property laws and any other laws causing an
..... 270effect on education would be subject to international intervention.
270
GREEN, supra note 111 at U 46.
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CHAPTER 5
THE ECONOMIC POLICY IN MANY STATES IN THE WEST
REFLECTS A HISTORIC TRADITION OF TREATING
CREATORS AND HOLDERS OF RIGHTS IN A CREATION
AS PROPERTY OWNERS
We are by nature stubbornlypledged to defend our own from attack, whether it be our
person, ourfamily, ourproperty or our opinion.... The little word my is the most
important one in all human affairs andproperly to reckon with it is the beginning of
wisdom.271
The Western copyright law tradition reflects a philosophical premise that a creator
has a possessory interest in his creation. This property right is evidenced in the pre-
copyright history in the West as well as its domestic copyright legislation and economic
policy. There is little doubt that there is a strong belief in the West that a creator has the
right to call his creation "mine." The history of the emergence ofmodern human rights
indicates a reluctance to impose on states a philosophical basis for economic policy.
Whether a state's economic policy should be based, in broad terms, on capitalism,
socialism, communism or something in-between was never the purpose of modern human
rights. Similarly, the protection of aspirational human rights such as the moral and
material interests in creations is generally left to the states to determine as an essentially
domestic issue.272 In the West, many states based the protection of moral and material
interests on a property right. This property right is, in part, based upon a philosophical
271 JAMES HARVEY ROBINSON. See ERNEST BEAGLEHOLE, PROPERTY: A
STUDY IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY pre-face (1932).
272
STEINER, supra note 87 at 138.
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premise that can be traced back thousands of years. Until recently, little was written
regarding the treatment of copyright as a property right in economic policy. It seems as
though this economic policy of a property right in intangibles was widely accepted in the
West as if it were a gift from the ancient muses; or perhaps meant to unleash the furies
upon mankind.
The philosophical and economic justifications for the ownership of creative works
have gone through numerous manifestations. In the West, pre-copyright economic theory
is relatively undeveloped. In the ancient period there begins to form the basis for a
property interest in a creation. This continues through the medieval period with rights
transferring from individuals to guilds coupled with an open trade policy to help establish
an infant industry in the United Kingdom as well as a closed trade policy to protect the
printing industry after it had been established.273 There was state and church control of
creative works to protect political and economic dominance through censorship. Further,
letters patent were issued as political favours often to those who provided economic
assistance to the state.274 But as the economic importance of creative works increased
economic policy had to evolve.
A. The Birth of a Property Right in Creative Works in the Ancient World.
The pre-history and history of copyright law may help to explain why certain
societies, and in particular societies in the West, have adopted a view, reflected in their
economic policy, that there is a property right in copyright. It is, to a significant extent,
this property right that has created tension between advocates for strong copyright laws to
2/3 1 Ric. 3, c.9 (1483); 25 Hen. 8, c.15 (1533).
274 See infra, 101-02.
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protect such rights and advocates for weaker copyright laws to promote access and
encourage education.275
It does not appear that there was any "copyright" law regarding the right to make
copies in the ancient world.276 Yet, there was a belief among some ancient creators that
their artistic creations were their possessions and that they were entitled to profit by their
labour. Prior to the introduction of the printing press, photography, videotape, copy
machine, computer, tape recorder, etc.... stealing another's artistic creations was difficult
but not impossible. While the visualization of some scribe furiously chiseling away at a
stone tablet in order to steal the words of some great orator may bemuse us in this
modern era of techno-copying it was not amusing to those who had their works usurped.
Despite this belief that an artistic creation belonged to the creator there appears to
be an abundance of evidence that the ancients freely pilfered stories and expressions from
each other. For example, some have noted the remarkable similarities between the
diluvial story related in the Epic of Gilgamesh and that ofNoah in the Christian bible.277
278Even within the bible itself there appears to be instances of heavy borrowing.
275 See World Summit on the Information Society ("WSIS"), Declaration of Principles
Building the Information Society: a global challenge in the new Millennium, (12 Dec.
2003) DocumentWSIS-03/GENEVA/DOC/4-E:
24. The ability for all to access and contribute information, ideas and knowledge is
essential ....
25. The sharing and strengthening of global knowledge for development can be
enhanced by removing barriers to equitable access to information for ...educational ...
activities ... by facilitating access to public domain information....
26. A rich public domain is an essential element for the growth of the Information
Society,...Public institutions...should be strengthened so as to promote...free and
equitable access to information.
276 AUGUSTINE BIRRELL, SEVEN LECTURES ON THE LAW AND HISTORY OF
COPYRIGHT IN BOOKS 9 (1899).
277 GEORGE HAVEN PUTNAM, AUTHORS AND THEIR PUBLIC IN ANCIENT
TIMES (3rd ed 1967). See, THE EPIC OF GILGAMESH; A NEW TRANSLATION 88
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(Andrew George trans. 1999), Tablet XI, Immortality Denied: Tear down (this) house,
build a ship!...Aboard the ship take thou the seed ofall living things ....On the seventh day
the ship was completed....All myfamily and Tdn I made go aboard the ship. The beasts of
thefield, the wild creatures of thefield, ....Six days and six nights Blows theflood wind,
as the south-storm sweeps the land. When the seventh day arrived, Theflood (-carrying)
south-storm subsided in the battle,.... Compare, the Bible, King James version, Genesis
6: [13] And God said unto Noah, The end ofallflesh is come before me; for the earth is
filled with violence through them; and,behold, Iwill destroy them with the earth.
[14] Make thee an ark ofgopher wood; ...[17] And, behold, I, even I, do bring a flood of
waters upon the earth, to destroy all flesh, wherein is the breath oflife, from under
heaven; and every thing that is in the earth shall die....[19] And ofevery living thing of
allflesh, two ofevery sort shalt thou bring into the ark, to keep them alive with thee; they
shall be male andfemale. Genesis 7: ...[10] And it came to pass after seven days, that the
waters of theflood were upon the earth.
278 For example, Genesis 19: [1] And there came two angels to Sodom at even; and Lot
sat in the gate ofSodom: and Lot seeing them rose up to meet them;
and he bowed himselfwith his face toward the ground; [2] And he said, Behold now, my
lords, turn in, Ipray you, into your servant's house, and tarry all night, and wash your
feet, andye shall rise up early, and go on your ways. And they said, Nay; but we will
abide in the street all night. [3] And hepressed upon them greatly; and they turned in
unto him, and entered into his house; and he made them a feast, and did
bake unleavened bread, and they did eat. [4] But before they lay down, the men ofthe
city, even the men ofSodom, compassed the house round, both old andyoung, all the
peoplefrom every quarter: [5] And they called unto Lot, and said unto him, Where are
the men which came in to thee this night? bring them out unto us, that we may know
them. [6] And Lot went out at the door unto them, and shut the door after him,
[7] And said, Ipray you, brethren, do not so wickedly. [8] Behold now, I have two
daughters which have not known man; let me, Iprayyou, bring them out unto you, and
do ye to them as is good in your eyes: only unto these men do nothing; for therefore came
they under the shadow ofmy roof. Compare Judgments 19: [17] And when he had lifted
up his eyes, he saw a wayfaring man in the street ofthe city: and the old man said,
Whither goest thou? and whence comest thou? [18] And he said unto him, We are
passingfrom Bethlehemjudah toward the side ofmount Ephraim; ... and there is no man
that receiveth me to house.... [20] And the old man said, Peace be with thee; howsoever
let all thy wants lie upon me; only lodge not in the street. [21] So he brought him into his
house, and gaveprovender unto the asses: and they washed theirfeet, and did eat and
drink. [22] Now as they were making their hearts merry, behold, the men ofthe city,...,
beset the house round about, and beat at the door, and spake to the master of the house,
the old man, saying, Bringforth the man that came into thine house, that we may know
him. [23] And the man, the master ofthe house, went out unto them, Nay, my brethren,
nay, Ipray you, do not so wickedly; seeing that this man is come into mine house, do not
thisfolly. [24] Behold, here is my daughter a maiden, and his concubine; them Iwill
bring out now, and humble ye them, and do with them
what seemeth good unto you: but unto this man do not so vile a thing.
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Plagiarism seems to have been endemic in the ancient world.' While plagiarism
is not the functional equivalent of copyright, the term plagiarism along with the concerns
of the victims of plagiarism provide insight into the birth of a premise to call a creation
"mine"; a property right in a creation. Admittedly, there is no evidence from the ancient
period that there were written laws directly on point to guard against the kidnapping of
artistic expression.280 This lack of legislation, however, should not be interpreted as a
lack of concern regarding the conduct. We in the modern era of legislative neurosis
should not attempt to transport modern notions that all things moral need a corresponding
law to the ancient world. It is possible that law evolves and develops without recourse to
statutes due to social, political and economic pressures.281 In fact, there was
condemnation in parts of the ancient world for plagiarism.282
1. Interests in Creative Works in Ancient Greece.
The ancient Greeks represent a transition society from an oral tradition to a
literate tradition in the first millennium B.C.E.283 The social, political and economic
279 ALEXANDER LINDEY, PLAGIARISM AND ORIGINALITY 65 (1952); H. M.
PAULL, LITERARY ETHICS: A STUDY IN THE GROWTH OF THE LITERARY
CONSCIENCE 103 (1929).
280
PUTNAM, supra note 277 at 54; A.R.W. HARRISON, THE LAW OF ATHENS
(1968); BRUCE W. BUGBEE, GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND
COPYRIGHT LAW 12-13 (1967).
281 RALPH SEALEY, THE JUSTICE OF THE GREEKS 12-13 (1997).
282
PAULL, supra note 279 at 103.
283 >Paul Edward Geller, CopyrightHistoiy and the Future: What's Culture Got to do
With it?, 47 J. COPYRIGHT SOC. U.S.A." 209, 210 (2000). See PLATO, PHAEDRUS
(Benjamin Jowett Trans. 1871) available at
http://plato.evansville.edu/texts/jowett/phaedrusl4.htm:
Socrates. At the Egyptian city ofNaucratis, there was a famous old god, whose name was
Theuth; ... and he was the inventor ofmany arts, ... but his great discovery was the use of
letters. Now in those days the god Thamus was the king of the whole country ofEgypt; ....
To him came Theuth and showed his inventions, desiring that the other Egyptians might
be allowed to have the benefit of them he enumerated them, and Thamus enquired about
their several uses, .... But when they came to letters, This, said Theuth, will make the
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policies of a culture based upon an oral tradition are different from a culture that has
reduced its oral tradition to a tangible medium.284 Obviously, there is little documentary
evidence of laws remaining from an oral tradition culture leaving future generations to
speculate as to what laws existed. Even with literate societies, evidence may be scant
depending upon whether the laws were codified or based upon an early form of common
law. With respect to the literate ancient Greek society, it is not surprising that
archeologists have been unable to find evidence of laws that addressed plagiarism
directly let alone copyright. There is little evidence remaining about any codified Greek
law.285 Further, it seems as though the Greeks did not have the annoying habit of
reducing all legal principles to a Procrustean medium.286 This does not mean, however,
that there was no legal redress or social repercussions for plagiarism.
A familiar theme of social attitudes regarding plagiarism in ancient Greece may
be gleaned from ancient Greek plays which were the political and social commentary of
that time.287 For example, in Aristophanes' play Frogs Dionysus, the divine patron of
Egyptians wiser and give them better memories; it is a specific both for the memory and
for the wit. Thamus replied: O most ingenious Theuth, theparent or inventor ofan art is
not always the bestjudge ofthe utility or inutility ofhis own inventions to the users of
them. And in this instance, you who are thefather ofletters, from a paternal love ofyour
own children have been led to attribute to them a quality which they cannot have; for this
discovery ofyours will createforgetfulness in the learners' souls, because they will not
use their memories; they will trust to the external written characters and not remember of
themselves. The specific which you have discovered is an aid not to memory, but to
reminiscence, andyou giveyour disciples not truth, but only the semblance oftruth; they
will be hearers ofmany things and will have learned nothing; they will appear to be
omniscient and will generally know nothing; they will be tiresome company, having the
show ofwisdom without the reality
284
Geller, supra note 283 at 210.
285 DOUGLAS M. MACDOWELL, THE LAW IN CLASSICAL ATHENS, 42-43
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286 Id. at 46; Demonsthenes, Against Boeotus, (J.H. Vince, M.A. Translation) 477(Boe.
38-41 1935, Loeb Classical Library).
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drama, journeys to the underworld to bring back the tragic poet Euripides. Once in the
underworld, Dionysus finds a contest in progress between Euripides and the tragic poet
TEeschylus for the Throne of Poetry. Dionysus is selected to judge who between these
contestants is the greater poet. As the characters of Euripides and Aeschylus first take
the stage they are slinging insults at each other, including an accusation of plagiarism
from TEeschylus:
AZeschylus: How say 'st thou, Son o' goddess of the Greens? -
You dare speak thus ofme, you phrase/collector,
Blind/beggar/bard and scum ofrifled rag/bags!
Oh, you shall rue it!
Mypoetry survived me: his died with him. 288
It is apparent from this satirical treatment ofplagiarism that there was a belief in a
possessory interest in a creative work and that the ancient Greek culture considered
plagiarism reprehensible.289 This early manifestation of the concept of "mine" will later
lead to the treatment of creative expressions as a property right thus embedding creative
expressions further in economic policies.
Another example of a belief in a property interest in a creation is recounted by the
Roman architect, Marci Vitruvius in Book VII in his seminal work "The Ten Books on
Architecture" giving an interesting overview about an act of plagiarism at a festival and
its punishment in the crossover period in Egypt between the ancient Greek influence and
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Alexandria. After construction was completed a poetry contest was held with prizes for
the victorious authors. According to Vitruvius:
A group ofpoets was first brought in to contend, and, as they recited their
compositions, the whole audience by its applause showed the judges what it
approved. So, when they were individually askedfor their votes, the six agreed,
and awarded thefirstprize to the poet who, as they observed, had mostpleased
the multitude, and the second to the one who came next. ButAristophanes, on
being askedfor his vote, urged that thepoet who had leastpleased the audience
should be declared to be thefirst.
As the king and the entire assembly showed great indignation, he arose, and
asked and receivedpermission to speak. Silence being obtained, he stated that
only one ofthem — his man — was a poet, and that the rest had recited things not
their own; furthermore, thatjudges ought to give their approval, not to thefts, but
to compositions. Thepeople were amazed, and the king hesitated, but
Aristophanes, trusting his memory, had a vast number ofvolumes brought out
from bookcases which he specified, and, by comparing them with what had been
recited, obliged the thieves themselves to make confession. So, the king gave
orders that they should be accused of theft, and after condemnation sent them off
in disgrace;....29
Vitruvius was a first century B.C.E. Roman architect who related this story in the
introductory section in book VII of his seminal work on architecture to emphasize the
debt his art owed to those who preceded him. He goes on to recognize, by name, the
works of others that he drew upon "as it were water from springs... ."291 By his conduct
he was invoking an act of attribution; a moral right of copyright law granted under
modern legislation.292 His story about Aristophanes the Grammarian indicates a notion
of a property interest in a creation along with the ideal of attribution going back at least
as far as the first century B.C.E.293
290
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2. Interests in Creative Works in Ancient Roman.
The authors of ancient Rome were in an interesting juxtaposition in relation to
their ancient Greek counter parts. Being the conquerors, they were for all practical
purposes free to pilfer from the vanquished including the literary works of the Greeks.294
Moribus actionis res stat Romana virisque.295 Certainly, imitation is the highest form of
compliment296 and the ancient Romans did hold the literary works of the ancient Greeks
in high esteem.297 Yet, such altruistic motives apparently held little value when one was
298the victim of the compliment. Thus, while Virgil imitated Homer and purloined verses
from his fellow Romans299 he reputedly complained when accorded with reciprocal
compliments.300
The first century A.D. Roman epigrammatist Martial is credited with the first use
of the term plagium301 to describe the conduct of those who borrowed from his works.
His epigrams on the subject reflect his strong views regarding this practice:
To your charge I entrust, Quintianus, my works - if, after all, I can call those
mine which thatpoet ofyours recites. Ifthey complain oftheir grievous
servitude, comeforward as their champion and give bailfor them; and when that
fellow calls himself their owner, say that they are mine, sentforth from my hand.
Ifthrice andfour times you shout this, you will shame theplagiarist.302
294
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Rumour asserts, Fidentinus, that you recite my works to the crowd, just as if
they were your own. Ifyou wish they should be called mine, I will sendyou
thepoems gratis; ifyou wish them to be calledyours, buy my disclaimer of
them.303
There is one page ofyours, Fidentinus, in a book ofmine - a page, too, stamped
by the distinct likeness of its master - which convicts yourpoems ofpalpable
theft.... My books need no title orjudge to prove them; yourpage stares you in
the face, and calls you "thief. "304
Martial's use of the terms plagium, thief and "my works" with regard to those he believes
are taking his creative expression reflects some belief in a possessory interest in creative
works. In support ofMartial's protestations regarding his claims of ownership over his
creative works the Roman concept of natural law, as discussed in more detail below,
justified ownership for the fruits of ones labour.305 Accordingly, the labour theory so
many attribute to Locke306 can be traced back at least as far as the Roman period.
Unlike the Greeks, the Romans had more specific, codified laws; however, much
is missing from the historic record thus leaving the scope and breadth of the law to
speculation. Certainly, there is no evidence to date of a copyright code in ancient Rome.
Yet, the laws that we do have evidence a possibility for a possessory interests in creative
works reflecting some economic policy to encourage creations. Under Roman natural
law theory there is support for artists' rights. Thus, one who created was entitled to the
value for the creation. For example, in The Institutes ofGaius307 commentary is given
304 Id. at 64-65.
305 THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN, TEXT, TRANSLATION AND
COMMENTARY, 71 (II, 1, §§35-37) (J.A.C. Thomas trans., 1975)(hereinafter
JUSTINIAN).
306 See generally, JOHN LOCKE, THE TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, Book
II, ch. 5 (1994 ed.).
307 THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS AND THE RULES OF ULPIAN, (James Muirhead
trans., Edinburgh 1880)(hereinafter "GAIUS").
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regarding actions based upon the misappropriation of things {res), including artistic
works:
And again, ifI have agreed with a goldsmith that he shall make me with his own
gold some rings ofa certain weight andpattern, and get say two hundred denarii
for them, it is a point ofcontroversy whether this bepurchase and sale or location
and conduction. Cassius thinks there is purchase and sale ofmaterial, location
and conduction ofthe labour expended upon it; but the general opinion is that the
contract is one ofpurchase and sale. But ifIprovide the gold, agreeing to give
the goldsmith so much for his labour, the contract is admittedly one of location
and conduction.308
This is significant as it establishes that the ancient Romans assigned some economic
value to the creative process, similar to Locke's natural law theory regarding the fruits of
ones labour, and that Roman law provided some recourse to the courts to obtain that
value.
Roman law applied to several legal questions including the question ofwho was
the owner of an end product made out of another's material - he who made the end
product or he who owned the material?309 This question is interesting in the copyright
context as it evidences a legal dilemma addressed by the Roman's with regard to the
ownership of the creative process. For example, if one makes a vase out of another's
gold who owns the vase? If one makes an eye-salve out of someone else's drugs who
owns the eye-salve? The natural law solution, according to Roman law was:
...if theproduct can be reduced again to its original material, he who was owner
ofthe material owns the thing; but if it cannot be so reduced, then he rather is
owner who makes the thing. 10
308 Id. at 233 (III, §147).
309
JUSTINIAN, supra, note 305 at 68-69 (II, 1, §25).
310 Id. at 68 (II, 1, §25).
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This result did not mean that the owner ofmaterials made into an irreducible nova
species was without recourse.311 However, this does indicate recognition of ownership in
the creative process.312
Another legal dilemma that the Roman's resolved through the use of natural law
involved the issue of ownership of an end product with respect to a writing or painting:
Writing, again, even though it be in gold lettering, accedes to the paper or vellum
in the same manner that buildings accede to the land or the seeds planted therein.
Thus, ifTitius write a song or narrative on yourpaper or vellum, not Titius but
you will be regarded as the owner thereof. But ifyou claim your books or vellum
from Titius but are unwilling to pay the cost of the writing, Titius can put up the
defense offraud, assuming - that is - that he is in possession ofthe paper or
vellum in goodfaith. Ifone person paints on another's board, there are some
who think that the board accedes to thepicture while others hold that the picture,
whichever it be, accedes to the board. To us, however, it appears preferable that
the board accedes to the painting: for it is absurd that a painting by Apelles or
Parrhasius should, by accession, becomes part ofa cheap board. Hence, if the
artist seek the paintingfrom the owner ofthe board who is in possession of it and
does not give theprice ofthe board, he can be met with the defense offraud; but,
equally, ifthepainter be in possession, itfollows that the owner ofthe board will
be given against him an extended action (action utilis); in which case, ifthe
owner be unwilling to pay the cost of thepainting, he can be repelled by the
defense offraud, assuming thepainter to be a possessor in goodfaith ofthe
painting. It goes without saying, ofcourse, that the owner has the action for theft
in respect ofthe board, whether it be stolen by the artist or by someone else.3'3
This example, given by both Gaius and Justinian, reflects some consideration given by
the Roman's to the issue of ownership of the creative process. 314 Of further import is
the specific mention of the artists, Apelles315 and Parrhasius316 showing some value in
311 Id. at 78-79; GAIUS, supra, note 307 at 2.79.
312
JUSTINIAN, supra, note 305 at 78.
313
JUSTINIAN, supra, note 305 at 70-71 (II, 1, §§33-34).
3,4 Id. at 78.
315 Late 4th cent.-early 3rd cent. BC) Greek painter. Available at
http://education.yahoo.com/search/be?lb=t&p=url%3Aa/apelles.
316 "Greek painter. A native of Ephesus (now in Turkey) who settled in Athens, he was
praised by ancient critics as a master of outline drawing." Available at
http://education.yahoo.com/search/be?lb=t&p=url%3Ap/parrhasius.
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reputation to the artist and the inference regarding increased economic value to a board
by the painting of an artist of such a high caliber.
B. The Medieval Period and Control Over Creative Works by Church and
State.
The fall of the Roman Empire in the West occurred around 476 A.D.317 Despite
the demise of a central authority in the West, literature continued to prosper. At about the
time the Western Roman Empire was collapsing the Christian church was beginning to
fill the social, political and economic instability created by the power vacuum with the
fall of the Western Roman Empire.318 In its battle to wrestle control from temporal
powers the Church found the production and distribution ofmanuscripts beneficial.319
Preserving canon law was one critical step in gaining power. At the end of the
fifth century A.D. a Greek, Dionysius Exiguus, compiled a collection of conciliar canons
dating from the councils ofNicea and Constantinople I (381 A.D.).320 He also compiled
a collection ofpapal decretal letters beginning with Pope Siricius (385-398) and ending
with Pope Anastasius II (496-498.) These two works were combined in a Corpus
Canonum, which scholars refer to as Collectio Dionysiana. This work was not performed
gratis as it seems Dionysius Exiguus was commissioned to create these works by Pope
Gelasius I (492-496 A.D.) and Pope Hormisdas (514-523 A.D.)321
317 Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite, The Globalisation OfRegulation, available at
http://www.oiprc.ox.ac.uk/EJWP0200.html, at 6 (2000).
318 L.D. REYNOLDS & N.G. WILSON, SCRIBES AND SCHOLARS: A GUIDE TO
THE TRANSMISSION OF GREEK AND LATIN LITERATURE 70 (1986).
319 GEORGE H. PUTNAM, BOOKS AND THEIR MAKERS IN THE MIDDLE AGES,
vol. I, 81 (1896)(hereinafter "MIDDLE AGES").
320 KENNETH PENNINGTON, A SHORT HISTORY OF CANON LAW FROM
APOSTOLIC TIMES TO 1917, 6, available at
http://faculty.cua.edu/pennington/Canon%Law/ShortHistoryCanonLaw.htm.
321 Id. at 6-7.
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The written word was a powerful political tool during this period. The high value
placed on manuscripts and issues relating to their copy may be gleaned from the story of
Saint Columba's copying his masters' book of Psalter, which is based upon oral tradition
but reduced to writing at least as early as 15 32.322 As the story goes Saint Columba, while
visiting his master the abbot Finnian, made an unauthorized copy of Finnian's Psalter at
night while none could observe what he was doing; or so he thought. A passer-by
noticed the light by which Saint Columba was copying and observed through a window
the not-so-saintly act of Columba's copying. This was reported to Finnian who claimed
this act to be a theft and the copy to be his as he was the owner of the original. Columba
refused to give up the copy and the matter was submitted to the High King, Diarmid. The
judgment rendered by the king was in favor of Finnian, to wit: "To every cow her calf,
and consequently to evety book its copy. "323 While some commentators dispute the
veracity of this story324 it does reflect a social attitude regarding the copying of written
works going back at least to 15 32.325 Further, it reflects a private interest possessed by
322 Saint Columba lived around 560 A.D. The story has been attributed to Adomnan's
life of Columba (around 628 A.D.) However, a reading of Adomnan does not directly
refer to this tale. It merely mentions an act by Columba that was not very egregious but
caused the Saint to leave Ireland. (ADOMNAN'S, LIFE OF COLUMBA, (Alan Orr
Anderson and Maijorie Ogilvie Anderson Trans. (1991)), at 185.) The earliest written
reference I could locate was by MAGHNAS O'DOMHNAILL, BETHA COLAIM
CHILLE, 141 (1532) (ed. A. O'Kelleher and G. Schoepperle (1994), {"To every book its
transcript.".)
323 MIDDLE AGES, supra, note 319 at 46.
324 For example, see Brendan Scott, Copyright in a Frictionless World: Toward a
Rhetoric ofResponsibility, 6 First Monday 1, 3 (2001), available at
http://firstmonday.org/issues/issue6 9/scott/; BIRRELL, supra, note 276 at 42.
325 I believe that this story reflects a much earlier social attitude regarding the copying
ofwritten materials as there is quite often at least a grain of truth in stories based upon
oral tradition; for example the existence of Troy. However, unlike Troy, which left
physical evidence to establish the truth of the matter asserted by Homer, the social
attitudes ofmembers of an oral culture leaves no physical evidence resulting in
speculation and conjecture regarding such issues.
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the owner of the book. These private interests took priority over any public interest to
access, which was not even mentioned.
At around the twelfth century universities started to get involved in the
manuscript business.326 In the thirteenth century we see the emergence of regulations
327
concerning the production and distribution ofmanuscripts in Italy. For a period of
time up until the fifteenth century books in university towns had to be rented from the
328
stationarii, a university official. The stationarri was responsible for maintaining a
sufficient stock of books, authorized and verified translations and copies, and ordered or
recommended books to be used in courses.329 Some rented books were not allowed to be
carried out of the university town.330 Regulations also appear to have addressed
manuscript dealers during this period. As early as 1275 statutes specified what texts a
dealer could sell, the number of copies, and a schedule ofprices for rent or sale.331 The
manuscript dealers and the stationariis obtained these works by purchasing them from the
authors. The author would sell or rent the work for copying and distribution.3,2 The
focus had changed from one of attribution in the ancient period to one of a political and
commercial nature; namely distribution. The Christian world was not concerned with the
moral rights of the author; it was concerned with the power of the written word. The
326
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author could be bought, the content and distribution controlled, and the message
delivered; at least to the literate people.333
C. The Introduction of the Printing Press Caused a Shift in Western
Economic Policy.
The introduction of the printing press was an early, key development that
influenced an adjustment in economic policy. First, the printing press created a need to
establish a domestic printing industry. This was necessary for several reasons such as to
provide domestic access to creative works, particularly information; to better control
access to information; and to compete with foreign trade. Second, the printing press
introduced the concept of allowing for the recapture of costs invested in machinery,
supplies and labour plus a profit to induce businessmen to invest in the new printing
industry - an early concept of return on investment ("ROI").334 Finally, the
mechanization of printing created a problem ofmarket failure. Market failure stems from
the fact that information is nonrivalrous, that is, once it is created it is inexhaustible; the
making of a copy of information does not deprive the owner of the original. Further, if
the cost of copying is inexpensive, in terms of time and money, free-riders, people who
copy a creation without paying for the right to do so, will reduce the ROI.335 Thus,
•> -J -3
The use of the written word as a means of power and control can be traced back to
the early development ofwriting in Mesopotamia. The few remaining records of
antiquity show the use ofwriting for palace and temple accounts, commerce and the
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market failure occurs when there is no market for a good either due to free-riders or a
price beyond the markets ability to pay.
The ability of the church and state to control the content and dissemination of the
written word suffered a setback with the invention of the printing press in 143 6.336 This
problem was addressed with new regulations and the beginning of copyright laws. For
example, in Venice the College of Venice, and sometimes its Senate, granted monopoly
privileges for the printing and copying of books. In 1469 such a privilege was granted to
one John Speyer, a printer, for a five-year period.337 Again in Venice in 1486 an author,
one Antonio Sabellico, was granted the sole right for an indefinite period of time to
publish or authorize publication ofhis works.338
The historical development of copyright law in the United Kingdom is
particularly helpful due to its subsequent influence in the international field and on other
States, such as the United States. Copyright law in the United Kingdom has been traced
back to the fifteenth century with the introduction of printing.339 When William Caxton
introduced the printing press in England in 1477340 he planted the seed of the debate
between access and author's rights. At first this novelty of printing seemed of little
import; printing could be of benefit to Church and Crown as a means to disseminate their
propaganda.341 For his part, Caxton seemed to be motivated by access concerns such as a
336 See PUTNAM, supra, note 277 at vol. II, 342.
337
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338 Id. at 345.
339 See E.P. SKONE JAMES, SIR JOHN MUMMERY, J.E. RAYNER JAMES, K.M.
GARNETT, COPINGER AND SKONE ON COPYRIGHT 7 (13th ed) (1991).
340 JOHN FEATHER, PUBLISHING, PIRACY AND POLITICS (AN HISTORICAL
STUDY OF COPYRIGHT IN BRITAIN) 10 (1994).
341 HENRY R. PLOMER, WILLIAM CAXTON 85 (1925).
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desire to educate and enlighten his countrymen with literature at a reasonable cost,342
however, Caxton's motives were not purely altruistic as access was not free. He
accurately predicted the market by translating numerous texts into English and published
English writers such as Geoffrey Chaucer and John Lydgate. Thus, although there may
have been a comparatively small percentage of the population who were literate at this
time, Caxton exploited this market to its fullest.343 While there was some competition for
Caxton in the London market within two years after he set up shop344 they posed no
threat; primarily because they did not print their texts in English.345
In the United Kingdom copyright began as commercial laws enacted to encourage
the printing of books.346 The primary focus of one of the first statutes in England dealing
with the printing trade was enacted during the reign ofKing Richard III and addresses the
restrain of trade with respect to Italian wool merchants.347 Yet, at the end of this
restrictive statute, after eleven paragraphs of restrictions against alien merchants,
paragraph XII states:
Provided always that this Act, or anypart thereof, or any other Act made or to be
made in this said Parliament, shall not extend or be in Prejudice, Disturbance,
Damage, or Impediment to any Artificer, orMerchant Stranger, ofwhat Nation or
Country he be or shall be of, for bringing into this Realm, or selling by Retail or
otherwise, any Books written orprinted, orfor inhabiting within this said Realm
for the same Intent, or any Scrivener, Alluminor, Reader, or Printer ofsuch
Books, which he hath or shall have to sell by way ofMerchandise, orfor their
343 Id. at 91-96; RICHARD DEACON,WILLIAM CAXTON 126 (1976).
344
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dwelling within this said Realm for the Exercise ofsaid Occupations, this Act or
any Part thereofnotwithstanding,348
This legislation appears to be in response to a need for the encouragement of an infant
industry within the Realm or possibly to encourage learning and the access to
information.
From 1477 to 1709 the economic policy for authors and the printing trade was
reflected in the basic concept of ROI for disseminators and control of content by the state.
With respect to the printing industry, disseminators invested in the purchase of creative
works, machinery, supplies and labour to create printed matter to sell. The method
agreed upon by the state and the printing industry to protect the ROI was a monopoly for
disseminators of potentially unlimited duration. In 1504 the Crown started to grant Royal
Prerogatives, a license also known as letters patents, for the right to print certain
materials.349 This power, vested in the Crown, was based upon an alleged property right
held by the Crown to grant certain privileges to subjects for the exclusive use of Crown
property.350 Thus, printers who were in favor with the Crown were granted the exclusive
right to print specified materials such as Bibles and service books, statutes and
proclamations, law books and almanacs.351
Regulation by the Crown over the press expanded in the succeeding years and in
1533 King Henry VIII repealed the free trade in books statute enacted by Richard III.352
THE STATUTES AT LARGE, v.2, p.62 (1763).
349
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352 25 Hen. 8, c.15 (1533) repealing 1 Ric. 3, c.9 (1483).
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Entitled "An Act for Printers and Binders ofBooks", 25 Hen.8, c.15 specifically found
that 1 Ric. 3, c.9:
seemeth to be, for that there were butfew Books, andfew Printers within this
Realm at that Time, which could well exercise the said Craft ofPrinting,.... 5
In the eyes of the Crown this problem had been rectified and, indeed, a new problem had
arisen of strangers providing too many books so that:
many ofthe King's Subjects, being Binders ofBooks, and having no other Faculty
wherewith to get their Living, be destitute ofWork, and like to be undone....554
Accordingly, foreigners were no longer allowed to sell books in retail (gross was
allowed) in the Realm. Books of violators were to be seized. However, in order to avoid
excessive pricing of books due to this statute, a person could bring a complaint alleging
unreasonable prices and if the prices were found unreasonable the offender would forfeit
the books and the authorities authorized to hear such matters could set the price. This
price provision may have been included to meet the needs of academia and the Church
and gives some indication of a limited desire to expand domestic learning within the
framework of a trade restriction. Here, we begin to see the emergence of an economic
policy reflecting the public's interest in access competing with political and economic
interests. The commercial interests are still tied to the political interests of control but
access is beginning to emerge as a valuable interest to safeguard. Another interesting
observation is the commodification of creative works and its tie to trade issues. As with
icc
the statute it revoked, 25 Hen. 8, c. 15 is tied to trade and the protection of industry.
353 Id.
354 Id.
355 1 Ric. 3, supra note 347 at c.9.
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The link between economic policies in advancing education, protecting an infant industry
and trade were not originated in the nineteenth or twentieth centuries.
Although the Royal Prerogative was based on a property right of the Crown it did
not apparently vest in the recipient a fee simple absolute. Rather, it seems to be akin to a
fee simple conditional; conditioned upon the pleasure of the Crown. For example, in
1553 Queen Mary I took away from the Queen's Printer the privilege to print books of
356
common law and gave it to one Richard Tottel, an established printer of law books.
Accordingly, it does not appear that there was, in this period, an absolute property right in
printers to make copies. As with many property rights, there were exceptions for various
reasons.
One alleged purpose for the granting of exclusive privileges in printing was to
ensure that essential books were readily available.357 While this appears to be an access
motive, this process also ensured that the Crown could control what was printed. It is
clear that at this time the Crown was concerned with its hold on power and wanted to
control the printed word. For example, there were laws against printing materials that
358*
were deemed malicious, false, seditious or slanderous against the Crown. This was, of
course, stated to be for the public good.359
The system of regulation of printed matter by Royal Prerogative assumed a dual
track when in 1556 the Stationers' Company was granted its charter.360 The Stationers'
356
FEATHER, supra note 340 at 12.
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Company, a guild established around 13 5 7,361 desired an exclusive right to print to
protect their members' investment. The Crown saw this granting of an exclusive right as
useful to co-opt the Stationers' Company into serving the Crown's desire of
censorship.362 At the time the charter was granted there were ninety-seven persons listed
as members.363 Under Queen Mary,364 the Stationers' Company was granted a virtual
monopoly over the printing and bookselling trade. This was expanded under the reign of
Queen Elizabeth I. In essence, no one was allowed to print or sell a book unless it was
properly registered with the Stationers' Company. To be registered, the book must have
been licensed as fit and could not infringe on any other person's right in the copy of the
book.365 However, no one could register a book if a Royal Prerogative had already
granted an exclusive right to print and sell that book.
Elizabeth I ofEngland acceded to the throne in 1558 and continued this use of the
Stationers' Company to enforce censorship. In 1559 the Queen issued rules governing
the press, to wit, no book was to be published unless it had first been licensed as
acceptable by Crown appointed censors.366 Indeed, as with her half-sister Queen Mary,
Queen Elizabeth was concerned, for the public good no doubt, about printed words that
could undermine the authority of the Crown.367 The ultimate power of censorship rested
361
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362
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with the Star Chamber, a quasi-judicial body comprised of members of the Privy Council
and other designated members of church and state.368
James VI of Scotland became James I of England in 1602. While little is written
regarding the Stationers Company during the first halfof the seventeenth century, it does
appears that rights to copy were bought, sold, inherited and used as security during this
time thus adding to and reinforcing the belief that a right to copy was a property right.369
But social attitudes were changing with respect to a perpetual monopoly right. In 1623
the Monopolies Act was passed limiting, for a term of years, the exclusive right to a
monopoly with respect to an invention.370 However, letters patents, or grants of
privileges regarding printing, past, present or future, were specifically excluded from the
•571
act. Accordingly, the granting of Royal Prerogatives for the exclusive right to print
and disseminate specified written materials continued in the seventeenth century. Indeed,
368 LORD MACAULAY, HISTORY OF ENGLAND v. 1, 70-71 (1967 Heron Books
ed.) The Star Chamber had jurisdiction over the printing of allegedly seditious material,
would hold hearings and pass judgment. The punishment for such acts included being set
in the pillory, having the nose slit, an ear cut off, a check branded, imprisonment, and
whipping. HENRY HALLAM, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND
v.2, 37 (1863) (discussing the Star Chamber cases of Leighton, Lilburne and Prynne.)
Thus, while the Stationers' Company did have coercive powers for search and seizure
(FEATHER, supra note 340 at 23) the Star Chamber had ultimate power to control the
printed word through fear and torture and would issue decrees regarding the regulation of
the press. For example, in 1585 the Star Chamber issued a decree reasserting the
authority of the Stationers' Company and requiring the licensing of books prior to
printing. COPINGER ON THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT IN WORKS OF
LITERATURE, ART, ARCHITECTURE, PHOTOGRAPHY, MUSIC AND THE
DRAMA, 4 (7th ed. 1927); Millar v. Taylor, 98 E.R 201, 206 (K.B. 1769).
369
Indeed, this treatment of rights in copies seems to be traced back as far as 1563. See
FEATHER, supra note 340 at 17-34.
370 21 Jac. C.3 (1623).
371 21 Jac. at section X.
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the proclamation for the Monopolies Act confirmed the Star Chamber's decree of 1585
restating search and seizure powers vested in the Stationers' Company.372
Over the years political power to censure and economic control by the monopoly
were abused. This resulted in reduced access to creative works due to content control and
price.373 But a change in the political and philosophical environment in the seventeenth
century allowed the advocates of access to gain more prominence in the economic debate.
Additionally, as advances in printing technology decreased the cost ofprinting the
economic justification based upon ROI decreased. In essence, while a reasonable ROI
may be acceptable, a monopoly lasting longer than necessary for the recapture of that
reasonable ROI was not justified as it restricted access causing other negative social and
economic effects.
Political difficulties between the Crown and Parliament became the focus of
attention under the reign of Charles I (1624-1649). In the battle for power between
Charles I and Parliament both sides recognized the power of the press. At this time
political pamphlets were being printed and distributed to spread the propaganda of the
various factions and incite disruption.374 In 1637 the Star Chamber again issued a decree
confirming the authority of the Stationers' Company to regulate the press in an attempt to
stem the flow of unlicensed information.375 This is one of the last recorded acts we have
FEATHER, supra note 340 at 35; Millar v. Taylor, 98 E.R. at 206.
373 See MOGLEN, supra note 334 at 2.
374
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regarding the Star Chamber's decrees in matters of printing for in 1640 the Star Chamber
was abolished.376
After the Star Chamber was abolished there was chaos in the printing trade. Both
sides during the English civil war377 were attempting to seize control of the press but the
Stationers' Company was ill equipped to enforce censorship let alone alleged property
rights during this period. Parliament, in an attempt to regain some control over the
printed word, issued an order in January 1642 that the author of a written work must be
acknowledged by name before the work could be printed and sold. This ordinance was
not so much a predecessor to the moral right of attribution as it was an attempt to identify
and hold accountable authors of scandalous works.378 But, as we are experiencing today
with the Internet, the Genii was out of the bottle. For over a year the public was
experiencing an unregulated press. Inexpensive information, particularly regarding
political events, was being disseminated in vast quantities.379 Parliament attempted to
cork that overflowing bottle of information in 1643 with a licensing ordinance but this
met with resistance and does not seem to have been ofmuch effect.380
The cause of resistance to another licensing requirement for the press was taken
up by the poet John Milton in his attempted to dissuade Parliament from such an act with
his work Areopagitica written in 1643. As with many earlier government attempts to
censor the press, the 1643 Ordinance of Parliament professed to be for the public good.
Milton questioned the validity of this by pointing out that it was in the public good to
376 16 Car. c.10 (1640); COPINGER, supra note 368 at 4; Millar v. Taylor, 98 E.R at
207; HALLAM, supra note 368 at v.2, 333.
377 1 642-51
378
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380
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have a press free of licensing requirements.381 In Milton's Areopagitica we see a plea for
a press free from prior restraint to encourage the advancement of education in the name
of the public good. While this may not be the first expression of the notion that access to
information through printing benefited the public, Milton inspired subsequent emissaries
of education such as John Locke.382 Unfortunately, he did not inspire Parliament, which
did not reverse its ordinance and, in fact, issued another ordinance in 1649 attempting to
forbid the copying without consent of the holder of the right in the copy.383
Milton was not against all forms of censorship or regulation of the printed word.
Indeed, he seems to have believed that the law should provide some redress for the
printing of "monster" books.384 Additionally, Milton supported the notion that there was
a property right for the holder of the right to copy.385 The Areopagitica is, primarily, a
plea against prior restraint in the name of the advancement of knowledge. Thus, the
importance of information for education in connection with the public good was starting
to take a more prominent position in the struggle for control of the printed word and was
premised on philosophical beliefs in this period.
The Commonwealth period (1649-1660) does not appear to have much legal
action of note regarding the printing trade. Cromwell's military rule has been described
more akin to a dictatorship386 and does not seem to have been popular nor conducive to
381 Simeon Djankov, Caralee Mcliesh, Tatiana Nenova, Andrei Shleifer, Who Owns The
Media?, 46 J.L. & ECON. 341, 378 (2003).
382 BENJAMIN RAND, THE CORRESPONDENCE OF JOHN LOCKE AND
EDWARD CLARKE (1927).
383 Millar v. Taylor, 98 E.R. at 207.
384
Areopagitica : a speech ofMr. John Milton for the liberty of vnlicenc'd printing, to
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the free expression of the printed word. When Cromwell died in 1658 his son, Richard,
attempted to carry on as Lord Protector but the rule of Cromwell proved so unpopular
that the son ofKing Charles I, Charles II, was restored to the throne in 1660. This
historical period, known as the Restoration, saw the return of licensing laws with regard
to printing. In 1662 another Licensing Act was passed which, again, required a book to
be approved by Crown censors prior to publication and renewed the Stationer's Company
search and seizure powers.387 However, this attempt to control the printed word does not
seem to have been very successful as it appears that only around one half of the political
ioo
pamphlets distributed during the Restoration period were ever licensed. Still, the
Licensing Act was in force and renewed in 1664.389
Some interesting case law also begins to develop in the 1660's, specifically with
regard to the assertion of a property right in a creation. For example, Parliament seemed
to hold that the right over the copying and dissemination of a book was a property right
especially if the right was granted by Royal Prerogative.390 In Stationers v. Seymour391
the court found in favor of the holders of a patent, this time the Stationers' Company, and
in so doing asserted a property right.
The acquiescence to the Licensing Act was short lived as it lapsed in 1679392 and
•i 'JQ'J
was not renewed untd 1685. During this six year period the Stationers' Company had
no search and seizure powers and no ability to obtain injunctions. Enforcement of a
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property right in a creation was left to common law rights which were viewed as
inadequate.394 Attempts were made by the Stationers Company to renew the Act but
these were countered by those who viewed the Act as harmful. One such advocate
against the Act's renewal was Charles Blount who wrote A Just Vindication ofLearning
and the Liberty of the Press in 1679 under the pseudonym of Philopatris.395 In this letter
to Parliament, Blount ties the suppression of knowledge to Popish influences and asserts
a free press is in the public interest. Although primarily against the prior restraint aspect
of the Licensing Act, Blount makes some fascinating arguments in the name of
education:
All Civilized People, as well Ancient as Modern, have ever had that veneration
and deferencefor Learning,.... Such Patrons and Admirers ofLearning were the
Heroes ofold, that they seem to contend about nothing more, than to excel in
their Liberality to the Muses:... Yet notwithstanding all these Encouragements,
Learning hath of late Years met with an Obstruction in many Places, which
suppresses itfromflourishing or increasing, in spite ofall its other helps, and
that is the Inquisition upon the Press, which prohibits any Bookfrom comingforth
without an Imprimatur; and old Relique ofPopety, only necessaryfor the
concealing ofsuch defects ofGovernment which ofright ought to be discover'd
and amended.396
Truth and understanding are not such Wares as to be Monopolized and Traded in
Tickets, Statutes and Standards. We must not think to make a Staple Commodity
ofall knowledge in the Land, to Mark and License it like our Broad-cloth and
Wool-packs.397
394
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Here we see a call for access in the name of education and a disparaging treatment of
commodification of information. Interestingly, Blount seemed to believe there was some
property right in the copy.398 Ironically, Blount suggested that all that was needed to
protect this right was a law requiring the book to carry the author's or printer's name.399
This, of course, would have the same effect of censorship as the Parliamentary Act of
1642; however, it does avoid the prior restraint problem of the Licensing Act.
Blount and others succeeded in postponing the renewal of the Licensing Act for
six years. However, in 1685 the Licensing Act was renewed and continued in force. It
was renewed again in 1692400 but finally expired in 1694.401 The end of the Act again
caused concern in the printing and bookselling trade. It was difficult to enforce
registration of books to determine ownership without a statutory requirement. Further,
the end of the act meant that there were no restrictions on the number ofprinters, the
location ofprinters, the number of journey men, the number of apprentices or the import
of books 402 The printing/bookselling trade began to lobby Parliament to reinstate the
Licensing Act, ostensibly for the public good but no doubt for its own good in protecting
its monopoly in the trade and what it had come to view as, and treat like, a property right.
Still, there was now a different twist being placed upon the definition of the "public
good" inspired, in part, by Milton's Areopagitica and continued with Blount in A Just
Vindication ofLearning and the Liberty of the Press. Under this new definition the
"public good" was being described as a free press to enhance learning; an access
argument.
398 BRITISH PHILOSOPHERS, supra note 395 at k23.
399 Id. at K24.
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In 1694 the Licensing Act was once more up for renewal. Sentiment seems to
have been opposed to the renewal despite the printing and booksellers support on the
grounds that it was necessaiy to restore order to the trade. With a law on the books
similar to the Licensing Act the Stationers Company had the ability to control printing
through coercive measures. With no such law, people could print with impunity.
In an effort to quash the renewal of the Licensing Act, John Locke wrote
persuasively against its enactment, reiterating and expanding on Milton's plea in the
Areopagitica for the advancement of knowledge. However, Locke's prose was much
more pragmatic and has been given some credit in persuading Parliament against
renewing the Licensing Act.403
As with Milton, Locke was against the prior restraint aspect of the Licensing Act.
He argued that the terms were much too "general and comprehensive."404 With respect to
the printing of offensive books Locke argued that the present laws were enough to
address this concern and that all that was needed was a requirement that the author,
printer or bookseller's name be required to assist in identifying the person responsible.405
Locke had particularly strong sentiments regarding the granting ofRoyal Prerogatives
creating monopolies in certain books. On that issue he argued against the practice on the
basis that competition creates a better quality work at a lower cost but seems to concede
that some limited term of years for the exclusive right to copy ought to be granted. On
these issues, Locke writes in a prose that is easily understood in any age:
By this clause [section 6protecting letters patents], the Company ofStationers
have a monopoly ofall the classical authors; and scholars cannot hut at excessive
rates, have thefair and correct edition of those books printed beyond seas. For
403
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the Company ofStationers have obtainedfrom the Crown a patent to print all, or
at least the greatestpart, ofthe classic authors, upon pretence, as I hear, that
they should be well and truly printed; whereas they are by them scandalously ill
printed, both for letter, paper, and correctness, and scarce one tolerable edition is
made by them or any one ofthem....by this act scholars are subjected to the
power ofthese dull wretches, who do not so much as understand Latin, whether
they shall have any true or good copies ofthe best ancient Latin authors, unless
theypay them 6s. 8d. a bookfor that leave.
Tlie liberty, to any one, ofprinting them, is certainly the way to have them the
cheaper and the better; and it is this which, in Holland, has produced so many
fair and excellent editions of them, whilst theprinters all strive to out-do one
another, which has also brought great sums to the trade ofHolland.406
That anyperson or company should have patents for the soleprinting ofancient
authors is very unreasonable and injurious to learning; andfor those who
purchase copies from authors that now live and write, it may be reasonable to
limit theirproperty to a certain number ofyears after the death ofthe author, or
thefirstprinting of the book, as, suppose, fifty or seventy years.407
Again, access is given primary concern but it is not free access, just access at a
reasonable price. Further, the commercial nature of the information trade is recognized
by Locke but the anti-competitive problems of a monopoly are also addressed. While
Locke seemed to acknowledge some property right in the right to copy books he clearly
thought such rights needed to be limited to authors for a term of years. His mantra was
the encouragement of learning and that competition made sound practical and economic
sense; even on an international scale. As for the authors' rights, this does not seem to be
of great concern to Locke. The suggestion in favor of attribution was nothing more than
a means to placate those who fanned the fire of emotions regarding the printing of
offensive material; particularly against the Crown or Church. Locke's focus, which
4Uft
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seems to have influenced Parliament, was for the economic policy favouring the
encouragement of learning.408
From 1695 until the passage of the Statute ofAnne in 1709 numerous attempts
were made by the bookseller/printer trade to reenact the licensing law; all failed. The
appeal for a free press in the name of encouraging learning seems to have trumped the
call for restricting a licentious press. In support of this position were authors such as
Daniel DeFoe who, in 1704, wrote an essay entitled: An Essay on the Regulation ofthe
Press again arguing in favour of a free press and against any attempt to re-enact a prior
restraint licensing law. In his essay DeFoe argued:
To put a general stop to publickPrinting, would be a check to Learning, a
Prohibition ofKnowledge, and make Instruction Contraband:....409
Thus, DeFoe carried on with the argument that seemed to be working; the need for a free
press for the encouragement of learning in the public interest. However, DeFoe also
introduced a relatively new theme to the debate; the rights of authors. In the later half of
his Essay DeFoe addressed the concern ofpiracy and acknowledges that there was a
problem:
This is really a most injurious piece ofViolence, and a Grievance to all Mankind;
for it not only robs their Neighbor oftheirjust Right, but it robs Men of the due
Reward ofIndustry, the Prize ofLearning, and the Benefit of their Studies; in the
next Place, it robs the Reader, byprinting Copies ofotherMen uncorrected and
imperfect, making surreptitious a spurious Collections, and innumerable Errors,
by which the Design ofthe Author is often inverted, conceal'd, or destroy 'd, and
the Information the World would reap by a curious and well studied Discourse, is
dwindled into Confusion and Nonsense.410
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This is thefirst Sort ofthe Press-Piracy, the next is pirating Books in smaller
Print, and meaner Paper, in order to sell them lower than thefirst impression.
The Law we are upon, effectually suppresses this most villainous Practice, for
every Author being oblige'd to set his Name to the Book he writes, has, by this
Law, an undoubted exclusive Right to the Property of it.4"
DeFoe was arguing that the press should not be repressed with a prior restraint licensing
law; rather it should simply require that the name of the author be affixed to the book so
the author could be called to account for his book if, after publication, it was believed to
be improper. This argument, previously advanced by Milton, Blount and Locke, was
again simply a means to address the cries against the licentious press; not for the purpose
of a moral right to attribution. Further, DeFoe recognized that prior restraint not only
discourages learning domestically, DeFoe acknowledged the worldwide influence and
benefit from the dissemination of knowledge. Finally, as with Milton, Blount and Locke
before him, DeFoe seemed to accept a property right in the making of copies; however,
he clarified the author's property right in the book, which could be assigned. This
author's property right was premised upon a natural law, fruit of his labour, theory
harkening back to the ancient Greeks and Romans concept of "mine."
Subsequent property theories to justify a property right in copyright have included
the utilitarian theory of legislatively created rights such as that adopted in the United
States.412 Under this theory, copyright was legislatively created to serve the interests of
411
DEFOE, supra note 409 at 20-21.
412
LACY, supra note 335 at 1540-41; Fox Film Corp., v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127
(1932) where the Court held that copyright law in the United States was not simply a
codification of existing law but the creation of a new law by Congress under the authority
of the Constitution; U.S. CONST, art. I, §8 which states the puipose of copyright as to
promote "the Progress of Science and the useful Arts."
123
the public not the creator.413 This theory recognizes that, unlike natural law theories,
there are formalities that are state-imposed conditions on the existence or exercise of
copyright such as the early requirement of registration. If copyright is created by the
state as an incentive program, formal prerequisites may accompany the granting of the
right. If copyright were a natural right born with the work no further state action should
be required to confer the right.414
Another property theory advanced to justify a property right in copyright is
founded on personal or moral rights. This theory, premised on the works of Hegel415 and
Kant,416 holds that intellectual property works are the "embodiment ofpersonality."417
While the social psychology of such a theory may establish some merit in its
suppositions, the economic realization ofROI is obscured. It does, however, echo
Mansfield's argument about what is just,418especially with respect to attribution, and
inserts into the debate the ancient concept of "mine" regarding creative works. Further,
this concept of "mine" has an indirect economic effect with respect to the fear creators
may have in disclosure of their works due to copying by others with the possibility of a
loss of reputation and profit. This may also affect productivity and access.
413
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To counter the social benefit of access argument, which had its own economic
justification in an educated and more productive public, the disseminators advanced the
emotional appeal of protecting the creators property and, thus, providing an incentive to
create. The Stationers' Company seemed to realize that it was getting nowhere with its
protestations in favor ofprior restraint censorship based upon the licentious press so it
changed strategies and took up the cause advocated by DeFoe - protect the author for the
public interest.419 Several more attempts to get a bill passed through Parliament were
made with this change in strategy starting in 1707. The window dressing of protecting
the author and advancing learning was added but some attempts were still made to
include a prior restraint licensing clause. These attempts were unsuccessful so the
licensing clause was dropped and the first copyright statute was passed in the United
Kingdom in 1709.420
D. The Statute ofAnne Reflected a Bifurcated Economic Policy of Access
For Education and Property Rights.
The Statute ofAnne was not without its own contentious arguments in the United
Kingdom Parliament prior to its passage. The booksellers and printers trade lobbied long
and hard for a bill that they believed would protect their economic rights and restore
some of the legal protection they had prior to the lapse of the Licensing Act in 1694. Of
particular note the drastic changes to the preamble to the proposed bill explaining its
purpose is telling. The original draft provided:
Whereas the liberty which Printers Booksellers and other Persons have oflate
frequently taken in Printing Reprinting, and Publishing or causing to be Printed,
Reprinted and Published Books, and other Writings, without the consent of the
Authors thereof, in whom ye undoubted Property ofsuch Books and Writings as
the product oftheir learning and labour remains or ofsuch persons to whom such
419
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Authors for good Consideration have lawfully transferred their Right and title
therein is not only a real discouragement to learning in generll [sic] which in all
Civilized Nations ought to receive ye greatest Coun tenance and Encouragement
but it is also a notorious invasion ofyeproperty ofye rightful Proprietors ofsuch
Books and Writings, to their own very great Detriment, and too often to the Ruin
of them and their Families....421
The final version stated:
Whereas Printers, Booksellers and other Persons have of late frequently taken the
Liberty ofprinting, reprinting andpublishing, or causing to be printed, reprinted
andpublished, Books and other Writings, without the Consent of the Authors or
Proprietors ofsuch Books and Writings, to the their [sic] veiy great Detriment,
and too often to the Ruin ofthem and their Families...422
Gone is the forceful language declaring the property rights of authors as well as the
language regarding the encouragement of learning and all civilized nations. The final
version does contain language in the preamble regarding "the Encouragement of learned
Men to compose and write useful Books.. ,"423 but this is not the type of language
reflecting the ideology of access to useful information to encourage learning; rather, it is
language reflecting the economic justification for the copyright statute espoused by the
booksellers and printers trade, namely the incentive to write. Indeed, the only language
relating to the encouragement of learning reflected in the Statute ofAnne is in the bills
title: "An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by vesting the Copies of printed
Books in the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein mentioned."
Thus, though the encouragement of learning took prominence in the argument leading up
to the Statute ofAnne it was relegated to a secondary purpose in the final act.424
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Ultimately, the puipose of the Statute ofAnne was intended to be commercial not to
42 5
protect creators.
The booksellers and printers were happy with this watered down version of the
bill which, they believed, provided them with the same basic rights they had under
common law and before the lapse of the Licensing Act in 1694.426 There were term
limits of twenty-one years for books already in print and fourteen years for books not yet
in print and a fourteen year extension if the author was alive at the end of the first
fourteen year period but these term limits did not concern the booksellers and printers too
much given the deliberately vague language of the statute.427 This cavalier attitude would
turn out to be a monumental mistake.
SUMMARY
The concept of a property right in a creation emerged in the West in ancient
Greece and Rome and to this day has not lost its appeal in Western economic policy.
This property right reflects the concept of "mine" anchored in ancient history and
extended to a property right in the right to make copies in the medieval period.
Accordingly, there is little wonder that Western copyright law would reflect this
philosophy.
The introduction of the printing press increased the economic and political
imperative as it induced a more commercial aspect with a growing industry and made
copies of creations available on a more numerous less expensive basis. This property
right primarily served the economic and political aspirations of the church and state with
425
CORNISH, supra note 360 at 340.
426
FEATHER, supra note 340 at 62-63.
427 Id.
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access for education being given little if any note. But that changed in the seventeenth
century with the advent of the belief that a free press was necessary for the advancement
of education together with an economic theory favouring competition. A property right
in the creation and its copy was still acknowledged but limits on such rights were being
advanced.
The debate between an absolute property right monopoly and access for learning
was temporarily resolved by the Statute ofAnne which provided a monopoly for a term
of years to allow for an incentive to create and a reasonable ROI while addressing the
access issue by establishing a public domain of creative works after the term had expired.
Thus, ROI, while the predominate concern in economic policy prior to the Statute of
Anne was relegated to obscurity in order to allow the more appealing access sensitive
property rights and incentive to create argument take centre stage.
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CHAPTER 6
REFLECTIONS OF A DEVELOPING STATE'S ECONOMIC POLICY REGARDING
COPYRIGHT: PRE-COPYRIGHT HISTORY IN UNITED STATES
Butfirst let me eat of thefruit of the tree ofknowledge.42ti
The problem of the potential conflict between moral and material interests of
creators and the right to education is particularly relevant in developing states which is
the reason for Resolution 2000/7. Specifically, it has been argued that developing states
have been forced by economic and political pressure to enter into TRIPS. This has
resulted in a change in economic policy in developing states to provide more protection
for copyrighted works with little to no domestic copyright industry to benefit by such a
policy and to the detriment of access for education. Conversely, in the domestic
copyright law example of the United States we see in the early history an emphasis in
economic policy on access concerns. This was primarily due to the developing state
status of the United States which fostered an economic policy to provide inexpensive
access to educate its people; to eat of the fruit of the tree of knowledge. Accordingly, the
United States enacted weaker copyright laws particularly with respect to protection
offered foreign creative works. However, this emphasis on access shifted to material
interests of creators as the United States copyright industry developed. Flexibility, not
absolute priorities, was necessary to address the changing challenges relating to social
benefit through copyright.
United States copyright law is inextricably tied to the lessons learned in the
creation of the United Kingdom's copyright law. As with the United Kingdom's
428 ROBERT INGERSOLL, THE GODS AND OTHER LECTURES, Title page (1880.)
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copyright law, United States copyright law was enacted, in part, with a concern to guard
against censorship of the press. This is a bit ironic as there appears to be an inherent
conflict between the copyright clause in the United States Constitution, which limits
unfettered speech and press, and the First Amendment rights to a free speech and press
found within the same document.429 However, an examination of the early history of
United States copyright law establishes that the two were, initially, meant to work
together to encourage a free speech and press.
Prior to the drafting of the United States Constitution and Congresses' subsequent
enactment of the first United States copyright legislation a debate between the natural law
and utilitarian philosophies was taking shape. For example, Noah Webster, an author,
sought state legislation to protect copyright prior to federal legislation on the subject. He
obtained letters to advance his cause from professors at Princeton and the University of
Pennsylvania to present to state legislators. These letters supported copyright on the
basis of a public interest in education and property rights of authors.430 Another
copyright enthusiasts, one Joel Barlow, wrote a letter to the Continental Congress dated
10 January 1783 requesting that Congress make a recommendation for the states to enact
copyright legislation, invoking the natural law principle of Locke's fruits of their
429
Compare United States Constitution, art. 1, § with United States Constitution, First
Amendment; L. Ray Patterson and Craig Joyce, Copyright in 1791: an Essay Concerning
the Founders' View ofthe Copyright Power Granted to Congress in Article I, Section 8,
Clause 8 ofthe U.S. Constitution, 52 EMORY L.J. 909, 910 (2003). This apparent
conflict finds a parallel problem in international human rights law, not only with respect
to access and author's rights, but also with respect to author's rights and the human right
of free speech and press. Universal Declaration of Human Right, supra note 3 at arts. 19
and 27; 1CESCR, supra note 3 at art. 15.
430
Ginsburg, supra note 414 at 1000; NOAH WEBSTER, ORIGIN OF THE COPY¬
RIGHT LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES, in A COLLECTION OF PAPERS ON
POLITICAL, LITERARY AND MORAL SUBJECTS 173 (1843, reprint 1968).
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labour.431 The Continental Congress did make such a recommendation to the states that
suggested:
The committee, ...to whom were referred sundry papers and memorials from
differentpersons on the subject ofliteraryproperty, beingpersuaded that nothing
is moreproperly a man's own than thefruit ofhis study, and that the protection
and security of literaryproperty would greatly tend to encourage genius, to
promote useful discoveries and to the general extension ofarts and commerce,
beg leave to submit thefollowing report:....4:2
This resolution recommending that the several states adopt copyright law utilized
language that bares a remarkable similarity to the Statute ofAnne including a fourteen-
year term, to wit:
Resolved, That it be recommended to the several States, to secure to the authors or
publishers ofany new books not hitherto printed, being citizens ofthe United States,
and to their executors, administrators and assigns, the copy right ofsuch bookfor a
certain time not less than fourteen years from thefirstpublication; and to secure to
said authors, if they shall survive the term first mentioned, and to their executors,
administrators and assigns, the copy right ofsuch books for another term of time not
less than fourteen years, such copy or exclusive right ofprinting, publishing and
vending the same, to be secured to the original authors, orpublishers, their
executors, administrators and assigns, by such laws and under such restrictions as to
the several States may seem proper.43^
431
Ginsburg, supra note 414 at 1000-02 (citing to Mass. Act ofMar. 17, 1783, reprinted
in COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1783-1906,
COPYRIGHT OFF. BULL. NO. 3, at 14; N.H. Act ofNov. 7, 1783, reprinted in
COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1783-1906, COPYRIGHT
OFF. BULL. NO. 3, at 18-19; R.I. Act ofDec. 1783, reprinted in COPYRIGHT
ENACTMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1783-1906, COPYRIGHT OFF. BULL.
NO. 3, at 19-20; Conn. Act of Jan. 1783, reprinted in COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS OF
THE UNITED STATES, 1783-1906, COPYRIGHT OFF. BULL. NO. 3, at 11; N.C. Act
ofNov. 19, 1785, reprinted in COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1783-1906, COPYRIGHT OFF. BULL. NO. 3, at 25; Ga. Act of Feb. 3, 1786,
reprinted in COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1783-1906,
COPYRIGHT OFF. BULL. NO. 3, at 27; N.Y Act ofApril 29, 1786, reprinted in
COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1783-1906, COPYRIGHT
OFF. BULL. NO. 3, at 29.
432 XXII Journals of the Continental Congress 326 (1774-1789)(1922 reprint); XXIV
JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 326 (1922);
Patterson, supra note 429 at 931-32. But see Patterson, supra note 429 at 948.
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Patterson, supra note 429 at 932.
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Again, we see this concept of natural law expressed in economic rights and the utilitarian
theoiy promoting access expressed in terms of the encouragement of learning and the
creative process.
The United States Constitution, complete with the copyright clause, was drafted
in 1787.434 During this drafting process Thomas Jefferson and James Madison
exchanged letters expressing their views on various provisions of the draft Constitution.
These letters express a concern regarding the authorization ofmonopolies, inherent in the
copyright clause, based upon the United Kingdom experience.435 With respect to
copyright issues, the following excerpts of Jefferson's and Madison's letters provides
some illumination as to their views on the subject:
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison 1787:
I will now add what I do not like. First the omission ofa bill ofrights providing
clearly and without the aid ofsophismsfor... freedom ofthe press,... [and]
restrictions against monopolies, ,...436
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison 1788:
The saying there shall be no monopolies lessens the incitements to ingenuity, which is
spurred on by the hope ofa monopolyfor a limited time, as offourteen years; but the
434
Patterson, supra note 429 at 910.
435
Monopolies. Perpetuities. Corporations. Ecclesiastical Endowments, in J. Madison,
Writings 756 (J. Rakove ed.1999) (hereinafter Madison on Monopolies); Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (July 31, 1788), in 13 Papers of Thomas Jefferson
(J. Boyd ed.1956) (hereinafter Papers of Thomas Jefferson); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S.
186 at 246(2003)(J. Breyer dissenting).
436
Request For Information Related to Thomas Jefferson, available at
http://www.geocities.com/Athens/7842/archives/monoplv.htm., at 2; Thomas Jefferson,
The DMCA, Copyright, Fair Use, et. Al. || kuro5hin.org, by Zeio, (hereinafter Kuro)
available at http://www.kuro5hin.org/story/2001Z7/23/23214/3438 at 2.
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benefit even of limitedmonopolies is too doubtful to be opposed to that of their
general suppression.7
Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson in response:
With regard to monopolies they are justly classed among the greatest nuisances in
government. But is it clear that as encouragements to literaiy works and ingenious
discoveries, they are not too valuable to be wholly renounced? Would it not suffice to
reserve in all cases a right to thepublic to abolish theprivilege at a price to be
specified in the grant of it? Is there not also infinitely less danger ofthis abuse in our
governments than in most others? Monopolies are sacrifices of the many to thefew.
Where thepower is in thefew it is naturalfor them to sacrifice the many to their own
partialities and corruptions. Where thepower, as with us, is in the many not thefew,
the danger can not be very great that thefew will be thusfavoured. It is much more
to be dreaded that thefew will be unnecessarily sacrificed to the many.438
Madison noted that the Constitution had limited monopolies to two cases, the authors of
books, and for useful inventions.439 He thought that in those two cases a monopoly was
justified as its purpose was to benefit the public by economic incentive creating more
access and its term was limited.440
To understand the intent of the drafters of the United States' Constitution one has
to recognize their familiarity with the history of the United Kingdom copyright. This
familiarity is evident from the words of James Madison in explaining the need for a
copyright clause in the Constitution441 and the very language of the copyright clause,
437 Liber: Jefferson and the Copyright Monopoly, (hereinafter Liber) available at
http://users.vnet/alight/iefferson.html: Kuro, supra note 436 at 2.
438
Kuro, supra note 436 at 2-3.
439 Madison on Monopolies, supra note 435 at 756.
440 Madison on Monopolies, supra note 435 at 756; Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186,
246-47 (2003)(J. Breyer dissenting).
441 The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The copyright ofauthors has
been solemnly adjudged in Great Britain to be a right ofcommon law. The right to useful
inventions seems with equal reason to belong to the inventors. Thepublic goodfully
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which is taken from the Statute of Anne.442 As indicated by the Jefferson/Madison letters,
the drafters of the United States' Constitution were also familiar with the Licensing Act
of 1662, which utilized a monopoly system of granting copyright privileges or patents as
a means of censorship.443
The language of the copyright clause in the United States' Constitution states:
To promote theprogress ofscience and useful arts, by securingfor limited times
to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and
discoveries; ...,444
The phrase "to promote the progress of science and the useful arts" in the copyright
clause of the United States Constitution reflects the economic policy for copyright,
namely, "to enhance the public welfare by encouraging artistic endeavors through the
creator's self-interest."445 To further protect access the copyright clause in the
Constitution includes a clause for term limits in the language "by securing for limited
times....", however, this vague language leaves it to Congress to set the term 446
coincides in both cases with the claims ofindividuals. THE FEDERALIST PAPERS,
(1961 New American Library) No. 43 (Madison) 271-72.
442
Ginsburg, supra note 414 at 992 and 998.
443 Eldredv. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 201 fh5 (2003).
444 United States Constitution, art. 1, § 8, cl.8.
445 GILLIAN DAVIS, COPYRIGHT AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 149 ( v. 14 ITC
Studies in Industrial Property and Copyright Laws (1994))(citing to Sheldon Light
Parody, Burlesque and the Economic Rational for Copyright, 11 Conn. L. R. 615, 619
(1979).
446 Some have argued that this language limits Congress in that it could not grant a
copyright term that would impede "the progress of science and the useful arts."
Accordingly, an economic analysis would be required if a term extension appears to be
contrary to the purpose ofpromoting science and the useful arts. DAVIS, supra note 445
at 149. Unfortunately, the level of economic analysis has been held by the United States
Supreme Court to be very low; only a rational basis being required. Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537 U.S. at 206-09. The rational basis test is applied when there are no suspect
classifications in a statute such as statutes directed toward a particular race or gender.
Under this test, a statute shall be presumed valid and shall be upheld if there are plausible
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While some have urged that the phrasing of the language in the United States
Constitution evidences a subordination of the author's rights for the public benefit,447
others have noted that these separate considerations are present but given equal weight as
evidenced by documentation recording the drafters of the United States' Constitution
thoughts on this matter 448 Thus, an undercurrent of both natural law (economic rights)
and utilitarian philosophy (access) flows equally through this brief Constitutional
provision.
Although access to information was considered necessary by the drafters of the
United States Constitution to foster learning the notion of a property right in a creation
also found favour 449 Control of access either by the government as in the Licensing Act
of 1662 or by the private sector through an unlimited monopoly was viewed as retarding
the learning process. Accordingly, the drafters of the United States' Constitution, some
of them begrudgingly, struck a compromise by granted a limited monopoly.450 The
monopoly was limited in two important ways: term limits to offset anticompetitive
monopoly451 practices and by the idea/expression dichotomy to allow progress by
building upon the ideas of others.452 Further, the public domain was protected by limiting
the copyright protection to new books.453 The judicial doctrine of fair use (fair dealing in
the United Kingdom) would later be utilized by courts as a tool to further promote access
reasons for its enactment. Williamson v. Lee Optical ofOklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483
(1955).
447
Ginsburg, supra note 414 at 999 (citing to a 1909 Congressional report H.R. REP.
NO. 2222.)
448
Ginsburg, supra note 414 at 999-1002.
449
Patterson, supra note 429 at 948.
450 Madison on Monopolies, supra note 453.
451 See Patterson, supra note 429 at 948-49.
452
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by allowing the use ofportions of creative works for specified purposes such as
education.
The Federalists Papers, an authoritative commentary on the United States
Constitution written in an attempt to persuade the several states to ratify the Constitution,
contains very little regarding the copyright clause of the United States Constitution. In
fact, only one segment of the eighty-five papers, Federalist number 43 written by James
Madison, directly addresses the copyright provision. In describing the powers to be
vested in the legislative branch, Congress, Federalist number 43 states:
A power "to promote the progress ofscience and useful arts by securing, for a limited
time, to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and
discoveries."
The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The copyright ofauthors has
been solemnly adjudged in Great Britain to be a right ofcommon law. The right to
useful inventions seems with equal reason to belong to the inventors. The public
goodfully coincides in both cases with the claims of individuals....454
This brief, conclusory, commentary on the copyright clause accepts as complimentary a
limited natural law property right of authors and a utilitarian access goal.
The United States Constitution was ratified in 1788 and the Federal government
established in 1789.455 During the drafting and even after the adoption of the
Constitution the drafters of the United States' Constitution were concerned that there
were not enough safeguards for fundamental rights such as a free press and speech.
Accordingly, a Bill of Rights456 was being drafted at around the same time that Congress
454 THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note 441 at 271 -72.
455
Patterson, supra note 429 at 910.
456 The Bill ofRights is reflected in the first ten amendments to the Constitution. The
first amendment protects a free press and free speech.
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was working on the first copyright legislation.457 Jefferson was still concerned about the
monopoly created by the copyright provision as reflected in another letter to Madison:
Letter from Jefferson to James Madison 1789:
I like the declaration ofrights as far as it goes, but I should have been for going
further. For instance, thefollowing alterations and additions would have pleased
me...Article 9. Monopolies may be allowed to personsfor their own productions in
literature, and their own inventions in the arts, for a term not exceeding years,
butfor no longer term, and no otherpurpose.458
Jefferson proposed a term of 19 years based on the premise that hereditary rights should
not be allowed in the intellectual property field459 Such a provision specifying a
maximum term in the United States' Constitution would have precluded Congress' ability
to extend the copyright term in the United States absent a Constitutional amendment.460
Congress first considered intellectual property statutes in its inaugural session in
1789 461 with House Resolution 10; "a bill to promote the progress ofscience and useful
arts, by securing to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings
and discoveries,,A62however, it did not pass. A similar bill was reintroduced in the
457 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. at 219.
458
Liber, supra note 435 at 1.
459
Liber, supra note 435 at 1; Kuro, supra note 436 at 3-4.
460 United States Constitution, art. 5 which states in pertinent part: The Congress,
whenever two-thirds ofboth Houses shall deem it necessaiy, shallpropose amendments
to this Constitution, or, on the application of the legislatures of two-thirds ofthe several
States, shall call a convention forproposing amendments, ...shall be valid ...when
ratified by the legislatures ofthree-fourths ofthe several States, or by conventions in
three-fourths thereof, ....
461 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. at 228 (J. Stevens dissenting.)
462 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. at 228 (J. Stevens dissenting.); DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 94 (L. DE
PAUW, C. BICKFORD, & L. HAUPTMAN EDS. 1977).
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second Congress in 1790.463 This ultimately resulted in the United States' first copyright
statute enacted in 1790.464 As with the Statute ofAnne, it provided for a copyright term
of fourteen years renewable for an additional fourteen years if the author survived the
first term.465 Although the United States copyright law reflected in the Constitution and
in the first copyright legislation copied the Statute of Anne the English Parliament
confronted a situation that never existed in the United States, namely the government-
sanctioned printing monopoly held by the Stationers' Company and enforced by the Star-
Chamber. 466 Even after the legal monopoly in England ended in 1695, concerns about
effects ofmonopolies on learning, free press and speech caused the Parliament in the
United Kingdom to be resistant to granting any enhanced economic rights.467 In the
United States at the time of the drafting and enactment of the United States Constitution
and later copyright legislation competition among those who would hold most of these
economic rights, publishers, printers, and booksellers, was strong and there was no threat
similar to that experienced by the United Kingdom's Stationers' Company. That said,
competition in the printing industry did not, at that time, amount to a significant
percentage of the United States economy.469 Hence, the economic policy at that time
could be more generous with the social goal of access for education.
463 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. at 228-29 (J. Stevens dissenting.)
464 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. at 194 (2003); Patterson, supra note 429 at 910.
465 Act ofMay 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (1790 Act); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S.
at 194 (2003).
466 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. at 201 fn5 (2003).
467 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. at 201 fn5 (2003) (citing to ROSE, supra note 395 at
52-56.)
468 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. at 201 fn5 (2003) (citing to Thomas B. Nachbar,
Constructing Copyright's Mythology, 6 Green Bag2d 37, 45 (2002).
469 Lawrence Lessig, The Creative Commons, 65 MONT. L. REV. 1, 5 (2004)
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In an attempt to avoid the censorship problems experienced by the United
Kingdom under the Licensing Act the drafters of the United States' Constitution of the
United States Constitution adopted the First Amendment in 1791.470 This Constitutional
guarantee of a free press and speech along with the fact that copyright was limited to new
books and had term limits was intended to avoid the prior restraint problem of the
Licensing Act. Under the Licensing Act, nothing could be printed without prior
approval. Under copyright law, in both the United Kingdom and the United States,
printing was not restrained; rather, the exploitation rights of authors and disseminators
were limited for the public interest, primarily education.471
The first copyright legislation in the United States suggests that Congress took a
utilitarian approach to the subject, enacting copyright legislation as a means of furthering
public education. The statute's title was:
An Actfor the Encouragement ofLearning, by Securing the Copies ofMaps, Charts
and Books, to the Authors and Proprietors ofSuch Copies, During the Times Therein
Mentioned.472
There were three constitutional copyright policies for Congress to consider in avoiding
the experience of the Licensing Act of 1662:
1. To promote learning (as stated in the copyright clause and through the First
Amendment right to free press and speech);
2. to provide public access to information (through economic incentives); and
470 See supra at 97-111. Indeed, to this day the American courts view prior restraint of
speech as one of the most invidious violations of the First Amendment. Patterson, supra
note 429 at 910; Eldredv. Ashcroft, 538 U.S. at 219.
471 See Patterson, supra note 429 at 935.
472
Ginsburg, supra note 414 at 1001.
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3. to protect the public domain (for the puipose of access through inexpensive
copies and to build upon the works of others by limiting the term and only
allowing copyright in new books.)473
The importance of learning was ofprimary concern to the drafters of the United States'
Constitution. Evidence of this is established through the speeches and writings from the
period around the time that the first copyright legislation was enacted. For example in
addressing Congress in 1790, George Washington stated:
"Knowledge is, in eveiy country, the surest basis ofpublic happiness. 'A1A
The analysis of the intent of the drafters of the United States' Constitution is
important for purposes of interpretation. While the "original intent" theory of
interpretation does not completely restrain the Supreme Court in its constitutional
interpretations,475 the extent ofCongress' authority under the copyright clause as
intended by the drafters of the United States' Constitution is given significant weight and,
at times, nearly conclusive.476
Ultimately, it appears that the drafters of the United States' Constitution believed
in the need to balance the interests of economic rights and access, similar to the approach
473 See Patterson, supra note 429 at 946.
474
George Washington, address to Congress, 8 January 1790, U.S. Copyright Office,
Copyright in Congress 1789-1904, Bull. No. 8, at 115 (Thorvald Solberg ed., 1905);
Patterson, supra note 429 at 947.
475
Indeed, it is often difficult if not impossible to ascertain such an original intent. See,
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 599, 869-70 (1952): Just what out
forefathers did envision, or would have envisioned had theyforeseen modern conditions,
must be divinedfrom materials almost as enigmatic as the dreams Joseph was called
upon to interpretfor Pharaoh. (Justice Jackson.)
476 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. at 197-98 (2003); (citing Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co.
v. Sarony, 111 U.S.'53, 57 (1884).)
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adopted in the United Kingdom, in creating United States copyright law. Indeed,
Jefferson came to hold this view despite his reservations regarding monopolies as
indicated in the following letter of 1813 to Isaac McPherson:
It has been pretended by some, (and in England especially,) that inventors have a
natural and exclusive right to their inventions, and not merelyfor their own lives,
but inheritable to their heirs. But while it is a moot question whether the origin of
any kind ofproperty is derivedfrom nature at all, it would be singular to admit a
natural and even an hereditary right to inventors.... Stable ownership is the gift of
social law, and is given late in the progress ofsociety. It would be curious then, if
an idea, the fugitivefermentation ofan individual brain, could, ofnatural right,
be claimed in exclusive and stableproperty. Ifnature has made any one thing less
susceptible than all others ofexclusive property, it is the action ofthe thinking
power called an idea, which an individual may exclusively possess as long as he
keeps it to himself; but the moment it is divulged, itforces itself into the
possession ofevery one, and the receiver cannot dispossess himselfof it. Its
peculiar character, too, is that no one possesses the less, because every other
possesses the whole of it. He who receives an idea from me, receives instruction
himselfwithout lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine, receives light
without darkening me. That ideas shouldfreely spreadfrom one to another over
the globe, for the moral and mutual instruction ofman, and improvement ofhis
condition, seems to have been peculiarly and benevolently designed by nature,....
Inventions then cannot, in nature, be a subject ofproperty. Society may give an
exclusive right to theprofits arisingfrom them, as an encouragement to men to
pursue ideas which mayproduce utility, but this may or may not be done,
according to the will and convenience ofthe society, without claim or complaint
from anybody.477
Here, Jefferson discards the natural law theory for intellectual property and embraces the
utilitarian approach. While he accepts the notion that a society may deem it necessary to
grant a limited monopoly to encourage the creative process as an economic policy he did
not accept the natural law argument that a peipetual monopoly was justified based upon a
property right in a creation.
Jefferson's utilitarian approach seems to be reflected in the type ofmaterials that
appeared to dominate copyright registration and litigation during the late eighteenth
477 The Founders' Constitution, available at http://press-
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/al_8_8sl2.html.
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century and early nineteenth century. These materials were primarily of an instructive
nature such as social science topics and public affairs.478 Fiction was low on the list.
This reflects the fact that the utilitarian function ofprotecting "useful" arts was
succeeding.479 Further, the first reported copyright cases in the United States reflect this
preference.480
From 1791 to 1891 there was no federal protection in the United States for works
of foreign authors.481 Economic policy was the reason: during this period the United
States was a net importer of works. By permitting inexpensive use of foreign works,
primarily English works, the domestic printing industries could thrive.482 Given this
history, some have stated that the United States was "born a pirate nation."483 This
economic policy of protecting an infant industry is a common practice rationalized by the
England under Richard III and by developing states today. The United States was at this
time a developing state.
In 1891 the copyright act allowed for some protection for foreign works albeit
limited by the manufacturing clause, which disallowed protection of foreign works that
478
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479 Id.
480 Nichols v Ruggles, 3 Day 145 (Conn. 1808) (compliance with formalities issue);
Ewerv. Coxe, 8 F. Cas. 917 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1824) (compliance with formalities issue);
Blunt v. Patten, 3 F. Cas 763 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1828) (navigation charts); Clayton v. Stone,
5 F.Cas. 999 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1829) (financial charts); Wheaton v. Stone, 33 U.S. 591
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Ginsburg, supra note 414 at 1005 fn 61.
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482 Id. at 750.
483 Lawrence Lessig, Keynote: The International Information Society, 24
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were not printed, bound and published in the United States.484 Again, economic policy
and, thus, the law reflected the desire to protect the domestic printing industry.
SUMMARY
The history of the United States' copyright law reflects a mixture of natural law
and utilitarian philosophies. Yet, underlying both is a basic belief in a property right of
some sort in the right to copy. While philosophically similar to the United Kingdom, in
the early days ofUnited States history it was a developing state and its economic policy
reflected that fact. In the copyright arena some protection was justified under United
States' economic policy but the focus was on the promotion of access for education. The
utilitarian philosophy of limited property rights in copyright to enhance education
prevailed. As for foreign works, early United States economic policy reflected this status
as a developing state exploiting foreign works to protect an infant domestic publication
industry and to promote education.
Is the United States as a developing state a model to be advanced for other
developing states to follow? There certainly is some ironic appeal to this notion given
the position the United States takes today regarding international copyright enforcement.
However, the United States past conduct is no justification for others future conduct.
What this example does permit, however, is the observation that flexibility in the
development of domestic economic policy is needed and that developing states do have
different needs that should be reflected in their economic policy. To the extent access is
needed for education and there is market failure due to an inability to pay a less rigid
domestic copyright law may be necessary. That said, it must also be remembered that
one of the goals of the United States economic policy as a developing state was to protect
484
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its domestic copyright industries. Thus, in order for a developing state to wean itself off
of the need to access foreign works through weak copyright laws it must promote a




THE BATTLE OVER PERPETUAL COPYRIGHT IN THE WEST
EVIDENCES AN ECONOMIC POLICY
THAT BALANCED COPYRIGHT MATERIAL GAINS AND EDUCATION
I wish as sincerely as any man, that learned men may have all the encouragements, and
all the advantages that are consistent with the general right and good ofmankind. But if
the monopoly now claimed be contrary to the great laws ofproperty...if it will hinder or
suppress the advancement of learning and knowledge...I can never concur in establishingsuch a claim.
After the enactment of the Statute ofAnne in the United Kingdom, followed by
enactments of copyright legislation in France and the United States, there begins to
develop an attempt to regain a peipetual monopoly by disseminators. Although this tactic
ultimately failed, slow but steady erosion of the access emphasis in developed states has
followed through extending the copyright term, and expanding the scope of protection.
As with the current human rights debate regarding intellectual property, in the
United Kingdom from at least 1643 to the present there has been a built in tension
486between protecting economic rights on the one hand and access on the other. Indeed
the Preamble to the Statute of Anne balances this tension by stating, as its purpose, the
protection the economic rights of the author to encourage and promote learning and
progress.487 This invokes natural law based on property rights by giving creators what is
485 Millar v. Taylor, (Justice Yates) 98 E.R. at 247-50.
486
DAVIS, supra note 445 at 135, 148.
487
DAVIS, supra note 445 at 2.
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488
justly due; however, this has also reflected a utilitarian philosophy through the
incentive for access theory and term limits.489 But once the first term limit under the
Statute ofAnne began to expire rights holders began to urge for perpetual copyright
under a natural law philosophy.
The evolution of copyright law emphasizing utilitarian then natural law property
rights began immediately after the passage of the Statute of Anne. While the Statute of
Anne acknowledges natural law rights of authors490 this was, arguably, taken away by
Donaldson v. Becket which addressed the issue of perpetual copyright. Alexander
Donaldson was a bookseller in Edinburgh, Scotland. His business focused on
inexpensive reprints of standard works whose copyright term had expired under the
Statute ofAnne. The London booksellers largely ignored Donaldson and other Scottish
booksellers until the late 1750's and early 1760's. At this time they attempted to drive
the Scottish reprint business out of England as it was deemed a threat to the London
booksellers. Donaldson responded with typical Scottish diplomatic reserve; he opened a
bookshop in London. He was greeted with a barrage of lawsuits. In 1773, the Scottish
Court of Session rendered its decision in Hinton v. Donaldson491 holding that there was
no perpetual copyright. With the 1774 English decision in Millar v. Taylor492 holding
that there was a common law peipetual copyright the United Kingdom had a split of
authority regarding the issue.
488 Millar v. Taylor, (Justice Mansfield) 98 E.R. at 252.
489
DAVIS, supra note 445 at 2-3.
490 Id. 445 at 9.
491 1 Hailes Dec. 535.
492 9 8 E.R. 201.
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Subsequently, Thomas Becket purchased the Millar estate and sued Donaldson for
his reprinting of James Thomson's poem The Seasons which was no longer protected
under the statutory term provided by the Statute of Anne.493 Here the booksellers, in
particular Becket, made a political miscalculation. Donaldson did not agree to abide by a
decision of a lower appellate court, as had the defendant in Millar v. Taylor, so the matter
went all the way up to the House of Lords. In the House of Lords the non-legal peers
were allowed to vote on the issue; they outnumbered the justices and were not in favour
ofperpetual copyright.494 The House of Lords were asked to answer five questions in
Donaldson v. Becket.
1(a) Whether at common law, an author of any book or literary composition had the sole
right of first printing and publishing the same for sale; 1 (b) and might bring an action
against any person who printed published and sold the same without his consent? [Vote:
1(a) - 10 Yes; 1 No. 1(b) - 8 Yes; 3 No.] ;
2(a) If the author had such right originally, did the law take it away, upon his printing and
publishing such book or literary composition; 2(b) and might any person afterward
reprint and sell, for his own benefit, such book or literary composition, against the will of
the author? [Vote: 2(a) - 4 Yes; 7 No. 2(b) - 4 Yes; 7 No.] ;
3(a) If such action would have lain at common law, is it taken away by the Statute of
Ann.; 3(b) and is an author, by the said statute precluded from every remedy except on
the foundation of the said statute and on the terms and conditions prescribed thereby?
[Vote: 3(a) - 6 Yes; 5 No. 3(b) - 5 Yes; 5 No; 1 Maybe.];
493
ROSE, supra note 395 at 93-95.
494 Mat 99-102.
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4. Whether the author of any literary composition and his assigns, had the sole right of
printing and publishing the same in perpetuity, by the common law? [Vote: 7 Yes; 4
No.]; and
5. Whether this right is in any way impeached restrained or taken away by the Statute of
Ann.? [Vote: 6 Yes; 5 No.].495
The argument for perpetual copyright was narrowly rejected but not the Lockean concept
of a property right;496 however, this property right was not absolute.
If one accepts a purist approach to natural law it would be rational to accept the
argument for peipetual copyright. But the history of copyright establishes that, in the
instance of perpetual copyright, the utilitarian view prevailed. From the early days of
copyright legislation the economic policy of copyright law struck a balance between
authors' rights and affordable access.497 This balance resulted in an amalgamation of
natural law and utilitarian philosophies. Copyright law addresses this amalgamation
through four underlying principles:
1. The creation as an expression of the creators personality (moral rights) and it
is just he should be in control and be rewarded, (natural law);498
2. just reward for labour; John Locke's labour theory (natural law);499
495 98 E.R 258-62. Lord Mansfield abstained from the vote as it was his judgment that
was on appeal. Id.
496
ROSE, supra note 395 at 107.
497
DAVIS, supra note 445 at 4, 173.
498
DAVIS, supra note 445 at 10; Millar v. Taylor, 98 E.R. 201, 252 (1769).
499
DAVIS, supra note 445 at 10-11; JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT 287-88 (Peter Laslett ed„ Cambridge Univ. Press 1988)(1690).
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3. stimulus to creativity; copyright law presupposes that creators and
disseminators will only invest in creation and dissemination if there is a profit
to be made (utilitarian); and500
4. social requirements of access (utilitarian).501
Natural law proponents relied on a philosophical basis similar to that in the field of social
psychology regarding the acquisitive instinct as articulated in the nature v. nurture debate.
This debate examines whether certain human traits are induced by a biological instinct
(nature) or are they created by the environment in which we are exposed (nurture). The
notion that there was an acquisitive instinct to possess more than just the necessities of
life was a popular notion in the seventeenth to early twentieth centuries and influenced
philosophical debate regarding property. For example, the work ofDescartes and Hobbes
on this subject influenced Locke and his labour theory of property.502 This belief that
acquisition was instinctual was so widely believed that phrenologists held that
acquisitiveness was neurological503 and psychologists accepted the desire to acquire and
hoard property as instinctive.504
The natural law theory, reflected in the instinct or nature theory of social
psychology, came under attack in the battle for perpetual copyright. Here, we see the
arguments for natural law and economic rights and the utilitarian access arguments that
had been expressed and refined for centuries reach their zenith in eloquence. These
arguments, so elegantly phrased, provide some insight to the current human rights debate,
500
DAVIS, supra note 445 at 11 -12.
501 Id. at 12-13.
502
Floyd Rudmin, The Economic Psychology ofLeon Litwinski, 1 (1990) Journal of
Economic Psychology 307, 311.
503 Id. at 314 (noting that Spurzheim placed it in the temporal lobe.)
504 Id.
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although this philosophical debate in the international context is more complex in its
attempt to transgress national borders.
The economic policy reflected in the Statute ofAnne promoted access concerns;
specifically through the policy that an economic incentive to create would increase
access. The booksellers' tried, through the courts then the legislature, to change the focus
to natural law as an economic policy reflected in authors' rights ostensibly to promote
access but in reality to increase profits as there was no evidence that increased author's
rights would promote access. We see this battle in some of the history of the ever
expanding term limits in copyright law as well as the reduced application of exceptions to
copyright such as fair dealing. At first the booksellers' trade was not successful but as
the economic importance of intellectual property increased the economic policy started to
shift.
The moral and economic justification in creating a property right in copyright was
initially premised on the natural law, Lockean "fruits of their labour" concept.505 The
theory rests on the belief that productivity is increased through ownership and the
emotional appeal, as expressed by Blackstone in the Miller case, that ownership is just.506
Applying a perpetual property right to copyright was justified as term limits and fair
dealing takes from the one who justly deserves the fruits of his labour and gives to those
who have not expended effort.507 However, application of this property theory in its pure
form proved to be problematic from both a philosophical as well as a practical standpoint.
505
LACY, supra note 335 at 1539; LOCKE, supra note 500.
506
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Philosophically, Locke did not extend his theories on tangible property to
intellectual property. Indeed, he advocated term limits for copyright.508 Even with
tangible property Locke had certain conditions such as that property not be wasted and
that the appropriation of property by one does not harm others in society.509 These
conditions also exemplify the fact that Locke's "fruits of their labour" theory was
primarily concerned with avoiding what he perceived to be the waste of rivalrous
resources due to the tragedy of the commons.510
From a practical standpoint, the natural law theory has not proven to be
economically sound. Prior to the enactment of the Statute ofAnne the right to copy
creative works was treated in an absolute fashion, as they would be under the natural law
theory. This resulted in less than desirable productivity that, in part, stimulated the need
for change. For example, the observation that increased productivity in creative works is
the result of a rich public domain whereby creators are allows to build upon the works of
others had been noted prior to the enactment of any copyright legislation.511
Perhaps the state most notorious for a natural law perspective in its domestic
copyright legislation is France with its emphasis on moral rights. However, even France
has a history reflecting a utilitarian philosophy influence. In eighteenth century France,
booksellers from the provinces were also attempting to loosen the garrotte booksellers in
the capital city of Paris had placed on the trade. They did so by arguing that prolonged
property law theory for intellectual property in private international law cases see JAMES
J. FAWCETT AND PAUL TORREMANS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 487-94 (1998).
508
LOCKE, supra note 500.
509
Jacqueline Lipton, Information Property: Rights And Responsibilities, 56 FLA. L.
REV. 135, 179 (2004).
510 Id.
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privileges were against the public interest.512 In defense of the monopoly held by the
Parisian booksellers, the advocate Louis d'Hericourt argued that a property right existed
with the author over his creation and that this light was perpetual.513 However, this
argument would turn against the booksellers in 1761 when it was successfully argued by
the grand-daughters of La Fontaine that when the privilege expired the rights reverted to
the author's heirs not the booksellers.514
During the nineteenth century, several committees in France were established to
investigate the perpetual copyright issue. These committees rejected the arguments for
perpetual copyrights on the grounds of harm to education,515 that it would increase the
cost of books,516 and that the public had a right to enjoy creative endeavours produced in
r]7
the community. The copyright term was ultimately extended to the author's life plus
fifty years by the law of 14 July, 1866 and this term remained until 1957 when peipetual
no
moral rights were granted.
Prior to 1957, French economic policy in the realm of copyright law focused on
economic rights of disseminators and public interest concerns, similar to the copyright
laws of the Unite Kingdom and the United States, rather than moral rights. However, in
the nineteenth century the concept ofmoral rights, in particular the extension of the
512
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513 Id. at 75-76.
514 Id. at 76.
515 Id. at 86.
516
DAVIS, supra note 445 at 87-88; Jean Matthyssens, Copyright Law Schemes in
France During the Last Centwy, IV RIDA 15 (1954).
517
DAVIS, supra note 445 at 87-88; Matthyssens, supra note 445 at 34.
518
DAVIS, supra note 445 at 89; Matthyssens, supra note 445 at 34.
152
personality of the author contained in his works, started to gain attention in case law and
519
commentary.
By 1945 the French were investigating possible reforms to their copyright law,
which would ultimately hold the moral rights of authors' pre-eminent. Several
Committees on Intellectual Property were formed to review the issue and draft proposed
legislation. During the course of the drafting process, little attention was focused on
public interest issues such as education. The new legislation would place French
copyright law on a natural law footing as opposed to a utilitarian right granted by the
state as with pre-1957 legislation and United Kingdom and the United States copyright
laws.520 Further, these moral rights were to be perpetual and inalienable unlike economic
rights.521 However, in 1985 the French law was amended to reflect the advances in
technology, which, in turn, created new economic realities. In addressing these proposed
changes in the law, commentators refocused attention on public interest aspects of
522
copyright, primarily access, and economic concerns such as competition from abroad.
In the United States, perpetual copyright and the natural law theory were rejected
523in the 1834 United States Supreme Court case of Wheaton v. Peters. In Wheaton the
appellant (copyright holder) argued for a perpetual copyright on the basis of an alleged
common law right utilizing many of the same arguments urged by the copyright holders
in the English cases ofMiller v. Taylor and Donaldson v. Becket. The appellee placed
519
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much emphasis on the fact that, as Donaldson v. Becket and Miller v. Taylor were
decided before the drafting and adoption of the United States Constitution the drafters
must have been aware of them. Presumably, if the drafters of the United States'
Constitution were aware of them they could have clearly indicated any disagreement that
they had with these opinions and rectified the situation. As they did not, this omission
was interpreted by the appellee as an indication in favour of perpetual copyright. The
Court in Wheaton did not agree:
That eveiy man is entitled to thefruits ofhis own labour must be admitted; but he can
enjoy them only, except by statutoiyprovision, under the rides ofproperty, which
regulate society, and which define the rights of things in general.*24
It is clear, there can be no common law of the United States. Thefederal government
is composed oftwenty-four sovereign and independent states;.... There is no principle
which pei-vades the union and has the authority oflaw, that is not embodied in the
constitution or laws ofthe union. The common law could be made a part ofour
525
federal system, only by legislative adoption.
Congress, then, by this act, instead ofsanctioning an existing right, as contendedfor,
created it....526
In Wheaton the Court's opinion reflects the dual nature of the copyright clause
with a nod to natural law but a restriction on it for utilitarian purposes. This restriction,
primarily reflected by term limits to promote access, is created by the legislature to
accomplish a social goal such as education. Additionally, the Court noted a distinction
between the common law system in England and in the United States, namely, that there
is no federal level or national common law in the United States. Federal law stems from
the United States' Constitution and federal legislation permitted by the Constitution, such
524 Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 658.
525 Id.
526 Id. at 661.
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as the copyright clause. Common law does exist in the United States, but only at the state
level. Thus, it is possible to have state common law on copyright but only to the extent
527that it does not conflict with federal statutory copyright law.
SUMMARY
The philosophical debate between natural law and utilitarian philosophy is
reflected in the perpetual copyright cases in the histories of the United Kingdom, France
and the United States copyright laws. The all three states maintained a de jure utilitarian
priority reflecting an economic policy of access for education but a de facto natural law
philosophy in some respects. This was due, in part, to a popular belief that it was just for
a creator to claim his creations and profits from his creation as "mine." Natural law
philosophy was not dead; it would remain a critical component in term extension and fair
dealing debates and, as we shall see, in the context of international copyright law.
527 The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution provides: This Constitution
and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all
Treaties made, or which shall be made, underAuthority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law ofthe Land... United States Constitution, art. VI (2).
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CHAPTER 8
MARKET FAILURE ANALYSIS IN REGARDS TO TERM EXTENSIONS AND
FAIR DEALING
t f i 528When you stealfrom one author, it's plagiarism; ifyou stealfrom many, it's research.
The modem Western economic justification for copyright begins with the premise
that intellectual property is a type of public good. Public goods are described as
having two characteristics: first they are nonrivalrous, meaning that once created
consumption by one does not deprive the availability of use by others; 530 second, there is
531the free-rider problem of one who has not paid for access being able to obtain access.
Market failure results when creators and disseminators lose incentive to create and
disseminate because they cannot make a sufficient ROI, through a free rider problem,
resulting in socially beneficial goods being under-produced;532 and when goods are
higher than the market can bare. To counter market failure, a state must intervene either
through an indirect tax system, such as a limited monopoly as with most intellectual
528 Wilson Mizner, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS, JOHN BARTLETT, supra note 171 at
757 ((14).
529 Uma Suthersanen, Copyright And Educational Policies: A Stakeholder Analysis 23
OXFORD JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 585 (2003); Lacy, supra note 335 at 1554;
Gordon, supra note 335 at 1610-12.
530
Suthersanen, supra note 529 at 585; Lacy, supra note 335 at 1555; Gordon, supra
note 335 at 1600, 1604, 1610-12.
531
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property laws creating an artificial restrained supply, or by a direct tax similar to taxing
for national defense. 533 While the limited term monopoly for copyright is justified, in
part, to prevent market failure from occurring in the case of a perpetual monopoly
creating artificially high prices history reflects continual extension of the term limit and
restrictions on fair dealing with little to no economic justification.
A. Term Extension.
In the United Kingdom in 1731 the first 21 -year period for existing works
specified in the Statute ofAnne was about to pass.534 This seemed to go unnoticed by the
trade until 1735 when the booksellers moved for a term extension until 1756 on
protectionist grounds.535 The main problem for the trade was competition from outside
booksellers and printers from Ireland and Holland importing less expensive reprints. The
trade requested an extension of another twenty-one years to protect its investment from
this alleged foreign piracy. In an attempt to persuade Parliament, the trade once again
evoked the encouragement of learning and marched in several noted authors to present its
case. Opponents to this term extension argued that it would, in effect, grant a perpetual
monopoly.536 The cause for term extension failed but managed to again raise the
standard of author's rights.537
The next significant term extension debate in the United Kingdom occurred in
1837 when a Member of Parliament, Sergeant Talfourd, spearheaded the cause for
posthumous copyright protection. He and his followers disagreed with the ruling in
533
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535
FEATHER, supra note 340 at 70-75; Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. at 232 (J. Stevens
dissenting.)
536 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. at 232-33 (J. Stevens dissenting.)
537
FEATHER, supra note 340 at 70-75; ROSE, supra note 395 at 52-57.
157
Donaldson v. Beckett holding against a perpetual copyright but sought a compromise by
securing a term of the author's life plus sixty years.538 Several prominent authors, such
as William Wordsworth and Sir Walter Scott, supported Talfourd's cause. The argument
was premised on the allegation that some authors' did not start to see a return on their
investment until the term limit was almost up.539 Further, the natural law philosophy of
copyright as a property right was still invoked along with the assertion that authors'
would be more likely to produce if they knew that their heirs would be taken care of.540
Opponents to Talfourd made the utilitarian access argument that books were for
the benefit of the public and needed to be procured at the lowest possible price.
Accordingly, the inducement to authors' should be no greater than necessary.541 Lord
Macaulay took this position when he argued:
We all know howfaintly we are affected by the prospect ofvery distant
advantages, even when they are advantages, which we may reasonably hope that we
shall ourselves enjoy. But an advantage that is to be enjoyed more than halfa
centuiy after we are dead, by somebody, we know not by whom, perhaps by somebody
unborn, by somebody utterly unconnected with us, is really no motive at all to
action....
Iwill take an example. Dr. Johnson diedfifty-six years ago. Ifthe law were
what my honourable and learnedfriend wishes to make it, somebody would now have
the monopoly ofDr. Johnson's works. Who that somebody would be it is impossible
to say; but we may venture to guess. I guess, then, that it would have been some
bookseller, who was the assign ofanother bookseller, who was the grandson ofa
third bookseller, who had bought the copyrightfrom Black Frank, the Doctor's
servant and residuary legatee in 1785 or 1786. Now would the knowledge that this
copyright would exist in 1841 have been a source ofgratification to Johnson? Would
it have stimulated his exertions? Would it have once drawn him out ofhis bed before
noon? Would it have once cheered him under a fit of the spleen? Would it have
538
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induced him to give us one more allegory, one more life ofa poet, one more imitation
ofJuvenal? Ifirmly believe not.542
Talfourd was defeated but shortly after he left Parliament the act of 1 84254j was
passed which provided a term extension of forty-two years or during the life of the author
and seven years after his death if this should be longer than the forty-two years.
Ultimately, the term would be extended several times until we arrive at the basic term set
today of the author's life plus seventy years.544
In the United States Congress extended the term limits for copyright in 1831 to
twenty-eight years from publication, renewable for an additional fourteen years for a total
of forty-two years.545 Prior to the adoption of this term extension a Judiciary
Committee Report prepared for the House of Representatives in connection to the
proposed term extension stated that: "an author has exclusive andperpetual right, in
preference to any other, to thefruits ofhis labour. "546 The floor debate reflected this
sentiment;547 however, as stated above the United States Supreme Court did not share this
view in Wheaton v. Peters.548 So, although the term extension passed its basic
justification premised upon a natural law right were rejected three years later by the
Supreme Court.549
542
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The United States Congress next extended the term limits in 1909 to twenty-eight
years from publication renewable for an additional twenty-eight years for a total of fifty-
six years.550 This time Congress was careful to record a more utilitarian perspective
stating that copyright was intended to benefit the public by stimulating writing and
inventions and, indeed, that it would be beyond the powers ofCongress to enact a
copyright statute that did not fulfill this constitutional objective of advancing learning.551
Despite this reflection of a change in philosophical justifications for term extensions from
natural law to utilitarian, the term extension passed.
Congress also acceded to the copyright industries economic concerns in the 1976
Act by changing the method of computing the term of protection from the date of
publication to fifty years after the author's death (for natural persons) intentionally
reflecting the international standard set forth in the Berne Convention.552 In the past few
years the United States Supreme Court has acknowledge the almost exclusive power of
Congress to set the term of copyright protection sans economic analysis.
In the past copyright law in the United States had a utilitarian (access) emphasis;
however, this is questionable in today's economic realities.553 The problem with the
utilitarian assertion is that it has not found favour with recent United States Supreme
Court decisions. For example, the Eldred v. Ashcroft554 case concerned Congresses
extension of the copyright term to the author's life plus seventy years to conform to the
550 Act ofMar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, §§23-24, 35 Stat. 1080-1081 (hereinafter the "1909
Act"); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. at 194.
551 H.R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess., 6-7 (1909); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. at
246-47 (J. Breyer dissenting).
552 1976 Act, 17 U.S.C. §§302-304; Elderd v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. at 194-95(citing to
H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, p. 135, U.S. Cong. & Admin. News 1976, p. 5659.)
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European Union Directive555 on this subject.556 In October 1993 the European Union
issued a directive requiring harmonization of term limits basically to the author's life plus
70. This directive had a reciprocity provision meaning that authors from states that did
not provide similar term limits would only reap the protection of their domestic terms in
the European Union.557 Rights holders in the United States approached Congress with a
558
request to extend term limits so as to reap the benefit of the European Union markets.
This request was met with a receptive audience. Hearings were conducted but there was
next to no economic analysis regarding the effect on United States consumers.559 The
focus was on international benefits with a sub-issue of a need for harmonization.560 The
net result was the 1998 Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA).561
The Eldred case challenged the constitutionality of this act arguing two primary
points: First, that the term extension violated the First Amendment's freedom of
expression; and second, that the term extension should be judged under a strict scrutiny
analysis to see if it actually promoted science and art as required by the Constitution.562
555 Council Directive 93/98/EEC of 29 October 1993 Harmonizing the Term of
Protection ofCopyright and Certain Related Rights, 1993 Official J. Eur. Corns. (L290),
p.9 (EU Council Directive 93/98).
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With respect to the second point, in Eldred, it was argued by plaintiff, an access
proponent, that the United States Constitution limited Congress' ability to extend term
limits to situations which "promote.. .science and the useful arts."563 Accordingly,
plaintiff argued Congress could not extend the copyright term unless it specifically found
that such an extension did promote science and the arts. This would, arguably require
some economic analysis to substantiate a term extension. The Court specifically found
that the constitutional language in the copyright clause "to promote the progress of
science and the useful arts" is merely preamble, thus placing little to no restriction on the
United States Congress to extend term limits.564 Further, the United States Supreme
Court has held that Congress may extend the term limits for copyright as long as there is
a rational basis for this legislation. The rational basis test for the constitutionality of
United States legislation is the lowest level of scrutiny provided by the Court. Thus, even
if there was a requirement placed upon Congress by the constitutional phrase "to promote
the progress of science and the useful arts" there may be a finding ofjustification in term
extensions with very little evidence.565
In upholding the lower court's decision regarding the constitutional correctness of
Congresses actions due to harmonization concerns the Supreme Court in Elder held:
... "harmonization in this regard has obvious practical benefits" and is "a
'necessary andproper' measure to meet contemporary circumstances rather than
a step on the way to making copyrights perpetual. "5 6
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. at 211-12.
564 This contradicts Congress' own belief reflected in 1909 that the language did limit its
powers. Supra note 551.
565 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. at 213.
566 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. at 198.
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By extending the baseline United States copyright term to life plus 70 years,
Congress sought to ensure that American authors would receive the same
copyright protection in Europe as their European counterparts. 567
Thus, it would appear that harmonization in and of itselfmeets the rational basis test
allowing the United States unfettered power Congress to exercise its constitutional grant
to legislate in the field of copyright law.
The failure of the United States Supreme Court to even address a balancing
approach regarding harmonization and access is troubling in that it appears to allow
Congress to place a priority on material gain and other author's rights. Granted, this term
extension for harmonization purposes may provide more creative works and, thus, more
access, however, this is mere conjecture. It would have been preferable, from an
economic policy perspective to require evidence of how access would be enhanced as
suggested by the language in the United States constitutional provision that the United
States Supreme Court has relegated to the perfunctory role of preamble. 568
The Supreme Court did acknowledged the philosophical underpinning of
balancing the interests to access with that of author's rights:
As we have explained, "[t]he economicphilosophy behind the [Copyright]
[CJlause ... is the conviction that encouragement ofindividual effort bypersonal
gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents ofauthors and
inventors. "Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219, 74 S.Ct. 460, 98 L.Ed. 630 (1954).
Accordingly, "copyright law celebrates theprofit motive, recognizing that the
incentive to profitfrom the exploitation ofcopyright will redound to thepublic
567 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. at 205-06.
568
See, e.g., S.Rep. No. 104-315, p. 3 (1996) ("The puipose of the bill [DMCAjis to
ensure adequate copyright protection for American works in foreign nations and the
continued economic benefits of a healthy surplus balance of trade") cited in Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. at 262-63 (J. Breyer dissenting) relating to the Sony Bono Copyright
Term Extension Act, 17 U.S.C.A. §302.
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benefit by resulting in theproliferation ofknowledge.... American Geophysical
Union v. Texaco Inc.. 802 F.Supp. 1, 27 (S.D.N.Y.1992), aff'd, 60F.3d913 (C.A.2
1994).... Justice BREYER's assertion that "copyright statutes must servepublic,
notprivate, ends, "post, at 803, similarly misses the mark. The two ends are not
mutually exclusive; copyright law serves public ends byproviding individuals
with an incentive to pursueprivate ones.569
The problem here is that the Court does not address the distinct possibility that there will
be times when these twin goals do conflict. In such circumstances would United States
law recognize an access priority or an author's rights priority? The Court gives some
indication of an access priority, for example:
Under the U.S. Constitution, theprimary objective ofcopyright law is not to reward
the author, but rather to securefor thepublic the benefits derivedfrom the authors'
labors. By giving authors an incentive to create, thepublic benefits in two ways:
when the original expression is created and... when the limited term ... expires and
the creation is added to thepublic domain. Id., at 17.570
However, in meeting this primary objective, the Court held:
We have also stressed, however, that it is generallyfor Congress, not the courts, to
decide how best to pursue the Copyright Clause's objectives.57'
In the Eldred case we see an example of the most recent United States position regarding
the access and author's rights debate. There has been a shift in economic policy from
access to author's rights as a practical matter with the term extension. While it may be
argued that longer term protection will provide more access through more incentive to
569 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. at 212 fn 18.
570 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. at 247.
571 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U,S. at 212.
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create, there is no evidence to support this position.572 And while affordable access and
access through more creations may still be the asserted objective under United States
copyright law, the appearance of impropriety by the lobbying ofmajor media
conglomerates to get the term extension passed through Congress with no court
intervention is ever present. This would appear to be the very concern that Resolution
2000/7 intended to address albeit in-artfully.573
B. Fair Dealing.
Modern Western economists justify exceptions to an absolute property right or
monopoly in copyright, such as fair dealing, as a counter-balance to potential abuses of a
monopoly.574 In essence, there would also be market failure if an absolute monopoly
were granted as the transaction costs to create by building upon previous works would
575increase thereby reducing productivity and access to new expressions and inventions.
The fair dealing exception is further economically justified under a market failure
theory when consensual bargaining has broken down thus making the desired transfer of
resource use unlikely to happen.576 For example, if the transaction costs were too high to
justify use, perhaps due to an inability to locate the owner to obtain permission or the cost
demanded by the owner, there would be market failure. Under these circumstances, the
benefit to allow the use of the resources without payment may be acceptable especially
572 KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY 12-18 (2000).
573 Shiloh Daum, Eldred v. Ashcroft: International influences and the Outer Limits of
the Copyright Clause, 29 N. CAR. J. INT'L L. & COMMERCIAL REG. 129, 131
(2003).
574
Suthersanen, supra note 529 at 585; Lacy, supra note 335 at 1555; Gordon, supra
note 335 at 1615.
575
Suthersanen, supra note 529 at 587; For an example of the sole source problem
resolved by compulsory license see RTE & ITP v. EC Commission, 4 C.M.L.R. 717
(1995) (Magill).
576
Gordon, supra note 335 at 1615.
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considering the fact that in either case the owner has no expectation ofpayment due to
market failure.577
In the United Kingdom during the late eighteenth century through the nineteenth
century the concept of limiting copyright based upon fair dealing was based upon case
law. The fair dealing test looked at independent labour or the amount copied and the aim
of the law was to encourage learning by allowing fair dealing while preventing the
578 • • 579
appropriation of another's labour. Though fair dealing may amount to plagiarism,
580
plagiarism was a moral but not necessarily a legal wrong.
Lord Mansfield, a staunch advocate for the natural law philosophy and authors'
rights, recognized that certain limits to copyright were socially desirable. In Sayre v.
Moore,5f" Lord Mansfield articulated some fair dealing limits with respect to a defendant
who used plaintiffs protected sea charts to create an improved/corrected set of sea charts,
to wit:
In deciding it we must take care to guard against two extremes equally prejudicial;
the one, that men ofability, who have employed their timefor the service of the
community, may not be deprived oftheirjust merits, and the reward of their ingenuity
and labour; the other, that the worldmay not be deprived of improvements, nor the
progress of the arts retarded,5H2
Courts struggled with the application of fair dealing in balancing the property
right interest of the copyright holder with the need of using preceding works." The
question of fair dealing was particularly difficult in cases where there was a mixture of
577
Gordon, supra note 335 at 1618.
578
DRONE, supra note 507 at 387-98.
579 Id. at 399.
580 Id. at 383.
581 102 E.R. 139 (K.B. 1785).
582 Id. at 140.
583 Mawman v. Tegg, 38 E.R. 380 (Chancery 1826).
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copied work and original work. While the courts at times seemed to look at the
percentage of plaintiffs work copied584 the purpose of the quotation and the value of
plaintiffs loses were also examined.
The United Kingdom's common law doctrine of fair dealing was codified in the
Copyright Act of 191 1,586 In the United Kingdom under the Copyright Act of
191 1 587Parliament codified pre-existing case law, which had accepted certain defenses to
infringement such as fair quotation; however, its application was for the courts to
determine.588 In interpreting the codified fair dealing law early court decisions seemed to
focus on commercial use such as whether the use was by a competing business, in which
case the use was not fair.589 Further, if the taking was by a newspaper but not for
criticism, review or summary it would not be allowed.590
Under the current copyright act of the United Kingdom591 fair dealing is available
for private study, non-commercial research, criticism, review and reporting current
events. However, even under these categories the statute does not define what amounts
to fair dealing. Judicial and academic guidance has, to date, left the doctrine
unpredictable. Generally, United Kingdom courts consider how much has been
584 Lewis v. Fullarton, 48 E.R. 1080 (Rolls Court 1839).
585 Bramwell v. Halcomb, 40 E.R. 1110 (Chancery 1836); Campbell v. Scott, 59 E.R.
784 (Vice Chancellor 1842).
586
DAVIS, supra note 445 at 38-40.
587
Copyright Act of 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c.46.
588
DAVIS, supra note 445 at 40.
589
University ofLondon Press, Ltd. V. University Tutorial Press, Ltd. [1916] 2 Ch. 601;
Hubbard v. Vosper [1972] 2 Q.B. 84, 93 (per Lord Denning).
590 Hawkins and Son (London), Ltd. V. Paramount Film Service, Ltd. [1934] Ch. 593 (on
appeal at 602-609.)
51 1988 Act, supra note 292.
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appropriated, qualitatively and quantitatively; the nature of the use, including whether the
n • ' 592
use is competitive or substitutive; and it is a matter of impression.
For example, with regard to education, generally speaking, a lecturer may
distribute a reading list ofmaterials students are to read but if he instructs the students to
make copies of those materials there is no fair dealing defense and he has infringed
because one may not authorize another to copy protected work.593 Accordingly, there is
no absolute fair dealing defense to education and courts would apply the vague
considerations of: A qualitatively and quantitatively analysis; the nature of the use,
including whether the use is competitive or substitutive; and the court's impression of the
matter. Similarly, there is no fair dealing defense with respect to a database where the
underlining research is for commercial purposes.594 This rule has created a problem in
education given the trend of university research towards commercial research to exploit
intellectual property creations.595 Thus, while fair dealing does provide some enhanced
access for educational purposes and building upon the works of others, its benefits to
access are quite limited.
In France, similar to the fair dealing exception to copyright protection in the
United Kingdom, the making ofmanuscript copies for personal use was not considered
an infringement but the making of a manuscript copy for commercial use was considered
592 Hubbard v. Vosper, [1972] 2 Q.B. 84 at 94, 98; Scott v. Stanford, LR 3 Eq. 722;
Suthersanen, supra note 529 at 589.
593 The Copyright Act of 1988, 4 & 5 Eliz., 2, c.74; UK v. Copyright Licensing Agency
Ltd., Copyright Tribunal Case Nos. CT 71/00, 72/00, 73/00, 74/00 and 75/01 (unreported)
available at http://www.patent.gov.uk/copy/tribunal/triabissued.htm; Suthersanen, supra
note 529 at 590.
594
Suthersanen, supra note 529 at 591-92.
595
Suthersanen, supra note 529 at 592.
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an infringement.596 The access concerns related to copyrighted works were reflected in
France in 1928 when it was held that copying extracts ofworks for use in schools was not
an infringement,597 that quotation for purpose of literary criticism or in support of or
against an argument was not an infringement,598 and quotation for purposes of historical
documentation, teaching and information was allowed.599 However, the 1957 copyright
law in France permitted specifically enumerated exceptions to the property right of
authors. These exceptions included: free, private performances produced exclusively
within the family circle; copies or reproductions for the private use of the copyist;
analyses and quotations made for critical, educational, or scientific reasons or for review;
publication ofpublic speeches in the press and in broadcast programmes; parodies,
pastiches and caricatures; recordings of broadcasts for national interest or documentary
character for preservation in official archives.600
These exceptions to copyright were modified in the 1985 law by allowing the
broadcasting of public speeches by any means of telecommunication but with respect to
the copying for private use this was restricted to works fixed on phonograms or
videograms and the producers of these works were entitled to receive remuneration for
the reproduction of such works.601 This restriction reflects the economic realities of the
situation created by advanced technologies which allow for decentralized copying:
596
DAVIS, supra note 445 at 85.
597 Id., Paris, 22 March 1928.
598
DAVIS, supra note 445 at 85, Civil Court of the Sein, 11 March 1897.
599
DAVIS, supra note 445 at 85.
600
DAVIS, supra note 445 at 95; 1957 Law at arts. 41 and 45.
601
DAVIS, supra note 445 at 98-99.
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inexpensive, multiple copies to be made relatively easily by individuals thus effecting the
compensation paid to producers of such works.602
The earliest United States recognition of fair dealing, referred to as fair use in the
United States, was in 1841 in Folsom v. Marsh m In Folsom plaintiff, a publisher of a
twelve volume work on the writings ofGeorge Washington including official and private
papers, sued defendant, the publisher of a two volume work on the life ofGeorge
Washington including three hundred and nineteen pages ofWashington's papers that had
never been published before plaintiffs work. After holding that there was a copyright in
the papers the Court addressed whether the defendant's use was justified. First, the Court
held that it was not necessary to copy the entire work or even a majority of the work. All
that was required by law to constitute a piracy was the copying of a sufficient portion so
as to diminish or injure the original.604 Next, the Court set out a test to determine if the
use was justified, to wit:
In short, we must often, in deciding questions ofthis sort, look to the nature and
objects of the selections made, the quantity and value ofthe materials used, and the
degree in which the use mayprejudice the sale, or diminish theprofits, or supersede
the objects, of the original work.605
The Court, relying heavily on United Kingdom case law, ruled the use here took the
essential value of the original work and, thus, was not justified. In general, early fair use
cases in the United States looked to case law from the United Kingdom and, accordingly,
602 See DAVIS, supra note 445 at 99.
603 9 F.Cas. 342.
604
Folsom, 9 F.Cas. at 348.
605
Folsom, 9 F.Cas. at 348
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tended to focus on the issue ofwhether the subsequent author's work caused substantial
material injury to the owner of the copyright in the original work.606
Fair use was a judicial doctrine in the United States until 1976 when it was
codified.607 In 1976 The United States Congress adopted a new copyright act, which is
essentially the act that remains in force today.608 The primary stated purpose of this act is
to "encourage the production of original literary, artistic, and musical expression for the
public good."609 The codified fair use provision states that the factors to consider
include:
(1) the purpose and character ofthe use, including whether such use is ofa
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educationalpurposes;
(2) the nature ofthe copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential marketfor or value of the copyrighted
work6'0
Although the 1976 Act codified fair use, as with the United Kingdom codification of fair
dealing, it was left to the courts to interpret.
The "deserving user" is articulated in the first factor for fair use, which
distinguishes between commercial and non-commercial use. For example, educators
606 See Stoiy v. Holcombe, 23 F.Cas. 171(1847); Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F.Cas. 26
(1869); Banks v. McDivitt, 2 F.Cas. 759 (1875).
607 17 U.S.C § 107; DAVIS, supra note 445 at 64; Michael J. Lynch, A Theory ofPure
Buffoonery: Fair Use and Humor, 24 UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON L. R. 1, 3 (1998);
Christine M. Fenner, Artists' Rights After Ringgold v. Black Entertainment Television,
Fair Use Analysis ofa Visual Work Within a Television Show, 8 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART
& ENT. LAW 327, 328-29 (1998).
608 1 7 U.S.C. §101 etseq.
609 Christa Dommers, Morphing and the Current Copyright Act: Is a Morphed Image an
Infringement?, 17 QLR 429 (1997); Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 524 (1994).
610 17 U.S.C §107.
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"deserve" to use the work for free as their motives are generally not considered to be for
private pecuniary gain, rather it is to benefit the public. Further, a user is a deserving user
if he uses the works of others to create additional works because that too benefits the
public.611 While Congress never weighted any of the listed considerations, the United
States Supreme Court in Sony Corp ofAmerica v. Universal City Studios, Inc.61' held
that commercial use was presumptively unfair613 thus tipping the balance of interests for
copyright law in favour ofmaterial gain.614 The Supreme Court did note that the
Congressional Record indicated that the balance was to be in the favour of public interest,
primarily access,615 but the unnecessary emphasis on the commercial use prong of the
statute by the Court in Sony placed an undue focus on the material gain aspects of
copyright law, which would be relied upon by other courts in the United States.616
Additionally, many United States' courts seem to also focus on the fourth factor,
the effect of the use upon the potential marketfor or value ofthe copyrighted work.617 It
has been argued that the fourth factor appears to be the most important factor, i.e. if the
611
Lacy, supra note 335 at 1563.
612 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
613 464 U.S. at 451.
614 Pierre N. Leval, Nimmer Lecture: Fair Use Rescued, 44 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1449,
1455-60(1997).
615 464 U.S. at 429.
616
Leval, supra note 614 at 1455.
617
Sony Corp. ofAm. V. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 450 (1984) (Owners of
copyrights on television programs brought copyright infringement action against
manufacturers of home videotape recorders. The Supreme Court held that videotape
recorder was capable of substantial noninfringing uses; thus, manufacturers' sale of such
equipment to general public did not constitute contributory infringement.); Harper &
Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 545-56, 569 (1985) (Copyright
infringement action was brought arising out ofmagazine's unauthorized publication of
verbatim quotes from President Ford's memoirs. The Supreme Court held that
unauthorized publication of verbatim quotes from essentially the "heart" of the
unpublished memoirs was not a "fair use.")
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use greatly affects the user's market the use most likely is not fair. But, if the
deserving user theory is to be given any practical affect the first two factors, 1) the
purpose and character of the use; and 2) the nature of the copyrighted work, need to be
given more attention by the courts.619 For instance, arguably political information is very
high on the list of information that needs wide public dissemination.620 Indeed, the
United States Supreme Court has given the most extensive First Amendment protection
(O 1
to political speech. If that is the case, then the courts should place a heavy emphasis
on the second factor whenever political information is involved.
At the same time that intellectual property, and in particular copyright, were
expanding as a percentage of the United States economy it appears that exceptions to
protection, such as fair use, were being revisited by the courts. In Campbell v. Acuff-
Rose Music, Inc.622 the Supreme Court clarified its remarks from the Sony case to
deemphasize the commercial use-economic factor. Campbell involved the parody of a
song. The Court applied an historical analysis of copyright law and the fair use
doctrine623 stating that some fair use was necessary to achieve the purpose of copyright to
promote the progress of science and the arts.624 All the factors, nature and object of the
selections made; the quantity and value of the materials used and the degree the use may
618
Lacy, supra note 335 at 1587.
619
Lacy, supra note 335 at 1587; See generally Patterson, supra note 429.
620
Lacy, supra note 335 at 1588-89.
621 Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191(1992)(The Court holding that restraints on political
speech is subject to strict scrutiny review.)
U.S.Tenn.,1992.
May 26, 1992 (Approx. 23 pages).
622 5 1 0 U.S. 569(1994).
623 See Leval, supra note 614 at 1464-65.
624 510 U.S. at 575.
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625
prejudice or reduce profits were to be considered in light of this purpose. The
626commercial use consideration was not dispositive.
In the United States the problem of balancing material interests of owners and
access for education has not been resolved by fair use partially due to the uncertainty of
the doctrine and advances in technology making copying increasingly quick and
inexpensive. In the educational field the Internet has created a concern with
decentralized copying which allows teachers to copy vast amounts of information quickly
for their classes. Fair use under United States law allows court's to consider if the use
was for non-profit educational purposes;627 however, cases discussing fair use for
educational puiposes limit the extent of such use and leave much to speculation.
Rather than take chances with the uncertainty of costly litigation, both the copyright
industries and educational institutions attempted to come to an informal agreement
regarding fair use for educational purposes. In 1994 a Conference on Fair Use
625 Id. at 576.
626 Id. at 584.
627 17 U.S.C. §107(1).
628
Encyclopedia Britannica Educ. Corp. v. Croks, 447 F.Supp. 243 (D.C.N.Y. 1978)
(No fair use where there was a significant market impact due to highly organized,
systematic copying of educational films for many teachers); Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d
1171 (9th Cir. 1983)(No fair use where the defendant did not even attempt to get
permission and there was wholesale copying. The court found that the Educational
Guidelines referenced by Congress in 17 U.S.C. §107 were not binding but were
instructive. These guidelines identify the approximate amount of copying allowed, have
a requirement of spontaneity (no time to get permission), look at the cumulative effect of
the copying allowed (how many teachers and how many classes are using the same
copied work - in essence a market effect analysis) and require acknowledgement.);
Educational Testing So-vices v. Katzman, 793 F.2d 533 (3rd Cir. 1986)(commercial use,
even if educational, questionable); College Entrance Examination Bd. V. Cuome, 788
F.Supp. 134 (N.D.N.Y. 1992)(Fair use where the purpose of the use was to ensure fair
testing, the use was functionally different and there was little market effect); American
Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2nd Cir. 1994)(Not fair use where there
is more private gain than public gain.); and Princeton University Press v. Michigan, 99
F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996)(Commercial use and market harm negate educational fair use.
Again, the court referred to Educational Guidelines to determine what was acceptable.).
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("CONFU") was convened to resolve these difficult issues. Unfortunately, consensus
ft) Q
could not be reached and the attempt failed.
Legislative action to address specifically the educational fair use problem,
especially regarding distance learning has also been utilized. For example, in the United
States the Teach Act630 articulates what the interested parties consider reasonable.631
Thus, educators would have rules creating certainty regarding the amount of use that is
fair. However, it does create an affirmative duty on the part of educational institutions to
"reasonably" prevent unauthorized copying and dissemination.632
The European Union has addressed fair dealing in Directive 2001/29/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonization of certain
aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society Brussels, 22 May 2001.
'l
. .
The preamble seems to focus on material gain; however, the public interest is also
mentioned in several preamble paragraphs.634 Article 5 of the Directive specifically
delineates the types of exceptions and limitations allowed.635 For example, affordable
access is addressed by reproduction made available at libraries or other educational
629 17 U.S.C. §110(2).
630 1 7 U.S.C. §§110 and 112(f).
631 Id.
632 Id.
633 DIRECTIVE 2001/29/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE
COUNCIL OF 22 MAY 2001 ON THE HARMONISATION OF CERTAIN ASPECTS
OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS IN THE INFORMATION SOCIETY,
22.6.2001 OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES L 167/10-15
(hereinafter "DIRECTIVE 2001/29/EC") at Preamble Hf 3-5, 9, 20, 22, 26, 31, 38, 42, 44,
47-48.
634 DIRECTIVE 2001/29/EC, supra note 633 at Preamble 3, 9-11, 14, 22-23, 31, 34,
38, 42.
635 Id. at Preamble ^[32 and art. 5.
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636establishments not for economic advantage. Access for educational puiposes and to
build upon the works of others is allowed by the exception that permits some use for
teaching and scientific research for non-commercial purpose.637 Additionally, access to
information is provided for by allowing some reproduction by the press so long as the
author's name is included.638 However, these exceptions only apply in special cases
which do not conflict with the normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably
prejudice the legitimate interests of the rights holder. Accordingly, the material
interests of the author or other rights holder seem to have a priority.
The harmonization directive takes away a significant amount of flexibility in the
balancing of interests previously allowed to judges in determining fair dealing
exceptions. While the preamble indicates some balance, the actual articles provide an
"exhaustive list" of the fair dealing exceptions and tip the balance in favour ofmaterial
gain. Additionally, the preamble instructs members to apply the Directive in accordance
with international obligations but than in the very next sentence states that such
exceptions may not be applied in a way that would prejudice the legitimate interests of
the right holder or conflicts with the normal exploitation of the work.640 While this
provision originally comes from Berne641 and can also be found in TRIPS,642 one could
argue that this Directive conflicts with international obligations, both legal and moral,
with respect to UDHR at article 27 and ICESCR at article 15 to the extent that access for
636 Id. at art. 5, §2c.
637 Id. at art. 5, §3a. Also allowed are quotations or criticism in accordance with fair
practice (art. 5, §3d); and political speeches and extracts ofpublic lectures of similar
works or subject-matter for information purposes (art. 5, §3f.)
638 DIRECTIVE 2001/29/EC, supra note 634 at art. 5, §3c
639 Id. at art. 5, §5.
640 Id. at Preamble f44.
641
Beme, supra note 11 at art. 10(2).
642
TRIPs, supra note 11 at arts. 9(1) and 13.
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education is restricted in an manner contrary to the priority that seems to be suggested in
Resolution 2000/7. As with the United States fair use law, the focus of protection for
European Union fair dealing is on material gain which could, in certain cases, conflict
with human rights access concerns.643
The main problem with fair dealing is the lack of foreseeability.644 This problem
with fair dealing doctrines needs to be addressed due to the practical considerations for
individuals and business interests. The vague nature of fair dealing coupled with the
threat of a law suite may make some unwilling to use a creative work even if the use
would be allowed. Two common solutions to this problem have been the use of
collecting societies and set licensing agreement. While these may provide foreseeability,
they are often invoked in a fashion that is too broad in that they include payments for
some copying that would be allowed under a fair dealing doctrine.
Lack of foreseeability may be rectified to some extent if fair dealing is allowed in
situations where (1) market failure is present; (2) the transfer of the use to defendant is
socially desirable; (3) an award of fair dealing would not cause substantial injury to the
economic incentives of the plaintiff copyright owner; and (4) due regard is given to
certain moral rights such as attribution.645 The first prong, market failure, would be
present in situations where the market could not afford to pay the price for works
protected by copyright. Here, there is no loss of profit because, as a practical matter,
there is no profit to be made. Of course, the problem of parallel imports would have to be
643 See Suthersanen, supra note 529 at 605; Europe 2002: CreatingA EUFramework
For The Exploitation OfPublic Sector Information, The Economic and Social Committee
and The Committee of the Regions, Brussels, 23.10.2001, COM (2001) 607 final.
644
Dessemontet, supra note 192 at 13.
645 See Gordon, supra note 335 at 1614.
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addressed to ensure that the fair dealing copies did not leave the market and spill over
into markets where a fair market price could be paid for the copyrighted works.
Additionally, the use of a fair dealing copy should not be exploited for commercial
advantage. This would apply to the second prong of the test, the socially desirable use.
This prong could not be defined to include the social desirability ofmaking a profit. That
would not be a justified use. Rather, this prong must be weighed with regard to
legitimate human rights concerns, such as education. The third prong of not causing
substantial injury to the economic incentives of the copyright owner would be partially
addressed under the market failure analysis, prohibition of parallel imports and limiting
the use to non-commercial exploitation. Finally, the fourth prong recognizes the social
psychology concerns of attribution and, possibly, other moral rights. A fair dealing law
that recognizes these concerns would help alleviate some of the human rights problems
addressed in Resolution 2000/7 while at the same time protecting the equally important
human right of the authors' rights to material benefit and moral rights.
While this four prong test does not eliminate all of the foreseeability problems it
does provide some guidelines for a fair dealing doctrine that is flexible and addresses the
needs and economic realities of developed and developing states. Further, as the
technological infrastructure of the developing states evolve increasing the probability of
decentralized infringement would cause an adjustment in analysis under the first and third
prong, (1) market failure is present and (3) an award of fair dealing would not cause
substantial injury to the economic incentives of the rights holder. This would increase
the findings of no fair dealing as we have seen in the case studies for developed states.
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Finally, while Beme and TRIPS do allow for some fair dealing there is the
problem ofpolitical pressure from developed states on developing states not to utilize a
fair dealing doctrine to its fullest potential. This political pressure is one of the concerns
that led to Resolution 2000/7.646 However, once again absolute proclamations such as
human rights always take priority over economic policies in addition to ignoring the
interconnectedness of the two fails to allow the use of established international tribunals,
such as the WTO dispute resolution tribunal,647 to resolve such conflicts. To the extent
that a developed state is exerting undue pressure on a developing state for trade
advantages that undermine the ability of the developing state to achieve human rights
goals there should be a dispute resolution tribunal to resolve the issue. This course of
conduct would do more to allow for natural development than the use ofuniversalized
priorities which may prove to be detrimental to all.
While use for educational purposes often meets these four criteria it is argued that
the wholesale exemption from copyright protection for educational purposes would also
create a market failure.648 This is so because there would be some users who are able to
purchase the use but could obtain it for free. Thus, injury is caused to the owner due to
the loss of reasonably expected ROI.649 In the United States the rather generous fair use
for educational exception has caused some market failure concern due to the easy, quick
availability of resources on the Internet coupled with decentralized infringement
646 Resolution 2000/7, supra note 7.
647 The Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (hereinafter
"WTO"), Annex 2, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994).
648
Suthersanen, supra note 529 at 594.
649
Gordon, supra note 335 at 1618.
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abilities.650 Further, because fair dealing requires a case-by-case analysis balancing
competing interests it has a high transaction costs in litigation expenses and an uncertain
outcome. Thus, the increased use by those traditionally thought to have some fair dealing
protection, such as educators, has created a potential market failure problem due to new
technologies with recourse to the courts being impractical.651 While this may be the case
in the domestic context, in the international context there would be no multiple user
litigation problem. A state would be able to bring another state before the WTO dispute
resolution panel to determine if fair dealing has been abused.652
SUMMARY
While the utilitarian philosophy seemed to prevail upon the sentiments of
Parliament in the United Kingdom just prior to the enactment of the Statute ofAnne it
was soon to face a challenge from natural law advocates through term extensions. The
battle for perpetual copyright may have been lost but steady erosion of access by term
extensions was gaining support. This phenomenon also occurred in the United States
where Congress and the courts professed balance but required little economic evidence to
justify term extensions.
Fair dealing reflects a utilitarian philosophy as an exception to copyright in the
West. But here too there has been limited economic analysis though market failure
analysis would be helpful in creating a balance of access for education and the moral and
material interests of the creator. That said, fair dealing is recognized in the domestic
650 I. Trotter Hardy, Copyright and New Use Technologies, 23 NOVA L. REV. 659, 668
(1999); Gordon, supra note 335 at 1619.
651 See Gordon, supra note 335 at 1604.
652 For example see Council For TRIPs, Review of Legislation on Copyright and
Related Rights-Replies to Questions Posed to the United States by Brazil, the European
Communities and Their Member States, Australia and Korea, 30 October 1996, WTO
Doc. IP/Q/USA/1.
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legislation and courts ofmany states in the West and may yet prove to be a useful tool in
achieving balance. Further, fair dealing is recognized in international copyright law.
Thus, it appears that Western domestic fair dealing history has influenced international
copyright but caution should be observed with this analogy. The lack of proper market
failure analysis in the Western domestic experience has allowed copyright law to all but
swallow up the fair dealing exception. This problem should be avoided in future
domestic and international balancing tests in considering the conflict between education
and the moral and material interests of creators.
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CHAPTER 9
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW WITH RESPECT TO ACCESS
AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS ISSUES
Oh, the leaky boundaries ofman-made states!
How many cloudsfloatpast them with impunity;
How much desert sand shifts from one land to another;
How many mountain pebbles tumble onto foreign soil
In provocative hops!
Only what is human can truly be foreign.
The rest is mixed vegetation, subversive moles, and wind.653
The juxtaposition of domestic copyright law and international copyright law is
incongruous. Domestic copyright law in the examples provided above show an
evolutionary path where the focus was always on state interests. While it is true that the
early stages expressed this state interest in terms of an interest of those in power to
maintain control, the state interest eventually shifted to an interest of an educated
populace thus necessitating affordable access and access in order to build upon the past.
While international copyright law may, arguably reflect a state interest, the focus appears
to be centered on author's rights. This focus may promote access through incentive but it
does not permit sufficient flexibility as it does not adequately consider users rights such
as access for education nor take into consideration the various economic stages of
development. This is due, in part, to the natural law priority instead of the utilitarian
philosophy.
653 WILSLAWA SZYMBORSKA, VIEW WITH A GRAIN OF SAND (PSALM) 99
(Harcourt Brace & Co. 1995.)
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In the early stages of international copyright law most of the states that ratified the
preeminent convention on the subject, Berne, were states with an advanced stage of
development regarding the copyright industry. It took hundreds of years for these states
to gear their economic policy toward enhancing the infrastructure necessary for copyright
and related industries. The current system under TRIPS and the WTO requires some
states to agree to certain minimum standards of intellectual property protection within
their domestic legal system in order to obtain the benefits ofmost favored nation trading
status under the WTO.654 This has resulted in accelerated attempts to evolve the
domestic economic policy in some states that cannot or will not comply. As we shall see,
the history of international copyright failed to take into consideration the importance of
this lengthy evolutionary process which was allowed to occur in the domestic economic
policies of developed states.
A. The Berne Convention.
The relatively peaceful period after the Napoleonic Wars (1805-1815) and a
worldwide increase in literary activity exposed the need for international protection of
creative works.655 This endeavor was lead by authors as their social and economic
position had increased and pirating from abroad was diminishing their livelihood.656 The
first bilateral copyright agreement was entered in 1852.657 This was induced, in part, due
to the French decree of 1852, which provided national treatment under French copyright
654
WTO, supra note 647 at Annexes 1-3.
655 Peter Burger, The Berne Convention: Its History and Key Role in the Future, 3 J. L.
& TECH. 1, 7-8 (1988).
656 Id. at 7-8.
657 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT, PRINCIPLES, LAW,
AND PRACTICE 19 (2001).
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law to foreign authors.658 Movement toward international protection evolved further in
and out of France through authors groups such as the international Congress ofAuthors
and Artists in Brussels and the formation of the Association Litteraire et Artistique
International led by Victor Hugo.659
In 1882 a meeting of these authors groups was held in Rome for the purpose of
discussing a proposal by the German Publishers' Association, the Boersenverein der
deutschen Buchandler to form an international copyright union. A subsequent conference
held in Berne, Switzerland, in 1883 produced a draft treaty.660 A year later the Swiss
government convened a diplomatic conference on the proposed treaty and after two more
conferences a final treaty was signed by Germany, Belgium, Spain, France, the United
Kingdom, Haiti, Italy, Liberia, Switzerland, and Tunisia in 1886.661
The Berne Convention of 1886 was, primarily, a result of authors' rights groups
exerting political pressure on their governments in order to obtain protection on an
international level. Accordingly, it is not surprising that the end result was a document
with a primary function of protecting economic rights of authors.662 But, in order to get
states to ratify Berne, certain compromises had to be made.663 For example, public
access to important information had to be preserved so member states were allowed to
658
Burger, supra note 655 at 10.
659
Burger, supra note 655 at 11; Susan Stanton, Development ofthe Berne International
Copyright Convention and Implications ofUnited States Adherence 13 HOUS. J. INT'L
L. 149, 153 (1990).
660
Burger, supra note 655 at 12; Stanton, supra note 659 at 153.
661
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 657 at 19; House Report on the Berne Convention
Implementation Act of 1988 (hereinafter "House Report"), H.R. 4262 (1988).
f\fO -
Burger, supra note 655 at 16; Stanton, supra note 659 at 154-55.
663' Jane C. Ginsburg, International Copyright: From a "Bundle" ofNational Copyright
Laws to a Supranational Code? (hereinafter "International Copyright") 47 J. Copyright
Society of the U.S.A. 265, 269 (2000).
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implement exceptions regarding works of a scientific or educational nature.664 Thus, the
fair dealing exception was included in a vague form in the Berne Convention of 1886.
The importance of access was not a primary goal for authors' rights groups.
Rather, it was a necessary compromise to obtain some international protection. This
reflected the schism between the philosophical differences of some Continental states and
the Anglo-American system. For example, while France did not contest the desirability
of some public access to information it was not agreeable to expand public access at the
expense of authors' rights.665 This philosophical beliefwas reflected in the increased
attention authors' rights were receiving in France's domestic legislation as well as
France's future role in advocating revisions in Beme to increase authors' rights,
particularly in the field of moral rights.
Between 1886 and 1967 there were five revisions to Beme, each one
progressively strengthening authors' rights. The first revision, in 1896, strengthened
authors' rights by extending the exclusive right to authorized translations from ten years
to the entire term of copyright protection.666 Additionally, it diminished the right to
reproduce serial novels appearing in periodicals by requiring an indication of the
f.f.n
source. However, due to political pressure in certain member states, such as the United
Kingdom, which may have resulted in a withdrawal from the convention, these
provisions were subject to reservations.668 Thus, as with the UDHR, compromise was
enlisted in the name of assention.
664
Burger, supra note 655 at 12 and 18.
665
Burger, supra note 655 at 19.
666
Burger, supra note 655 at 22; Stanton, supra note 659 at 157-58.
667
Burger, supra note 655 at 22.
668
Burger, supra note 655 at 20.
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The second Beme Convention revision occurred in 1908 and further strengthened
authors' rights by modifying formalities required to secure copyright protection,669
introducing a minimal term of protection of the author's life plus fifty years,670 expanding
671
the list of protected works, and strengthening protection for translations. However,
again to encourage agreement, reservations to these new provisions were allowed.672
The third revision in 1914 was primarily a reaction by the United Kingdom to the
United States manufacturing requirement for foreign author protection. The United
States was not a member of Beme but had, in 1891, passed legislation for the first time to
protect foreign authors. However, there was a catch; in order to obtain copyright
protection in the United States foreign authors were required to have their works
manufactured in the United States.673 Further, in 1909 the United States revised this
manufacturing requirement to apply only to foreign works written in English thus
primarily harming authors from the United Kingdom.674 To further aggravate this
situation the Beme revision of 1908 required member states to grant copyright protection
to foreign authors who first published in a member state.675 Thus, United States authors
who first published in the United Kingdom were granted copyright protection within the
United Kingdom. The domestic political fall out from this situation caused the United
669
Stanton, supra note 659 at 158-59. This modification reflects a leaning towards a
natural law philosophy in that, under natural law, such protection should arise as it is just
not because it is a privilege granted by the State.
670 This was not yet a minimal requirement; rather, it was more in the nature of a
suggested term of protection. Burger, supra note 655 at 23.
671
Burger, supra note 655 at 23-25; Stanton, supra note 659 at 158-59; House Report,
supra note 661.
672
Burger, supra note 655 at 25-26; Stanton, supra note 659 at 159; House Report,
supra note 661.
67j
Burger, supra note 655 at 26.
674
Burger, supra note 655 at 26.
Burger, supra note 655 at 26; Beme Revision of 1908 at art. 6.
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Kingdom to demand a revision to Berne so it could retaliate against the United States.
This demand was backed-up by the threat of leaving the union if not met.676 The United
Kingdom's threat succeeded and an additional protocol was added that would allow
members to restrict benefits allowed under Berne with regard to non-member states.677
A fourth revision occurred in 1928 again focusing on expanding authors' rights by
increasing the number of works protected and granting limited moral rights. Authors'
now had a claim of paternity of their works, the right to object to deformation, mutilation
678
or any modification that would "prejudice" the author's honor or reputation. The
revision did not set a standard to protect these moral rights; instead, again in order to get
agreement, each member state would decide how to protect these rights through domestic
legislation.679 Together with the modification of formality requirements, the rights of
authors reflected in natural law philosophies was prevailing over the access prone
utilitarian philosophy.
The fifth revision of Beme in 1948 furthered the protection of authors' rights.
First, it provided that the term ofprotection of the author's life plus fifty years was a
minimum requirement.680 Further, moral right term protection was extended from the
author's life to the author's life plus fifty years but only if domestic legislation so
allowed. Thus, as with the revision on term protection to the author's life plus fifty years
676
Burger, supra note 655 at 26 and fn. 178.
677
Burger, supra note 655 at 26.
678
Burger, supra note 65 at 27-28; House Repost, supra note 661. This type ofmoral
right protection was first seen in ancient Greece as indicated above.
ftlQ
Burger, supra note 655 at 28.
680
Burger, supra note 655 at 30; House Report, supra note 661; Berne Revision of
1948, art. 7 ][1. There were some exceptions for example; photographic works and
cinematographic works were still governed by the term of the member State in which
protection was sought, which could be less than the author's life plus fifty years. Burger,
supra note 655 at 30; Beme Revision of 1948, art. 7, Tf3.
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in 1908 where the term was optional, this revision reflected the direction of an emphasis
on natural law, which was yet to be fully realized.681 Additionally, the right to public
performance authorization was strengthened as were broadcasting rights, recording
rights682and cinematographic rights. Finally, a droit suite right was added.683 The droit
suite right provided authors' with a right to an interest in the resale of their work to
reflect an increase in the monetary value of creative works due to an increased
commercial value in reputation.684 This right, however, was not included as a minimum
685
requirement and was based upon reciprocity.
The 1948 revision not only narrowed access rights by expanding author's rights, it
also directly narrowed access rights previously protected. For example, the exception to
the use of excerpts ofworks for scientific or educational purposes had to be "justified by
its purpose."686 That said, there was some increase in access such as allowing the
reporting of important, newsworthy information.687
During the post warWorld War II period more changes were occurring with
respect to Berne. In the 1950's and 1960's the colonial system was collapsing and newly
independent states emerging. Many of these new states were reluctant to accept a
convention such as Berne due to the belief that it was drafted without their input and
681
Burger, supra note 655 at 32; Stanton, supra note 659 at 160-61.
682 For example, compulsory licenses were allowed but they could not prejudice the
author's right to just remuneration. Burger, supra note 655 at 33-35.
683
Burger, supra note 655 at 30-36.
684 This certainly does not reflect a utilitarian philosophy. With tangible real property
any appreciation in value usually goes to the owner of the real property not to previous
owners.
685
Burger, supra note 655 at 36.
686
Burger, supra note 655 at 37; Stanton, supra note 659 at 160-61; Berne Revision of
1948 art. 10, ^2.
687
Burger, supra note 655 at 37-38.
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reflected the interests of the developed states.688 An attempt was made to revise Berne to
reflect the concerns of these new, developing states; an attempt that caused a crisis in the
international copyright arena.689 The newly independent states sought to reform Berne to
address their priorities during the 1967 Stockholm Revision Conference including access
to inexpensive educational materials in order to improve literacy and education.690
Indeed, the need for access to inexpensive educational materials was one of the
justifications used by the United States when it was a developing state in refusing to sign
an international copyright convention prior to 195 5.691 Despite the fact that some in
developed states recognized that Berne had evolved to the point where it was intended for
states at a advanced stage of development692 a counter-attack by publishers and authors'
organizations resulted in the failure of the Stockholm Revision Conference.693
After the failure of the Stockholm Revision Conference another attempt was made
to revise Berne to address the interests the developing states at the Paris Conference in
1971. But rolling back the terms of protection was not an option. Rather, an appendix to
Berne was added to provide for compulsory licenses to address the interests of the
688 Alan Story, Burn Berne: Why the Leading International Copyright Convention Must
be Repealed, 40 HOUSTON L. REV. 763, 791 (2003); GOLDSTEIN, supra note 657 at
20.
689
Story, supra note 688 at 769; GOLDSTEIN, supra note 657 at 20; Burger, supra
note 655 at 38-39; Stanton, supra note 659 at 161-62.
690
Story, supra note 688 at 791-92; GOLDSTEIN, supra note 657 at 20; Burger, supra
note 655 at 38-40.
691
Story, supra note 688 at 775.
692
Story, supra note 688 at 782 (citing to Charles F. Johnson, The Origins of the
Stockholm Protocol, in 18 Bulletin of the Copyright Society of the U.S.A. 91, 91 (1971)
(quoting Observations ofGovernments on the Proposals for Revising the Substantive
Copyright Provisions (Doc. S/l), BIRPI Doc. S/13 at 103 (1967)).
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Story, supra note 688 at 791-92.
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developing states in obtaining affordable access as well as transfers of technology
694
access.
Many of the author's rights revisions suggested at the Stockholm conference of
1967 were ultimately incoiporated in Berne during the 1971 Paris conference. Again,
authors' rights were strengthened at the expense of access. For example, reproduction
rights were made broader to take into account possible new technologies.695 Further,
exceptions to reproduction rights could not conflict with the normal exploitation of the
work nor prejudice the legitimate interests of the author.696 Additionally, the scope of
6Q7
compulsory licenses was limited. Finally, moral rights were, for the most part,
expanded to be coexistent in term with economic rights.698 The one exception here was
for states where, at the time of ratification, domestic laws did not protect moral rights
after the death of the author through copyright law but did allow for protection after death
through common law remedies such as defamation.699
B. The World Intellectual Property Organization.
Although the developing states revisions to Berne were not forthcoming in 1967,
the developed states did manage to solidify the foundation for international protection of
intellectual property in Stockholm, 1967. The Convention Establishing the World
Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") was signed in July of 1967 stating a clear
694 Ruth Okediji, Toward an International Fair Use Doctrine, 39 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 75, 106-08 (2000); Burger, supra note 655 at 40.
695
Burger, supra note 655 at 43-44.
696 Id. at 44.
697 Mat 45.
698 Id. at 46.
699 Mat 46.
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purpose of protection of intellectual property rights at an international level.700 The
preamble and Article 3 makes this point:
Preamble
Desiring, in order to encourage creative activity, to promote the protection of
intellectualproperty throughout the world,
Article 3
Objectives ofthe Organization
The objectives of the Organization are:
c. to promote theprotection ofintellectualproperty throughout the world through
cooperation among States and, where appropriate, in collaboration with any
other international organization,....701
The preamble does address access in the sense of encouraging creative activity, however,
nothing is stated in the WIPO convention to directly address affordable access. Indeed,
the WIPO Convention seems to favour owners of intellectual property not users. It could
be argued that the treaties administered by WIPO, such as Berne, are concerned with
access and, thus, WIPO has such an interest. But Berne is also an owners' not a users
treaty.702 Berne and WIPO were agreed to in order to protect the economic rights of
owners not the access rights of users. Berne did provide for limited fair dealing, but that
70"5
along with most other access concerns was primarily left to domestic legislation.
700 The Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization
(hereinafter "WIPO Convention"), 21 U.S.T. 1749, 828 U.N.T.S. 3 (14 July 1967).
701 Id.
101
Berne, supra note 11 at art. 1.
703 Berne at art. 10 provides for fair dealing. It states:
(1) It shall be permissible to make quotations from a work which has already been
lawfully made available to the public, provided that their making is compatible with fair
practice, and their extent does not exceed thatjustified by the purpose, including
quotations from newspaper articles andperiodicals in theform ofpress summaries.
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In 1974, WIPO became a specialized agency under the United Nations. Its
agreement with the United Nations does address access issues, to wit:
Agreement between the United Nations
and the World IntellectualProperty Organization
Article 1
Recognition
The United Nations recognizes the World Intellectual Property Organization
(hereinafter called the " Organization ") as a specialized agency and as being
responsiblefor taking appropriate action in accordance with its basic instrument,
treaties and agreements administered by it, inter alia, forpromoting creative
intellectual activity andfor facilitating the transfer of technology related to
industrialproperty to the developing countries
Article 10
Transfer ofTechnology'
The Organization agrees to co-operate within thefield of its competence with the
UnitedNations and its organs, ...in promoting andfacilitating the transfer of
technology to developing ....
Thus, Articles 1, and 10, along with Article 2 regarding co-ordination and co-operation
do create an obligation on WIPO to take appropriate action in accordance with basic
international treaties and agreements it administers to promote creative intellectual
activity and transfer technology to developing states. This does focus on access but is
limited to access within the scope ofWIPO's basic instrument and the documents it
(2) It shall be a matterfor legislation in the countries ofthe Union, andfor special
agreements existing or to be concluded between them, to permit the utilization, to the
extentjustified by the purpose, of literary or artistic works by way of illustration in
publications, broadcasts or sound or visual recordings for teaching, provided such
utilization is compatible with fairpractice.
(3j Where use is made ofworks in accordance with the precedingparagraphs of this
Article, mention shall be made ofthe source, and of the name ofthe author, if it appears
thereon.
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administers. As these documents, such as Berne, focus on authors' moral and material
interests, Article 1 ofWIPO does little to promote access.
Article 2 ofWIPO is not so limited but only addresses co-ordination and co¬
operation. Granted, WIPO may not be fulfilling this obligation with respect to access
issues brought up by resolution 2000/7; however, co-ordination and co-operation are
vague terms; and do these vague terms require WIPO to place access over authors'
economic and moral rights? Such an interpretation may be in violation of its obligations
under its basic instrument, treaties it administers, and Article 1 of the agreement with the
United Nations. This hardly seems a likely reflection of the intent of the parties as such
contradictory terms would require a reading that voids certain terms rather than a reading
that attempts to inteipret the documents in a manner giving effect to all the terms to the
extent possible.
C. TRIPS.
Since at least the 1980's the United States, supported by the European Union and
Japan, sought to tie intellectual property to international trade policy.704 The impetus was
the increasing economic dependence for these economies on the sale of intellectual
property, such as copyrighted goods.705 This economic consideration, along with the fact
that many developing states had weak or no intellectual property laws caused concern in
developed states. While Berne was an important step toward international copyright
protection, it provided for national treatment. Many developing states had weak or no
copyright law and had not ratified Berne evidencing a weakness in the international
704 DAVID C. RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND GLOBAL
CAPITALISM: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 123
(2004).
705 See Okediji, supra note 694 at 81.
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intellectual property regime.706 In 1994, at the Uruguay round of trade negotiations for
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") intellectual property was
included under TRIPS and the WTO was created.707 In order to reap the benefits of free
and open trade, in essence a most favoured nation trading status, a state would have to
join the WTO.708 Membership in the WTO required agreeing to the requirements of
TRIPS.709 TRIPS incorporated Berne except for moral rights.710 Thus, many developing
states had to agree to incorporate the minimum requirements of Berne in order to reap
free trade benefits.711 But, unlike Beme, TRIPS provides for coercive measures for
failure to comply through trade sanctions. Further, the WTO provides a dispute
resolution mechanism.712
There are two main arguments made by developing states against the TRIPS
regime: 1. That TRIPS ignores the collectivist mentality thus allowing for the
7 1 -3
exploitation of traditional knowledge by foreign corporations; and 2. economic
concerns related to the costs to administer intellectual property laws, increased costs to
706 Robert J. Gutowski, TheMarriage ofIntellectual Property and International Trade
in the TRIPs Agreement: Strange Bedfellows or a Match Made in Heaven? 47
BUFF.L.REV. 713, 720 (1999).
707 Julie Cheng, China's Copyright System: Rising to the Spirit of TRIPs Requires an
Internal Focus and World Trade Organization Membership 21 FORDHAM INT'L L. J.
1941, 1948-49 (1998); Jared R. Silverman, Multilateral Resolution Over Unilateral
Retaliation: Adjudicating the Use ofSection 301 Before the WTO, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON. L. 233, fn 101 and 102 (1996).
708 Id.
709
Amy Nelson, Is There an International Solution to Intellectual Property Protection
For Plants? 37 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 997, 1008 (2005).
710
TRIPs, supra note 11 at art. 9; FAWCETT, supra note 507 at 480.
711 From 1994 to 2005 57 additional states have ratified Berne.
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=15.
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Gutowski, supra note 706 at 714-15.
713 Id. at 748-49. An oft-cited example is the traditional knowledge of certain peoples in
India regarding the various properties of the Neem tree. Some of these properties were
patented by the United States company, W.R. Grace.
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use foreign intellectual property, costs of displacement of domestic infringing
manufacturing, and increased costs for research and development.714 With regard to the
first problem, the solution given the most attention is to include traditional knowledge
within the scope of protection under international intellectual property. This would
basically include a community as an author or creator and a perpetual term of
protection.715 This solution has the problem of being overly access restrictive primarily
due to the perpetual term usually proposed.716 Further, it is inconsistent with respect to
the proposed solution for problem number two, specifically that developed states should
provide inexpensive or free access to their works protected by copyright to meet human
rights goals.717 It seems rather inconsistent and lacks a sense ofjustice to argue for
increased intellectual law protection for developing states on the one hand while,
simultaneously, arguing for decreased protection for developed states.
Further, the creation of an international intellectual property regime with coercive
powers tied to trade is a new development barely ten years old. The human rights
problems specified in resolution 2000/7 did not start twelve years ago with the
introduction ofTRIPS and, indeed, there is no evidence that the lack ofprotection prior
to TRIPS did anything to promote the human rights goals identified in resolution
2000/7.718 Accordingly, before TRIPS is called a failure with respect to developing states
more time is needed and an analysis of the pre-TRIPS compared to post-TRIPS problems
for developing states should be conducted.
714
Gutowski, supra note 706 at 751.
715 Thomas Cottier, Marion Panizzan, Legal Perspectives on Traditional Knowledge:
The Case For Intellectual Protection 1 J. INT'L ECON. L. 375, 393-94 (2004).
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That said, there are problems with the TRIPS regime that need to be addressed.
We have already examined the problem of TRIPS' imposition on the economic policies
of developing states in such a manner that they may not be able to obtain the best




The protection and enforcement ofintellectualproperty rights should contribute
to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and
dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage ofproducers and users of
technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic
welfare, and to a balance ofrights and obligations. 7,9
Article 7 addresses access, through the language such as the "promotion of...innovation"
and "transfer and dissemination of technology." It also seeks a balanced approach
focusing on the mutual advantages both owners and users may obtain from intellectual
property rather than the priority addressed in Resolution 2000/7. Another example of
where TRIPS addresses access concerns may be found in Article 10 which ensures
computer programs are protected but limits this by incorporating the idea/expression
dichotomy.720
719 The United States ratified TRIPS in 1994. The United Kingdom and France ratified
TRIPS in 1995.
720 Under the idea/expression dichotomy rule in copyright law ideas are not provided
copyright protection; only expressions are. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone
Sendee Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1991) "The most fundamental axiom of
copyright law is that [n]o author may copyright his ideas or the facts he narrates.... To
qualify for copyright protection, a work must be original to the author." Alfred C. Yen, A
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Further, Article 8 provides:
Article 8
Principles
1. Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations, adopt
measures necessary to protectpublic health and nutrition, and to promote the
public interest in sectors ofvital importance to their socio-economic and
technological development, provided that such measures are consistent with the
provisions of this Agreement.
2. Appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with theprovisions of
this Agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse of intellectualproperty rights
by right holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or
adversely affect the international transfer of technology.721
Article 8 is sensitive to access issues advocated by human rights groups with regard to
what amounts to a fair dealing provision. Article 13 does, however, present an access
problem in that it limits fair dealing to exceptions that do not unreasonably prejudice the
legitimate interests of the rights holder. Specifically, Article 13 has a three part test: (1)
the limitations or exceptions are confined to certain special cases; (2) they do not conflict
with a normal exploitation of the work; and (3) they do not unreasonably prejudice the
legitimate interests of the right holder.
A limitation or an exception is consistent with Article 13 only if it fulfils each of
the three conditions.722 With respect to the first prong, the terms "certain special cases"
First Amendment Perspective on the Idea/Expression Dichotomy and Copyright in a
Work's 'Total Concept and Feel.', 38 EMORY L. J. 393, 398-402 (1989).
721
-pRIPs, supra note 11 at art. 8.
722 WTO Panel Report in United States-Section 110(5) of the Copyright Act,




are defined by referring to the ordinary meaning of the terms in their context and in the
light of its object and purpose.723 This has been held to mean:
a limitation or exception in national legislation should be clearly defined and should
be narrow in its scope and reach. On the other hand, a limitation or exception may be
compatible with thefirst condition even if itpursues a specialpurpose whose
underlying legitimacy in a normative sense cannot be discerned. The wording of
Article 13's first condition does not implypassing a judgment on the legitimacy of the
exceptions in dispute.
The second prong deals with the exception not conflicting with the normal exploitation of
the work and has been held to mean that:
an exception or limitation to an exclusive right in domestic legislation rises to the
level ofa conflict with a normal exploitation of the work... ifuses, that in
principle are covered by that right but exempted under the exception or
limitation, enter into economic competition with the ways that right holders
normally extract economic valuefrom that right to the work... and thereby
deprive them ofsignificant or tangible commercial gains.724
And includes actual or potential effects on that market.725 Of course in a market failure
situation where the people can not afford the goods one could argue that there are no
tangible commercial gains to be had. Thus, a developing state may be able to achieve a
fair dealing ruling. Finally, the third prong has been defined as:
[Wjhether theprejudice caused by the exemptions to the legitimate interests ofthe
right holder is ofan unreasonable level. ... [Mjarket conditions [may be taken]
into account, to the extent feasible, [in addition to] the actual as well as the
potential prejudice caused by the exemptions, as a prerequisitefor determining
whether the extent or degree ofprejudice is ofan unreasonable level.726
The second and third prong are, perhaps the most troublesome as they do not provide
states with much guidance. Accordingly, Article 13 has the same problem of a lack of
Id. at ]j6.107.
724 Id. at T|6.183-4.
725 Id. at ]fl|6.183-84.
726 Id. at T|6.236.
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certainty that the domestic fair dealing doctrines have. While this may lead to some
frustration, it also has the benefit ofbeing flexible enough to adjust to various needs in
the international community. That said, the emphasis appears to be on the economic
rights of the author or rights holder, not on access concerns.
The possible conflict between TRIPS and the human rights access agenda is less
in the language of TRIPS than in the implementation and practice after TRIPS. TRIPS
incorporates Berne, except for moral rights, which sets forth the minimal protection
allowed. Domestic legislation may, and often does, set forth greater protections. For
example, Beme requires a basic term ofprotection of the author's life plus fifty years.727
Thus, developing states that ratify TRIPS are only required to provide for the minimal
copyright protections specified in Berne. Political and economic pressure, however, may
be exerted on developing states to provide domestic legislation that gives more than the
minimal protection to conform with the developed states copyright terms, in some cases
the author's life plus seventy years728 - the TRIPS-plus problem. Some have argued that
a solution to this problem is to change international intellectual property agreements to
reflect a maximum standard of protection.729 Yet, the history of international copyright
law has taught that such a lack of flexibility inherent in this solution will lack consensus.
The more realistic solution is to put political pressure through the international
community on those states that attempt to gain TRIPS-plus protection in developing
states. As Charles H. Malik stated with regard to the UDHR, more has been gained
through such political pressure tactics for the advancement of human rights goals than
727
Berne, supra note 11 at art. 7(1).
728 See James Boyle, A Manifesto on Wipo and the Future ofIntellectual Property, 2004
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 9,; Story, supra note 688 at 772.
729
Conflict or Coexistence, supra note 15 at 58.
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attempts to obtain consensus necessary for a binding convention.730 To that end, the goal
should be to encourage economic policy that is beneficial to human rights objectives not
assert that human rights have an absolute priority over economic policy; an assertion that
is incongruous.
Even assuming that there is a true conflict between TRIPS and other human rights
how might such a conflict be addressed? There is little authority on point in domestic
courts, however, there is one example where the courts in the United Kingdom did
consider conflicting human rights obligations and copyright law.731 The court in
Ashdown v. Telegraph Group, Ltd. 732 addressed the issue as a case of first impression
regarding the apparent conflict between copyright law and the human right of freedom of
expression embodied in the European Convention for the Protection ofHuman Rights,733
Article 10, which became a part ofUnited Kingdom law by the Human Rights Act of
1998. Article 10 states:
ARTICLE 10
1. Everyone has the right to freedom ofexpression. This right shall includefreedom
to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without
interference bypublic authority and regardless offrontiers. This article shall not
prevent Statesfrom requiring the licensing ofbroadcasting, television or cinema
enterprises.
2. The exercise ofthesefreedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities,
may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions orpenalties as are
prescribed by law and are necessaty in a democratic society,....
730
GLENDON, supra note 87 at .
731 Lion Laboratories, Ltd. V. Evans [1985] Q.B. 526, 536 (per J. Scott).
732
[2001] 2 A1.1E.R. 370 (Ch. Div.).
733
Rome, 4 Nov. 1950. There are five protocols: PARIS 20 March 1952,
STRASBOURG 6 May 1963, STRASBOURG 6 May 1963, STRASBOURG 16
September 1963, STRASBOURG 20 January 1966.
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With respect to freedom of expression, there is a recognized exception under United
Kingdom law implementing the European Convention For the Protection ofHuman
Rights for conduct prescribed by law for the protection of the rights of others and is
necessary for a democratic society such as property rights.734 The lower court held that
there was no human rights violation as the protection of copyright "property" was
necessary for a democratic society and a right recognized under the First Protocol of the
Convention.735 On appeal736 the human rights defense was also rejected. Lord Phillips of
Worth Matravers, M.R. noted that while copyright may conflict with free expression,
other European Union law protects copyright.737 Additionally, he stated that copyright
only protects expression not the ability to convey information or ideas, which,
presumably, may conflict with human rights.738 In essence, the right to free expression
■J1Q
does not carry with it the right to make free use of another's work.
The interpretation by the English courts of copyright law in the human rights context
is interesting in that it provides some insight as to how other domestic courts may balance
these competing obligations. The United States court decisions regarding conflicting
constitutional rights provide another example of a balancing test approach. For example,
the First Amendment of the United States Constitution may conflict with the copyright
provision in the same document but the courts balance the interests to be protected in
these provisions based upon the circumstances of each case to determine which provision
734
[2001] 2 All. E.R. at 376.
735
[2001] 2 All. E.R. at 376.
736
[2001] 4 All. E.R. 666.
737
[2001] 4 All. E.R. at 673-74.
738
[2001] 4 All. E.R. at 674.
739
[2001] 4 All. E.R. at 678.
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should prevail.740 Of course, one could argue that domestic courts will be biased in that
they will reflect the economic policy of the forum state. Thus, domestic courts in
developed states may reflect more concern for authors' rights, primarily protecting a
property interest as in Ashdown while courts sitting in developing states may express
more concern over access issues.
In the international arena, the WTO has applied a balancing test regarding conflicting
rights in Appellate Body in Korea - Various Measures on Beef741 and United States -
Measures Affecting The Cross-Border Supply Of Gambling And Betting Services742
where the WTO Dispute Resolution Panel articulated a three part balancing test including
(a) the importance of interests or values that the challenged measure is intended to
protect. (With respect to this requirement, the Appellate Body has suggested that, if the
value or interest pursued is considered important, it is more likely that the measure is
"necessary".) (b) the extent to which the challenged measure contributes to the realization
of the end pursued by that measure. (In relation to this requirement, the Appellate Body
has suggested that the greater the extent to which the measure contributes to the end
pursued the more likely that the measure is "necessary".) And (c) the trade impact of the
challenged measure. (With regard to this requirement, the Appellate Body has said that, if
the measure has a relatively slight trade impact, the more likely that the measure is
"necessary". The Appellate Body has also indicated that whether a reasonably available
WTO-consistent alternative measure exists must be taken into consideration in applying
740
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985); Cohen v.
Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S.
569 (1994).
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WT/DS161/R, WT/DS169/R, adopted 10 January 2001, as modified by the Appellate
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742 WT/DS285/R.
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this requirement.).743 Domestic case law and WTO decisions provide us with a start but
certainly not the final say on how courts, domestic and international will ultimately deal
with the problem addressed in Resolution 2000/7; specifically when certain human rights
concerns are involved, such as education, and there is a conflict with other human rights
concerns, such as the right to property and moral and material interests of creators, should
there be a priority on these rights as suggested by Resolution 2000/7 or a balancing test?
SUMMARY
The history of the development of copyright law in the West suggests a utilitarian
priority in economic policy with some aspects of natural law. Conversely, international
copyright law suggests a natural law priority to protect the moral and material interests of
creators with limited utilitarian philosophy. While Beme, WIPO and TRIPS allow for
some copyright exceptions, such as fair dealing, the language of these documents and
predominant natural law underpinnings seem restrictive unless liberally construed.
Currently, Western domestic case law in the area of fair dealing offers little help due the
failure to conduct sufficient market failure analysis, but the balancing test suggested in
WTO decisional law may be helpful. Such a balancing approach would certainly be
more desirable than an absolute priority suggested in Resolution 2000/7.
743 United States - Measures Affecting The Cross-Border Supply Of Gambling And
Betting Services WT/DS285/R at 236
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CHAPTER 10
THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT BETWEEN COPYRIGHT AND THE
RIGHT TO EDUCATION IN TERMS OF VARYING DOMESTIC
ECONOMIC POLICIES
/ have never known much good done by those who affected to tradefor thepublic
Philosophical differences certainly are one explanation for the different directions
taken by non-Western cultures regarding copyright law. With a different property theory
basis it is to be expected that the concept of "mine" would be absent or at least modified
into a communal concept of "mine." Additionally, the economic realities for developing
states make it difficult for some to fully realize aspirational human rights. Indeed, the
internal economic policies for these states may dictate that some aspirational human
rights, such as the moral and material rights interests in creators, be subordinate for a
time in order to obtain other aspirational human rights, such as education. Unfortunately,
making such internal decisions often has external repercussions.
Further, the decision to subordinate the moral and material interests of creators for
education may conflict with developed states human rights realization. This problem is
exacerbated by decentralized copying due to increased technology and an increased
economic dependence on the copyright industry in the West resulting in a perception in
the West that there was and is an emergency due to rampant pirating of copyright goods.
But the facts seem to indicate that the solution for the problem, at least with regard to
744 ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS, book IV, ch. 2.
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educational materials, does not require a rigid interpretation of TRIPS negating any
practical fair dealing exceptions.
A. Differing Philosophical Beliefs Regarding Creators in Non-Western
Cultures.
While the concept of a property right in intangibles was widely accepted in many
Western cultures it creates a cultural conflict with non-Westem societies that do not
recognize such a possessory interest. That said, the evidence existing from ancient
Eastern literary works, such as India's Rigveda and the Naladiyar, does suggest personal
gain did play a part in the non-Western economic policy equation.
In an example of an early form of attribution, and hence some concept of "mine,"
in the East the early prophets of Jewish law referred to stealing words from another.
While a Talmudic law reporter usually orally passed on principles of law he would be
careful to mention the author.745
Ancient India provides us an example of some economic concerns for the
individual in the Naladiyar date from 30 B.C.E to 1300 A.D. In it, a story is told about
royal patronage for poets:
Eight thousandpoets visited the court ofa certain prince, who, being a lover of
the Muses, treated them with kindness and received them into favour; this excited
the envy of the bards who already enjoyed the royalpatronage, and in a short
time they succeeded so completely in their attempt to prejudice their master
against the new comers that the latterfound it necessary to consult their safety by
flight, and, without taking leave of their host, decamped in the dead ofnight.
Previous to their departure each poet wrote a venba on a scroll, which he
deposited under his pillow. When this was made known, the king, who still
listened to the counsels ofthe envious poets, ordered the scrolls to be collected
and thrown into a river, when four hundred ofthem were obsei~ved to ascend, for
the space offourfeet, naladi, against the stream. The king, moved by this
miraculous occurrence, directed that these scrolls should be preserved, and they
745 EDWARD W. PLOMAN AND CLARKE HAMILTON, COPYRIGHT,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 6-7 (1980).
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were accordinglyformed into a work, which from theforegoing circumstance
received the name ofNaladiyar.746
Once again attribution does not seem to be a concern although material interests do.
Individual economic benefit was derived from the royal patronage. Further, even if the
benefit for the individual was not ofprimary concern a communal benefit would,
indirectly, economically benefit the individual.
This lack of attribution in some ancient Eastern cultures perhaps explains, in part,
a fundamental philosophical difference in economic policies between the West and non-
Western states. Cultures that have a history evidencing a philosophical belief that a
creation is a property right tend to view copyright as a property right and will have an
economic policy that reflects the social and political goal of protecting that property right.
Conversely, cultures that do not view a creation as a property right are less inclined to
view copyright as a property right and have an economic policy that reflects this
philosophical belief absent outside political and economic pressure to change domestic
laws. Yet, even if these non-Western cultures do change domestic laws due to outside
political and economic pressure such a change is superficial as this philosophical view is
deeply rooted in history. We are thus left in these states with Western law on copyright
that does not reflect their philosophical beliefs and an economic policy that is
inconsistent with internal needs.747
746 Available at http://www.sacred-texts.com/joumals/ia/nldr.htm.
747 For example, China's cultural heritage and internal needs in the past conflicted with
the Western concept of copyright. Cheng, supra note 707 at 1952, 1964, 1979-83.
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B. The Economic Reality.
In addition to differing philosophical beliefs regarding property rights in a
creation, the economic realities for developing states are obviously different from that of
developed states. In a developed state with a large, wealthy market the potential for a
748
reasonable ROI is achievable. Thus, monopoly rights have some value. Accordingly,
strong intellectual property laws are usually economically beneficial. While developing
states may obtain some benefit from strong copyright laws they also have more potential
to experience some detriment.
The potential benefits for developing states include transfers of technology and
foreign direct investment.749 Transfers of technology are encouraged by developing
states utilizing strong copyright laws as businesses from developed states are more
willing to license use in developing states if there are local laws that may effectively be
utilized to combat non-licensed use (infringement.) The developing state economy reaps
the use of, for example, educational materials while businesses from developed states
increase their market and, hence, their ROI. Strong copyright laws encourage foreign
direct investment in local research and development for the same reasons.750
The detriments include transfer of wealth from the developing states to developed
Tf i 7S9 7^T
states, increased enforcement costs, and higher use costs. The transfer of wealth
problem is premised on the fact that developing states are primarily copyright users and
developed states are net beneficiaries of a trade surplus in copyright, which is protected
748
Reinhardt, supra note 531 at 476.
749 Id. at 478-79.
750 Id. at 478-79.
751 Id. at 477; Story, supra note 688 at 769-70.
752
Story, supra note 688 at 775.
753 Id. at 784.
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under agreements such as TRIPS.754 Increased enforcement costs stem from
administrative, police and judicial resources directed to protect copyright.755 Increase use
costs are caused by the higher costs demanded for licensed use.756
While these are the main economic benefits and detriments focused on by
academics and the United Nations the practical reality of the situation is far more
complex. While stronger copyright laws may encourage transfers of technology to
developing states expectations have not been met, primarily due to the poverty of
developing states.757 From an economic perspective, there is no market in these states as
there is no potential for ROI. As discussed above, this cost exceeding the markets ability
to pay results in market failure thus dictating either a much lower cost to promote use or
no expenditure to create as there is insufficient ROI.
This lack of a market due to poverty also undermines those who argue that strong
intellectual property laws results in a transfer ofwealth from developing states to
developed states. This argument is premised, in part, on IMF data, which suggests that
only the United States and the United Kingdom have a net export surplus in intellectual
property and that no developing state has had such a surplus. But, as already indicated,
developing states can not afford to pay market prices for intellectual property so while
they may be net users they are not significant purchasers. Indeed, most of the transfer of
754 Id. at 769-70.
755
Story, supra note 688 at 776.
756 Id. at 773.
757 For example, the average annual per capita income in a least developed state is about
$294. Even with more competition from generic drugs the average cost for advanced
antiretrovirals is $200 to $400 per year. Reinhardt, supra note 531 at 483-84.
758
Story, supra note 688 at 769-70.
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wealth occurs between developed states with Canada, the United Kingdom, the
Netherlands, and Japan leading the list.759
Many factors have played a part in the less than desirable foreign direct
investment as well. Location advantages including market size and growth, local demand
patterns, transportation costs, labour costs and productivity, natural resources and
protection all influence direct investment.760 The least developed states have attracted
little foreign direct investment due to the negative impact ofmany of these factors.761
Simply put strong intellectual property laws in and of them selves are not enough to
attract foreign direct investment.762
Finally, a major part of the investment monies for the intellectual property comes
from developed states. 763 It is the consumers of the developed states who have
subsidized research and development in intellectual property resulting in numerous social
benefits.764 Alternative markets with a sufficient consumer base to subsidize creation are
"1f.z
currently non-existent. Accordingly, the economies with a consumer base that can
afford to pay must remain healthy to continue to subsidize creations.
From a realistic economic perspective, the critical questions for intellectual
property rests upon what is a reasonable ROI and is there a market that has a consumer
759
Reinhardt, supra note 531 at 477; Keith E. Maskus, The Role ofIntellectual Property
Rights in Encouraging Foreign Direct Investment and Technology Transfer, 9 DUKE J.
OF COMP. AND INT'L L. 109, 116 (1998)(hereinafter "Encouraging Foreign Direct
Investment").
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base that can afford to pay. The optimal ROI must take into account more than just the
cost to create, produce, and disseminate, especially in an economy that heavily relies on
the intellectual property sector. The profit needs to be sufficient to create re-investment
in the economy through additional research and development, employment growth
(including retirement and health benefits), investment in non-core related industries
including service and supply industries, and consideration of the tax base. The reality of
the ROI analysis must recognize that it is economic policy stimulating access that is the
true focal point.766 Thus, placing a priority on affordable access for developing states
without due consideration for the economic imperatives of developed states, as suggested
by Resolution 2000/7 and subsequent commentators, may result in reduced access.
Conversely, developed states may also face market failure concerns domestically
and be creating unnecessary access restriction by over protection in intellectual property
law. Although the limited monopoly is the method utilized to achieve the goal of balance
the failure to recognize the economic reality and the fact that term limits, at best, are
based upon little economic analysis, has created stresses in the system. For example,
term limits that are excessive increase transaction costs for further development, which
will affect the ROI for others. The lack of data to justify the economic policy relating to
term extensions is shocking. For example, why does a computer program with a shelf
life of three to five years before it is obsolete need protection of the author's life plus 70
years or even ninety-five years from publication for works made for hire? With
intellectual property law coming under increasing scrutiny in the international community
more economic justification for the term ofprotection is needed.
766 Matthew Dean Stratton, Will Lessig Succeed in Challenging the CTEA, Post-
Eldred?, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 893, 899 (2005)(citing
to S. Rep. No. 104-315, at 12-13) (1996).
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Further, overly restrictive protection may hamper economically beneficial social
programs such as education. As we have seen, an educated populace has the economic
benefit ofproductivity and increased foreign direct investment. Finally, few economists
today would support the anti-competitive problems associated with a monopoly.767
Accordingly, the economic analysis must balance the effects of over protection and under
protection.768
Another critical problem facing developing states with respect to the lack of
access to copyrighted materials is the lack of a domestic copyright industry. Recall that
the developing state example of the United States established an early economic policy of
weak copyright laws regarding foreign works, in part, to protect an infant copyright
industry. It is argued that developing states today need weak copyright laws to increase
access to foreign works for educational purposes similar to the economic policy of the
United States when it was a developing state.769 However, unlike the United States
example, most developing states today do not have a sufficient copyright industry to
protect with such an economic policy thus increasing the likelihood that weak copyright
laws would be a permanent, not a temporary, solution.770
The fact that developing states cannot afford intellectual property products is not
acceptable for many reasons, including human rights concerns. However, there are also
unacceptable economic repercussions in insisting on access for developing states at the
expense of the consumers in developed states. Solutions, such as foreign aid and price
767 William M. Landes and Richard Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U.
CHI. L. REV. 471, 475-76 (2003).
768
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differentials771 are stopgap measures that do not address the economic root of the
problem - eradication of poverty. While some of these measures may be necessary for
emergency situations the economic reality is that these measures are a tax on the
consumers in the developed states who are charged higher prices or forced to pay more
taxes.
Ultimately, the economic complexities of copyright law require flexibility and
balance on a domestic level. To suggest anything less on an international level which has
even more economic variances is not realistic. Access and economic prosperity have a
greater chance of being achieved by giving due concern to the economies of developed
states rather than focusing on temporary measures to alleviate the needs of developing
states. Conversely, the short period of time for developing states to transition under
TRIPS, seven years, is not realistic particularly when one considers that it took developed
states hundreds of years to transition.772 Further, businesses in developed states must not
be allowed unfettered reign in the copyright arena. Irrational term extensions and other
monopoly protecting legislation increase the inherent dangers of anticompetitive
measures. That said, while it is good that developing states may have their concerns
voiced through the United Nations as a counter-weight to powerful business interests, the
absolute priority language of Resolution 2000/7 of human rights over economic policy
will amount to little good by those who affect to trade for the public good.
771 Price differentials occur when a producer sells a product in one state for a higher
price than in another state in order to adjust for the fact that consumers in some states can
pay market prices or more while consumers in another state cannot. See Hammer, supra
note 164.
772 See text supra at 81-132.
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C. Decentralized Copying Has Altered the ROI Mechanism But Not the
Economic Policy of a Balanced Approach.
The application of the various Western property theories and non-Western
communal approach to copyright law reflects the numerous economic and philosophical
differences between states. One point of agreement seems to be in the realm of some
amount ofpublic domain materials. But even in public domain works we see economic
policy considerations. For example, while the Donaldson case focused on the property
issue of perpetual copyright, the economic policy relating to affordable access needed to
be considered. The access point ofDonaldson was that creative works in the public
domain would be more affordable. Mr. Donaldson did not print public domain works for
free; he charged a price albeit a much lower price than the copyright owner. While there
may not have been a transaction cost of creation Mr. Donaldson did have the cost of
production. Thus, he made his ROI through volume; charge less but sell more; a simple
principle of basic market competition. The point is that public domain often does not
equate to free access. This fact has been missed by modem copyright commentators
773who seem to believe that a larger public domain means free access.
Digital information and the Internet, however, decentralized copying through
inexpensive, quick reproduction. This has changed the dynamic for some Western
economic policies that relied, in part, upon a secondary market in the sale of public
domain works. Additionally, it has necessitated alternative ROI mechanisms for
copyrighted works. For example, some web sites that offer free creative works to
773 See Lessig, supra note 469 at 4; Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. at 242 (J. Stevens
dissenting.)
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774download and even to copy and re-distribute obtain their ROI through advertising.
This is a similar mechanism utilized by newspapers and other periodicals that can reduce
subscriber fees due to advertising revenues. Advertising costs, however, are built into the
overhead costs and reflected in the price of the goods sold by the advertiser. Similarly,
materials placed on the Internet for "free" by academics and researchers have a cost.
Many of these people receive a salary to, in part, create. Their salaries are paid by the
public through increased tuition, taxes, and, in the case of private industry researchers, in
the price of goods. Thus, someone is paying for the creation and dissemination of the
information. At best, access to "free" information spreads the costs to the general public,
both users and non-users of the information.
The economic realities of copyright through out history point to ROI, profit to the
disseminators and the revenues to states, usually through taxing business but also in
employment in the industry. There was some economic incentive for individual creators;
however, it does not appear that the system provides a lucrative profession for a majority
of those in the creator class.775 The romantic notion of the individual author/creator
being compensated for the fruits of his labour is not the economic reality of copyright
law; nor has it ever been so. It is the economic benefit to the domestic population in
terms of dissemination, ROI, increased employment opportunities, state revenues
generated by the copyright industry used for social programs in addition to incentives to
create that are critical and the focus of sound economic policy.
774 • s*
For example, see Free Public Domain, available at http://fpd.iwarp.com/: Project
Gutenberg, available at http://www.gutenberg.org/ (re-distributing copies here is limited
to non-commercial use.)
775 Peter Jaszi, On the Author Effect: Contempory Copyright and Collective Creativity,
10 CARDOZA ARTS & ENT. L. J. 293, 302 (1992).
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D. As the Economic Significance of the Copyright Industry Increased in
Some States the Access Imperative Decreased.
As the economic significance of copyright has increased through technological
developments the right to access imperative has diminished,776 particularly in the
domestic economic policies of developed states. Yet, technology has proved to be a
double-edged sword for it has also removed the barriers to access through
decentralized777 infringement by making high quality copies and dissemination available
to millions at little cost.778 It is perhaps ironic, yet historically predictable, that the very
mechanism that has substantially increased the economic significance of copyright has
also augmented concerns regarding free riders and resulting in market failure.779
However, in the present situation the market failure concerns are significant due to the
decentralized, low cost of infringement created by digital information and the Internet.
Thus, it may be understandable that the focus of emphasis in the domestic context for
developed states has shifted from access to protection of economic interests. This merely
reflects a perceived domestic imperative of commercial activity over access, which may
780
not be a significant access problem for people in developed states.
Some examples of the importance of copyright for the domestic economies of
developed states may help to illustrate the significance of the market failure concerns. In
776
DAVIS, supra note 445 at 137; UNESCO, third Medium-Term Plan (1990-1995),
adopted in November 1989, H 195.
777 Decentralized infringement means that the cost of copying by individuals is so
inexpensive that copying is no longer controllable by the copyright owners. I. Trotter
Hardy, Project Looking Forward: Sketching the Future ofCopyright in a Networked
World (Final Report, May 1998) 259 available at www.copyright.gov/reports/thardy.pdf.
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200 the core copyright industries contributed an estimated $626.2 billion value added to
the United States economy or 5.98% of Gross Domestic Productivity ("GDP.")781 This
represented an average increase of 3.51% per annum from 1997 to 2000 while the United
782
States economy overall grew just 2.40% during this same time period. The core
industries include newspapers and periodicals, book publishing and related industries,
music publishing, radio and television broadcasting, cable television, records and tapes,
motion pictures, theatrical productions, advertising, computer software and data
70-j
processing. The total copyright industry contribution to the United States economy in
2002 was estimated at $1,254 billion.784 Non-core copyright industries include partial
copyright dependant industries such as architecture, distribution and products that are
wholly or partially produced and distributed in conjunction with copyright materials such
as computers.785 This accounts for 5.99% of GDP of the United States with total
copyright industries accounting for 11.79% of the United States economy.786 From 1997
to 2002 the core copyright industries increased as a percentage of the United States
economy from 5.66% to 5.98%.787 Employment in the core copyright industries in 1997
was 5.1 million workers; in 2001 it was 5.8 million workers. In the core copyright
industries there was an employment growth rate of 3.19% from 19978-2001 as compared
to an overall annual growth rate in the United States over the same time period of
781 STEPHEN SIWEK, COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES IN THE U.S. ECONOMY 2002
REPORT (PREPARED FOR THE INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ASSOCIATION) §2.40 available at http://www.iipa.com/pdf/2004_siwek_full.pdf.
782 Id. at §3.
783
SIWEK, supra note 781 at §2.39.
784 Id. at §2.39.
785 Id. at §2.39.
786 Id. at §§2.40-2.41.
787 Id. at §2.40.
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1.39%.788 Foreign sales and exports are estimated to be at least $88.97 billion in 2001.
This is a 9.4% annual gain from 1999 figures estimated at $79.41 billion.789 The total
amount of foreign sales and exports for core copyright industries exceeds that of almost
all other leading industry sectors.790
In the United Kingdom it is estimated by the Department of Culture, Media and
Sports that creative industries (including advertising, architecture, crafts, design, fashion,
visual arts, publishing, software, computers, television, radio and art) represented 8% of
GDP in 2002 and grew by an average of 6% per annum between 1997 and 2002 as
compared to 3% for the whole economy over this same time period. Exports for creative
industries were 4% of all goods and services exported in 2002. Additionally,
employment in creative industries rose from 1.5 million to 1.9 million between 1995 and
2003 reflecting a 3% per annum growth rate compared to 1% for the whole economy.791
Copyright industries are an increasing percentage ofGDP in other domestic economies
for example in Australia 3.1%; Germany 2.9%; Netherlands 4.5%; New Zealand 3.2%
and Sweden 6.6%.792
Some have criticized surplus exporters of intellectual property, such as the United
States, as a predatory state taking advantage of states that are net importers of intellectual
7Q-3 #
property. However, the fact that the United States is the largest exporter of intellectual
788 Id. at §2.42.
789 STEPHEN SIWEK, COPYRIGHT INDUSTRIES IN THE U.S. ECONOMY 2001
REPORT (PREPARED FOR THE INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ASSOCIATION) 7-8 available at http://www.iipa.com/pdf/2002 siwek full.pdf.
790 Id. at 5. "
791 Id.
792 Lecture Prepared by Dr. Mihaly Ficsor For the WIPO-ESCEA Arab Regional
Conference on Recent Developments in the Field of Intellectual Propertry, Beirut, 5 and
6 May 2003, WIPO-ESCEA/IP/BEY/03/1 April 2003 at 3.
793 Story, supra note 688 at 770.
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property with a reported $23 billion surplus does not present an accurate economic
picture of the situation. The United States has an overall trade deficit of $496.2 billion794
reported for the first quarter of 2004. Many of the imports are in industrial and
agricultural sectors where developing states are more likely to be in a net export
surplus.795 This trade deficit has caused concern voiced by economists about the negative
effect this will have on the global economy.796 The surplus in the trade of intellectual
property reflects a change in the United States' economic policy from agriculture and
manufacturing, where the United States is in a net deficit and has been for some time, to
intellectual property where it has had some success in reducing the trade deficit. It would
be unwise for the United States economy and the global economy to take any action that
would have a negative effect on one of the few sectors where there is a trade surplus.
SUMMARY
The West developed copyright premised on a property right while non-Western
cultures treated creations in a different fashion. A communal property philosophy is
prevalent in many of these non-Western cultures and may explain why so many of these
cultures did not have domestic copyright laws. Additionally, the domestic economic
condition for some of these non-Western states did not dictate the need for copyright
legislation given the lack of a domestic copyright industry and the reliance on
inexpensive foreign copyrighted materials. Accordingly, forced change in domestic
794 International Monetary Fund Economic and Financial Data For the United States,
available at http://www.fedstats.gov/imf/.
795 See Id.; FAO Corporate Document Repository; Status and potential of fisheries and
aquaculture in Asia and the Pacific, available at
http://www.fao.org/documents/show_cdr.asp7url_fileWdocrep/007/ad514e/ad514e04.htm
796
Pingfan Hong, Global Implication of the United States Trade Deficit Adjustment,
United Nations Discussion Paper ST/ESA/2001/DP.17 DESA DISCUSSION PAPER
NO. 17 (2001).
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economic policy in these states coupled with unrealistic expectations of enforcement may
not be the solution.
That said, a balancing approach under TRIPS may still be a workable solution.
As discussed in more detail below, such an approach must take into consideration the
needs ofboth developing and developed states to realize human rights goals such as
education as well as the moral and material interests of creators; for an absolute priority
on access in the name of education may be counter-productive if creators are denied the
economic means to create.
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CHAPTER 11
POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF A CONFLICT BETWEEN ACCESS
FOR EDUCATION AND MORAL AND MATERIAL INTERESTS IN CREATORS
Eveiy art or applied science and every systematic investigation, and similarly eveiy
action and choice, seem to aim at some good; the good, therefore, has been well defined
as that at which things aim Will not the knowledge ofthis good, consequently, be veiy
important to our lives? Would it not better equip us, like archers who have a target to
aim at, to hit theproper mark?797
The solution to the problem of the conflict between access for education and the
moral and material interests in creators is one of balance on the domestic as well as the
international arena. Domestically, the balance is not so much a balance between access
for education weighed against property rights to material and moral rights interests; rather
it is a balance of the optimal level of copyright protection to enhance access. This is the
historical economic policy supporting a utilitarian philosophy for copyright in the West
although, as we have seen, it may not be the practical reality. Indeed, as the copyright
industries have gained in importance to a state's GDP we have seen a shift in economic
policy towards an emphasis supporting a natural law philosophy. In states such as the
United Kingdom and the United States the utilitarian philosophy is still recognized,
however, the natural law philosophy seems to be gaining preeminence in terms of
extended term limits and reduced fair dealing exceptions.798
797
ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS, 3-4 (Martin Ostwald trans.)(The
Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc. 1962).
798 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. at 212 fnl 8; New Era Publications Intern. V. Henry
Holt and Co., Inc., 695 F. Supp. 1493, 1525 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Quinto v. Legal Times of
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Conversely, in the international arena the natural law theory has been and
continues to be preeminent. Both Berne and TRIPS were implemented to protect
copyright holders not users. While access concerns are protected through the theory of
incentive to create and some fair dealing exceptions, the emphasis behind Berne and
TRIPS has historically been an economic policy of protecting domestic copyright
interests. There was no rallying cry of free press and access for education in the
implementation of Berne and TRIPS; rather there was the cry of theft and piracy
harkening back to the ancient period of "mine" and buttressed with a more significant
economic loss. To further exacerbate this problem, the natural law philosophy and
property rights expressed in Berne and TRIPS do not reflect the communal philosophy
regarding creative expressions in non-Western states which have their own unique social
concerns and economic policies to address such concerns.
Given this apparent conflict between access for education (utilitarian philosophy)
and protecting material interests and moral rights (natural law philosophy) and communal
rights the issue returns to examining Resolution 2000/7 stating a priority of human rights
over economic policy. Here, there is no conflict for, as stated before economic policy
can be and should be implemented to realize human rights. In that vein, the economic
policy of copyright must be implemented, domestically and internationally, to promote
education and the creator's moral and material interests. When the two come into
conflict a balancing test should be applied.
Washington, Ic., 511 F. Supp. 579, 581 (U.S.D.C. 1981); M. Witmark & Sons v. Fred
FisherMusic Co., 38 F. Supp. 72 (D.C.N.Y. 1941).
221
A. A Fair Dealing Balancing Test in the Domestic Context.
The state has the primary responsibility for protecting the human rights of its
people. Accordingly, state domestic economic policy should seek to protect the right to
and education and the material and moral rights of creators. These are both aspirational
human rights, historically; although a state may have a legally binding obligation to
achieve these rights to the extent it has signed a covenant or treaty creating such an
obligation. With respect to the moral and material rights of creators, human rights law
does not require the recognition of a property right nor the adoption of natural law,
utilitarian nor communal rights philosophies. This is left to the individual states to
determine. That said, some states have, in fact, legally bound themselves to adopt a
copyright basis ofprotection by ratifying Berne and TRIPS. Certainly, there are going to
be times when these human rights may seem to conflict. In those cases, domestic courts
should apply a balancing test where the competing interests are weighed.
Although there are some examples of a sort of balancing test in domestic court
opinions799 these balancing tests do not provide an in-depth analysis of the competing
interests. Contrast the copyright balancing test currently utilized by some domestic
courts with the balancing test those same courts utilize when the competing interests of
free press and privacy are at odds. In the later cases, the courts use a case by case
approach again, as the discrete factual context may change, but they also consider a
variety of factors such as the public's right to know and censorship concerns weighed
against a governmental interest or personal interest in protecting privacy.800 For example,
if the person whose privacy is invaded is a public figure his right to privacy may be
799
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. National Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985); Cohen
v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991); Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
800 The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
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diminished due to the public's right to know about public officials so they can make
informed voting decisions.801
In the copyright case, courts should apply this balancing test in the fair dealing
context. One advantage to such a suggestion includes the fact that it does not completely
dismantle a copyright system that has worked for some states. Additionally, it allows for
the further development of a doctrine that has met little opposition from the author's
rights advocates and has a long history, first as a judicial doctrine and then codified,
indicating a certain level of acceptability. However, as we have seen the doctrine of fair
dealing has numerous draw-backs. There is a high level of uncertainty leading to
increased transaction costs for both access advocates, in the form of constant threat of
litigation thus reducing legitimate fair dealing, higher transaction costs for author's rights
advocates again from litigation uncertainty and the problem of decentralized copying.
Further, decentralized copying has increased the likelihood ofmarket failure even for
legitimate fair dealing use. Finally, fair dealing only addresses access to currently
available expression and may be detraction to incentives to create as an access
component. It is an imperfect solution in but is well recognized as a protection of
educational concerns.
As we have seen, most fair dealing exceptions utilize a balancing test taking into
consideration the amount copied, if it was for a non-commercial use and the effect on the
material rights of the creator.802 What seems to be lacking is a true market failure
analysis and a moral compass. With respect to a true market failure analysis, that will
only occur if the amount copied reduces the number of consumers able to pay for the
801 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
802 See 17 U.S.C. § 110; 1988 Act, supra note 292.
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work thus causing an effect on the material rights of the creator. With respect to a moral
compass approach what is needed in the balancing test for fair dealing would be a
fonnula that may provide some guidance in determining when universally recognized
moral principles dictate that action is necessary. A United States judge, Learnard Hand
articulated such a formula in the cases of The T.J. Hooperm and The United States v.
Carroll Towing CoM'4 Both of these cases involved the issue of negligence and what
was a reasonable standard of care. In determining if conduct was reasonable, judge Hand
articulated a formula in algebraic terms: P=probability; L= loss; and B= burden.
Unreasonable conduct and, hence liability, was determined ifB<PL (B is less than L
multiplied by P.) Although Hand arguably applied this formula to avoid the issue of
morality, it may be useful to apply a similar formula to the issue of when universally
recognized moral judgments dictate action it is reasonable. Applying such a formula in a
fair dealing balancing test if the burden on the user is less than the probability of loss to
the creator the fair dealing exception would be valid.
B. Other Domestic Solutions That May Work in Conjunction With a Fair
Dealing Balancing Test.
The technological response, primarily encryption, seems to be the solution de jure
by copyright holders and domestic legislatures. In essence, this raises the cost of
infringement.805 However, it was discovered early on that encryption alone was not
enough to protect copyright owners due to the fact that as soon as these digital fences
were erected someone would find a way to tear them down. Accordingly, it was thought
necessary to enlist the assistance of the legislature to promulgate laws, like the DMCA in
803 60 F.2d 737 (2nd Cir. 1932).
804 1 59 F.2d 169 (2nd Cir. 1947)
805
Looking Forward, supra note 777 at 269-276.
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the United States, to make it illegal to break security encryption codes. However, this
tactic has created a tension with the doctrine of fair dealing.806
Basically, to the extent encryption codes prevent one from using materials that
could be utilized under fair dealing a legal user will be denied access. Thus,
technological fences have the potential of undermining fair dealing laws and extending
both the term and scope of copyright protection without legislation in place to prevent
such conduct. For example, in the United States the DMCA legislation addresses this
concern regarding encryption to protect work in the public domain by allowing
807
circumvention in certain circumstances.
Technological fences also pose a threat to access by providing copyright owners
with additional threats of civil and criminal prosecution against legal users who cannot
afford the costs associated with such protracted litigation. A simple letter from a law
firm representing a copyright owner to a middle income family may, in many cases, be
enough to stop use even if it is not infringing. That said, due to the decentralized aspect
of copying today it is apparent that the anti-circumvention provisions of legislation such
as the DMCA simply have not worked808 primarily because the public does not view
copying as wrong.809
The ultimate effectiveness of technological fences depends upon the practical
ability to enforce legislation such as the DMCA. We may again borrow from the pages
of history and look at the practical ability of the Star Chamber and the Stationers'
806 Id. at 262.
807
Lipton, supra note 510 at 183-84; 17 U.S.C. §1201 (d)(f)(g).
808
Christopher Jensen, The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same:
Copyright, Digital Technology and Social Norms, 56 STANFORD L. REV. 531, 549-50
(2003)(hereinafter "Social Norms").
809
THOMAS, supra note 298 at 131-32; RACHEL E. BOEHM, COPYRIGHT, THE
FIRST AMENDMENT, AND THE INTERNET, PLI GO-00Y3 (22 October 2001).
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Company ability to enforce a licensing act that was ignored by the public If the public
does not acknowledge the moral correctness of the law and:
"enforcement costs areprohibitive or courts lackpersonaljurisdiction over a
potential defendant, civil and criminal penalties will do little to ensure compliance with a
law thatpeople do not voluntarily obey. "8I°
Private guidelines are a more feasible solution when dealing with large groups of
potential infringers, such as educational institutions. Here, the large institution has
provided the means for the individual to infringe usually in the form of computer access
or photocopier access. These institutions may negotiate with copyright collection
societies for defined rights to copy in exchange for an agreement by the copyright society
not to sue. However, these guidelines are not always legally enforceable and, at times,
811
nothing is stated regarding copies that exceed the guidelines. This solution is also
limited in that it only is practical with regard to large groups that can effectively
812
negotiate; it does not address the copyright infringer using a home computer. Another
problem here is that is undermines the fair dealing doctrine and, hence, possible issues of
8 J 3
access. If there is a fee attached to such agreements, as in the United Kingdom, this
further undermines fair dealing as it replaces fair dealing with a fee structure which
captures legal and illegal uses alike. But in applying a fair dealing balancing test,
efficiency may be a factor in the equation of burden on the copyright holder being greater
than the probability of loss to society due to decentralized copying. If that is the case,
private guidelines should be held valid under a human rights analysis as it would balance
the human rights interests of creators conflicting with the human right to education.
810 Social Norms, supra note 808 at 549-50.
811
Looking Forward, supra note 777 at 260 (citing to Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171,
1178 (9th Cir. 1983)).
812 Id. at 264.
813 1988 Act, supra note 292 at §36.
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Finally, to counteract the problems created by technology and potential copyright
abuses or market failures in the educational setting, blanket licensing agreements have
been encouraged. For example, in the United Kingdom while the fair dealing defense is
still allowed to a limited extent, it is not allowed if there is a licensing scheme available
814
and if the copier had constructive knowledge of the scheme. Under such a scheme,
collecting societies enter into agreement with universities whereby works are made
available for copying for a set fee.815 This is the system currently in use in the United
Kingdom and the United States.816
The blanket licensing system, while efficient and perhaps effective in lowering
transaction costs,817 undermines the fair dealing defense in the educational arena.
Support for such a system recognizes efficiency but for disseminators not educators.
Additionally, it reflects the emphasis on the economic incentive purpose of copyright
while nullifying the public access purpose of copyright. True, universities may not have
to enter into such agreements but what are their options? Costly, protracted litigation to
make their case under fair dealing. Conversely, there seems to be little doubt that
copying beyond that anticipated under the fair dealing doctrine is occurring and that it
may create a market failure problem.818 But the solution of a blanket licensing agreement
814 1988 Act, supra note 292 at §36; Suthersanen, supra note 529 at 592.
815
Suthersanen, supra note 529 at 592-93.
816 1988 Act, supra note 292 at §36; Suthersanen, supra note 529 at 593. In the United
Kingdom the Copyright Licensing Agency represents the interests of authors and
publishers. Universities UK represents the interests of higher education institutions in the
United Kingdom. These two entities negotiate a flat rate per full time student. Disputes
are referred to the Copyright Tribunal. [1988 Act, supra note 292 at §36] The overall
structure of the United Kingdom system for copyright disputes appears to be that of an
administrative remedies system.
O 1 "7
Suthersanen, supra note 529 at 595.
818 Id. at 601.
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places the burden of such problems squarely on the shoulders of education at a cost to the
public interest in access.
C. International Solutions.
Currently, access advocates are pressing to develop international human rights
obligations on developed states to provide intellectual property at little or no costs to the
extent such intellectual property can alleviate concerns related to education. There is also
pressure on human rights bodies to develop specific interpretations of ambiguous rights
found in Berne and TRIPS; interpretations that emphasize the "human rights"
approach.819 Another approach is to focus on the treatment of copyright consumers as
rights holders. TRIPS focuses on the rights holders of intellectual property. It is believed
that by "giving users an equal status, governments will be better able to argue for a
rebalancing of intellectual property standards as part of an effort to rationalize the
system."820
While it is true that Berne and TRIPS are both authors' rights focused, they
merely implement national treatment which, in many cases, has an access focus. Further,
it has been recognized that Berne and TRIPS are to be read in light of other international
obligations, such as other human rights conventions. The Appellate Body for the WTO
has made it clear that WTO agreements are "not to be read in clinical isolation from
public international law," suggesting that the WTO dispute panel should consult
international adjudication under other treaty regimes when resolving trade-related
819 See Conflict or Coexistence, supra note 15 at 57.
820
Conflict or Coexistence, supra note 15 at 58.
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disputes.821 Accordingly, there is a legal balance already in place. The problem is in the
application of political pressure.
But even with this balance of access and author's rights in place in theory, there is
a further problem and that is the balancing of state interests and international interests.
There is a model for this balancing act in the European Human Rights adjudication where
the European Union has balanced state interests and concerns with larger multinational
interests. But as we have recently observed with the failure of the European Union
Constitution, the suppression of state sovereignty and interests for a multinational
institution has not evolved to the point of a true multinational state. Principally,
economic policy, such as agricultural subsidies and national debt issues, are still
staunchly sovereignty rights.
A better defined balancing test in the international context using fair dealing
should be applied, however, there will be an additional layer of balancing. The first layer
would be the balancing test at the domestic level. That is to say, the economic policy at
the domestic level taking into consideration balancing the human rights of education and
moral and material interests of creators. This balancing test is the one described
immediately above. The next step would be a balancing test at the international level
looking to the economic policy of, for example, two states; one claiming protection for
the creation and one claiming a right of use for education.
There are some examples in an international context of a conflict of rights such as
the Ashdown case and the WTO cases ofKorea-Various Measures 011 Beefand United
States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply ofGambling and Betting Services,
821 Laurence R. Heifer, Adjudicating Copyright Claims Under the TRIPS Agreement:
The Case For a European Human Rights Analogy, 39 HARV. INT'L L.J. 357, 387
(1998).
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however, once again these cases fall a bit short of the human rights mark. First, with
respect to Ashdown no balancing test was applied perhaps because the court did not see a
conflict. As for the WTO cases, a conflict was addressed and a three part balancing test.
The three elements of that test were:
1. the importance of interests or values that the challenged measure is intended
to protect;
2. the extent to which the challenged measure contributes to the realization of the
end pursued by that measure; and
3. the trade impact of the challenged measure.
Ifwe applied this test to a sample case involving protection of a creators material and
moral rights reflected in copyright law in conflict with another state's right to provide
education for its people we may glean a better idea of how this WTO balancing test might
work.
Suppose, for example, the state of Tantalus is a developed state whose domestic
economic policy has evolved from one that emphasized access for education to one that
emphasizes copyright protection due to its shift in the internal economy from a
dependence on industrial goods to an economy that relies heavily on the copyright
industry. Such a shift in economic policy may be justified on a human rights basis if the
level of educational services is not hindered. Indeed, other human rights goal may be
realized internally given the increase in tax basis, a consumer base that can afford to pay
higher prices and increased access due to increased incentives. Yet, this internal shift in
economic policy may cause an effect outside the borders ofTantalus if Tantalus seeks to
United States - Measures Affecting The Cross-Border Supply Of Gambling And
Betting Services WT/DS285/R at 236.
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protect its copyright industry abroad through a treaty such as TRIPS or political and
economic pressure on other states.
Ifwe now look at a developing state, such as the state of Pomona, with an
agricultural based economy and an economic policy that emphasizes access for the
education of its people we see that the realization of human rights goals in Pomona may
require less stringent copyright laws than those of Tantalus. This would be so in
situations where a state like Pomona did not greatly rely on its copyright industry as a
percentage of its GDP, had a strong need to educate its populace and could obtain more
access through weak copyright laws than through an internal incentive to create, partly
due to the lower educational levels of its population. This too may be an acceptable
internal balanced approach with respect to realization of human rights. However, if
Pomona has signed an international agreement such as TRIPS or is subject to external
political and economic pressures to revise its copyright law to provide more extensive
protection for creators a conflict may arise. First, unless Pomona has sufficient internal
creation for use by its people its decision to increase copyright protection may reduce
access having a detrimental effect on the realization of education. This is so because
Pomona's access would be based on foreign creations which it has just reduced access to
by agreeing to more stringent protection thus increasing consumer costs. Additionally,
unless the agreement Pomona has made regarding international copyright issues provides
a significant economic upside such as better trade with other states its people will be
denied access due to an inability to pay. Finally, unless Pomona weans itself away from
foreign creations by establishing its own internal copyright industry it will forever be
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relying on a liberal fair dealing exception so it can afford to purchase educational
materials.
Lets assume here that Pomona, under the fair dealing provision of its copyright
law, decides to allow some copying of foreign works from Tantalus as a means of access
for education. Both states have ratified TRIPS so Tantalus brings Pomona before the
WTO dispute resolution board for allowing the copying in violation TRIPS. Pomona
defends asserting the copying is allowed under fair dealing. Applying the WTO
balancing test articulated in Korea-Various Measures on Beefand United States-
Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply ofGambling and Betting Services the WTO
should look at:
First, the importance of interests or values (here education) that the challenged
measure (fair dealing under Pomona's copyright law) is intended to protect. The more
important the interests or values the more likely the WTO Appellate Body will find it to
be necessary and, thus, allowed. So how important is education? Certainly, few would
argue educations lacks importance given the apparent universal recognition of the need
for education.823
Second, the extent to which the challenged measure (fair dealing) contributes to
the realization of the end pursued by that measure (education.) Here, it is suggested that
the greater the extent to which the measure contributes to the end pursued the more likely
the measure is "necessary." Accordingly, some data would have to be provided by
Pomona to establish that its fair dealing exception actually contributes to the
823 For example, see UNESCO 2002 Report, Education For All: Is the World on Track?,
available at http://portal, unesco. org/education/en/ev.php-
URLJD=43489& URL_DO=DOJTOPIC&URL_SECTION=201. htmf CIPR, supra note
83 at 102-03.
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enhancement of the education of its people. A small percentage increase may not be
enough, however, under this test.
The ability to measure the enhancement of education from the fair dealing use of
these copyright goods would be critical to Pomona to establish the exception. But this
should not be an insurmountable barrier. The World Bank in its World Development
Report 2004 notes that the problems in the educational systems for some States are
primarily due to unaffordable access, dysfunctional schools, low technical quality, low
responsiveness and stagnant productivity.824 While all factors need to be addressed,
providing access to instructional materials has the greatest impact. For example, in
North East Brazil during the 1980's increases in test scores were measured based upon
dollars spent on different inputs. Increased teachers' salaries resulted in an increase of 1;
ensuring all teachers have three years of secondary schooling resulted in an increase of
1.9; providing tables, chairs and other "hardware" for the teachers and students resulted
in an increase of 7.7; and providing a packet of instructional materials (access) resulted in
an increase of 19.4. In India during the 1990's a similar study was conducted.
Increased teachers' salaries resulted in an increase of 1; facility improvements resulted in
an increase of 1.2; one additional square foot of space per student resulted in an increase
of 1.7; and providing a packet of instructional materials (access) resulted in an increase of
14.827 Data similar to this but tied to the actual use of the copyrighted materials, along
with what has been historically recognized regarding the importance of access for
824 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2004, 111, available at
http://www.wds.wprldbank.org (Report No. 26895).
825 Id. at 112-16.
826 Id. at 116 fig. 7.3.
827 Id. at 116 fig. 7.3.
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educational purposes could be utilized to provide evidence for the second prong of this
balancing test.
Finally, the WTO balancing test would look at the trade impact of the challenged
measure. Under this element, if the trade impact is slight it is more likely that the
measure would be deemed "necessary." If Pomona is a state with little to no consumer
base that can afford to pay for Tantalus' copyright goods there is market failure. If there
is such a market failure then there would be no conflict with the normal exploitation of
the work because there is little to no exploitation in a situation of market failure.
Additionally, there would be no unreasonable prejudice to the legitimate interests of the
rights holder in a market failure situation particularly if attribution is safeguarded.828
Under these facts it would appear as though the trade impact would be slight. That said,
there may still be a problem with parallel imports which could impact trade. Here the
problem lies in copyright goods available for little or no cost in developing states being
placed into the stream of commerce and made available to consumers in developed states
at lower than market rates. If there was a significant flow of parallel imports to
developed states this would create market failure in that there would be no demand for
the higher priced intellectual property resulting in reduced or negative ROI which will
reduce consumers subsidized research and development and that ill-serves the entire
world's interest. This could be considered a significant trade impact but under the second
prong of this balancing test the end goal is education not a black market economy. Thus,
Pomona would have to establish some safeguards to legitimize its fair dealing use to
ensure that the end use was education.
828
TRIPs, supra note 11 at art. 13.
234
If a balancing test similar to the WTO's test were utilized, the moral compass
element would also be met. This moral compass would be particularly helpful in
situations where the balancing test is not clear as to whether the fair dealing exception
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As is indicated from the chart above, if the interest protected is important, the challenged
measure highly contributes to the realization of that interest and the trade impact is low
the burden on the user for denial of use will be greater than the probability of loss to the
copyright holder so fair dealing should apply. Conversely, if the interest protected is not
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so important, the challenged measure does not significantly contribute to the realization
of that interest and the trade impact is high fair dealing should not apply because the
burden on the user will be less than the probability of loss to the copyright holder. For all
other situations the burden on the user will have to be measured against the probability of
loss to the copyright holder to determine whether fair dealing is applicable. For example,
if the interest protected is not that important; not critical, but the challenged measure
contributes greatly to realizing that interest and the trade impact is low courts should
examine the relative importance of the interest and how low is the trade impact. It would,
in essence be a rule of reason.
In the case of education, the interest to be protected will always be high. This is
due to the universally recognized importance of education as indicated by the history of
copyright in the West and the history of human rights law. Fair dealing should contribute
more to the realization of that interest in states where there is no consumer base to pay for
educational materials and the trade impact in these states would be low due to market
failure provided the parallel imports problem is addressed. In states where there is a
consumer base with the ability to pay, contribution to the realization of the interest would
be reduced and trade impact increased making it less likely fair dealing would apply.
D. Other International Solutions That May Work in Conjunction With a
Fair Dealing Balancing Test.
Differential pricing, also known as price discrimination, is the practice where
higher prices are charged for intellectual property in states where consumers can afford to
pay the higher price and lower prices are paid by consumers in states where the
consumers cannot afford the higher price. s"y This practice allows for the intellectual
829
Report ofAug. 2, 2001, supra note 66 at TJ28.
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property owners to set prices based upon market demand and ability to pay. As we have
seen, this avoids some market failure problems which can occur when prices are set too
high for a particular market resulting in no demand due to an inability to pay. So long as
the market can pay something above cost resulting in some ROI, price differentials make
economic sense. Indeed, in applying the WTO balancing test paying some price would
certainly reduce the negative trade impact element. However, in situations where the
market can not afford to pay costs, should the owners be allowed or required to sell
below cost and recover their losses and obtain their ROI from richer markets? This is the
question that has caused some political repercussions in the international arena.830
Some have argued that there needs to be support for the idea of price
discrimination so consumers in developed states will continue to subsidize research and
development that serves the entire world's interest.831 This would include allowing
consumers in developing states to pay below costs as, quite often, that is all they can
afford. In the field of education unlike the political repercussions from the HIV and
AIDS examples there does not appear to be a great cry from the voting public in
832
developed states. That said, the possibility of such a political fall-out in developed
states needs to be addressed
To avoid this problem of a demand for equal pricing for educational materials one
may apply what Lessig identifies as the ideal of exceptionalism; that intellectual property
has always allowed exceptions.833 Certainly, fair dealing is a well recognized exception
under copyright law; however, even in comparing the example of the United States when
830
Duties, supra note 14 at 32-33.
831
Reinhardt, supra note 531 at 487.
832 See Reinhardt, supra note 531 at 487; KEYNOTE, supra note 483 at 35-36.
833
KEYNOTE, supra note 483 at 36.
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it was a developing/pirate state there was the basis for a belief that a liberal use of
copyright materials for education would be limited. The United States was at this time
developing its own domestic copyright industry and a consumer base that would be able
to afford to pay for copyrighted goods. An exceptionalism that knows no bounds will be
more likely to stimulate negative political repercussions.
Again, rhetoric is important. As with the loose use of the term "fundamental
human rights" when discussing aspirational human rights the use of terms like
"differential pricing" and the avoidance of terms such as "wealth re-distribution" are a
thinly veiled attempt to stifle the voices of the voting public in developed states.
Differential pricing is nothing less than wealth re-distribution. It is, in essence, a wealth
tax; the problem is that many of the people who may be classified as wealthy by
international standards will not be classified wealthy in their own states and, certainly not
in their own minds. Thus, there will be a feeling of resentment and political fall-out if
they are required to pay more. This resentment will only grow by attempts to hide the
truth of the matter. But a fair dealing approach that utilizes a balancing test will appear
more just by harkening back to the early arguments in favour of copyright laws in the
West; a limited exceptionalism for the benefit of education.
Another suggested solution in the international context is the implementation of
an international copyright code. History again provides an analogy for those who
advocate the need to universalize copyright law. Ginsburg notes Federalist No. 43,
providing the justification for the United States Constitutional provision relating to
copyright, wherein it is stated that allowing the separate states within the United States to
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provide copyright law would be fragmentary and ineffectual. Accordingly, the drafters of
the United States' Constitution decide on a universalized approach for the United
States.834 And again in the nineteenth century with the formation of Berne it was poised
by the Gentian delegation at the first intergovernmental meeting in 1883 that universal
treatment in the form of an international code would be better than national treatment.
While this was discussed, national treatment was ultimately selected due to concerns
states had over the significant changes it would require in domestic laws and the inability
to get consensus.835 Into the twenty-first century we still see the views of the national
treatment pragmatist taking priority over the universalist.836
Yet, there are those who believe we already have an international copyright code
of sorts when taking into consideration Berne, TRIPS, WIPO and WTO agreements.837
While these agreements have reduced the impact of domestic copyright legislation in the
international arena, it is argued that national copyright laws are going the way of the
dinosaur in a digitally connected world.838 But what these arguments fail to recognize is
the importance of copyright industries in certain domestic economies and the relative
absence of a copyright industry in others. A universal copyright code will, inevitably,
interfere with domestic economic policy at some level. This creates sovereignty concerns
8^4
International Copyright, supra note 663 at 265.
835 International Copyright, supra note 663 at 268.
836
Adjudicating Copyright, supra note 821 at fn 31; WIPO, Guide to the Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1978), at 11 ("[The] very
concept of copyright from a philosophical, theoretical and pragmatic point of view differs
country by country, since each has its own legal framework influenced by social and
economic factors."). SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE
PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886-1986, at 917 (1987)
("Complete and absolute uniformity of protection, in the sense of an international
codification of copyright applicable everywhere, is undoubtedly a Utopian and
unobtainable goal.")
837
Ginsburg, supra note 414 at 266; See FAWCETT, supra note 507 at 465.
838 International Copyright, supra note 663 at 276-84.
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affording little opportunity for consensus as we saw with aspirational human rights.
Further, such a code would have to be flexible enough to accommodate the vast array of
economic conditions. In short, as long as there are national economies and national
economic policies universalization will be minimal.
A final possibility may be the setting of maximum standards, specifically term
839
limits, instead of the minimum standards currently in place under TRIPS and Beme.
While this may address the "TRIPS plus" problem referenced by the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights,840 it does not take into account the varying degrees of
development thus creating a rigid standard when something akin to TRIPS plus may be
desirable. The solution to "TRIPS plus" is political and international pressure in the
841
implementation of TRIPS not procrustean laws that do more harm than good.
There is no simple, one size fits all, solution to resolve the conflict of access and
author's rights in the international context primarily because there is a lack ofuniformity
ofphilosophy, culture, economic development and social development. Thus, a universal
international copyright code, at least for now, is not feasible. However, there is a
remarkable amount ofuniformity regarding the root of the problem. First, as we have
seen within the domestic and international context there are access advocates conflicting
with author's rights advocates. Second, it does not matter if the context is domestic or
international, developed or developing states, individual ownership or traditional
knowledge the desire to lay claim to a creation and call it "mine" is ever present.
839
Conflict or Coexistence, supra note 819 at 58.
840
Conflict or Coexistence, supra note 819 at 59.
841 • • rrrt rmSee Srividhya Ragavan, The Jekyll and Hyde Story ofInternational Trade: The
Supreme Court in Phrma v. Walsh and the TRIPs Agreement, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 777,
781 (2004).
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Accordingly, the only way to address this problem is to acknowledge and accept our
differences and our similarities. This, of necessity, will require a flexible,
multidimensional solution that allows for growth and development; in short an economic
policy that balances access with author's rights reflected in the law. The primary
problem with Resolution 2000/7 is that it ignores these basic facts and in so doing pays
heed to the child want while ignoring the child ignorance.
Similarly, there is social value in the author's rights argument. First, it is apparent
that the states with the largest production of intellectual property, including critically
important new inventions and discoveries, are states that have historically recognize and
protect author's rights. Secondly, the industry generated by author's rights, in particular
the copyright industry, forms a significant part of these states economy, provides capital
for further research and development, employment and the ability for these states to
create an environment where their obligations to meet human rights goals for their people
can be achieved. It also provides an economy in these states where it is possible to
provide foreign aid and capital for consumers in these states to purchase good from
developing states thus providing much needed capital to developing states. Accordingly,
there is a social value, both domestically and internationally, in recognizing and
protecting author's rights.
In resolving this conflict we must not ignore the social benefits articulated above.
Therefore, any solution requires the following:
1. Recognize the benefits and the conflict;
2. conduct more economic analysis on the optimal rate of return for term limits;
3. provide adjustments for market failure;
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4. require more transparency and due process by international agencies;
5. accept the concept of "mine";
6. continue applying political pressure; and
7. construct an unambiguous moral compass.
1. Recognize the Benefits and the Conflict Relating to Access and Author's
Rights.
The debate between access and author's rights in the domestic context has
recognized for centuries the benefits of each as well as the potential for their
complimentary nature. In the international context, the debate has digressed to an
emphasis on one side of the equation to the detriment of the other. Given the various
stages of economic and social development some states may have to take a more
aggressive access position while others may have to take a more pro-author's rights
position. We have seen this in the past for example when the United States was a
developing state it took a more aggressive access position. However, this was temporary
due to the existence, growth and expansion of the intellectual property and related
industries.842 Such a pro-access position thus needs to be coupled with a concerted effort
to establish and develop domestic intellectual property industries.
With respect to author's rights they need to be analyzed in terms of the type of
rights asserted and the market in which they are asserted. Certain moral rights, such as
attribution, have little to no effect on access and, accordingly, they should be given full
protection. But other moral rights, such as droit suite and economic rights including term
limits, do affect access, therefore, the scope of these rights must reflect the needs of the
state or market in which they are asserted.
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Stanton, supra note 659 at 150-51.
843 See CIPR, supra note 83 at 95-98.
242
The current system, with Berne, TRIPS and WIPO treaties, allows for this first
element by utilizing national treatment, allowing some fair dealing and exceptions based
upon a public state of emergency. A critical impediment to the success of the current
system comes from those who negate balance by promoting access to the detriment of
creator's moral and material interests and those who promote creator's moral and
material interests to the detriment of access.
2. Conduct More Economic Analysis on the Optimal Rate of Return.
The economic analysis regarding the optimal rate of return relating to economic
rights of authors is insufficient.844 While advocates for author's rights point to economic
incentives as a means to promote creation, precious little evidence is provided to support
this theory. For example, in the Eldred case addressing the validity of a term extension
for copyright protection under the United States Constitution, the United States Supreme
Court did not require economic justification for the term extension, although this is
arguably required under the United States Constitution.845 Rather, the Court was satisfied
with a mere assertion by the United States Congress that it was economically justified.
While author's rights advocates are correct in asserting that there is a human right for
creators to obtain the economic benefits of their creations this right should be read to
mean a "reasonable" economic benefit. This is so due to the balance required by the
inclusion of a human right to access. Legislatures and courts should require economic
justification, as was done in the United Kingdom in the Parliamentary debates regarding
844 ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 181 at 5; see generally Edmund W. Kitch,
Elementary and Persistent Errors in the Economic Analysis ofIntellectual Property, 53
VAND. L. REV. 1727 (2000).
845 See text, supra at 123 fn. 446, 150-51.
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the book deposit requirement and posthumous copyright protection,846 prior to any further
expansion of author's rights. This should be done by requiring reliable economic data
relating to the optimal rate of return with "optimal" being defined as proof that added
economic incentives will generate a substantially increased incentive to create thus
enhancing access.
A further area for analysis relating to economic analysis for the optimal ROI is the
realization that not all intellectual property will require the same term ofprotection in
order to achieve an optimal ROI.847 For example, it makes little economic sense that a
computer program with a market life expectancy of two to five years should be given a
term ofprotection of the author's life plus seventy years or even seventy years after
introduction into the market. While it is unlikely that author's rights advocates and
legislatures who are beholden to these groups will agree to any reduction in the current
term limits, legislatures should implement variable term limits for new creations based
upon an optimal rate of return analysis.
3. Provide Adjustments For Market Failure.
Market failure adjustments need to be addressed especially with respect to
developing states. As already discussed, there are two forms ofmarket failure: First,
there is market failure when infringement is so rampant and impossible to contain or
exceptions too broad that it creates an inability for creators or owners of intellectual
property rights to obtain a sufficient ROI. The second form ofmarket failure occurs
when the price of intellectual property is more than the market can bare.
846 See text, supra at 145-47.
847
CIPR, supra note 83 at 17.
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The first form ofmarket failure is a major problem for developed states due to
technology, such as the Internet, creating a decentralized infringement problem. While
not an insignificant problem in developing states it is less of a problem due to the fact
that access to infringing technology is less prevalent Although some of the solutions
suggested above, such as technological fences, a mulitprong approach, increased
penalties, private guidelines, indirect tax, education and blanket licensing may resolve
some of the market failure problems they contain their own set ofproblems as listed
above and ignore the fact that a healthy public domain will provide a reasonable
alternative to many cases of infringing conduct. Accordingly, market failure adjustments
in the first form must take the carrot and the stick approach; a healthy public domain and
a workable disincentive to infringe.
The second form ofmarket failure is prevalent in developing states and
contributes to the transfer of technology shortfall concerns of access advocates. While
price differentials may alleviate some of the problem this mechanism should not be
utilized without some analysis as to the repercussions it may create on the consumers
baring the burden of higher prices. Additionally, price differentials do not address the
problem of an inability to even pay for the cost ofproduction nor the problems associated
with a lack of an intellectual property infrastructure. To the extent a market can pay costs
for production or some ROI price differentials may make some economic sense.
However, to the extent that there is absolute market failure, which is an inability to even
pay costs of production, price differentials alone will not be enough. With regard to this
absolute market failure, it should be noted that there is no realistic expectation for
creators or owners to obtain any economic benefit. Accordingly, a zero ROI should not
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violate Beme or TRIPS.848 But it is not acceptable to require developed states, creators
or owners to make intellectual property available to developing states at a loss.
Therefore, some economic benefit must be provided. This can be achieved in the short
term for emergency situations through tax incentives for charitable contributions, public
relations benefits which translate into advertising benefits and foreign aid.
Because these incentives have a cost on the society providing them and
recognizing that resources are limited, reasonable limits should be included to direct
these benefits so that they cover only situations that are a serious threat to the recipient
state's public health and safety, such as the AIDS crisis. Additionally, safeguards need to
be in place that effectively controls distribution to avoid the parallel imports problem.
This may require governmental or international agency control of distribution as opposed
to the private sector and increased penalties, including criminal penalties, for parallel
importers and parallel exporters.
Finally, but perhaps most importantly, recipient states need to address their
domestic problems, including but not limited to a lack of education and lack of
intellectual property industry. While this may echo arguments by developed states that
the problem is due to developing states failure in addressing their domestic problems the
fact of the matter is that this seven factor solution will not work nor will any other
proposed solutions if states do not behave in a responsible manner and that applies to
developed states as well. This requirement of effectively addressing domestic problems
is in-line with the rule that the primary responsibility for achieving human lights goals is
848 See Berne at art. 1 and TRIPS at art. 13. These provisions protect the normal
exploitation of the work and prohibit an unreasonable prejudice to the legitimate interests
of the rights holder. To the extent that there is absolute market failure there is no
prejudice as there is no legitimate expectation or interest, from an economic rights stand
point, to make a profit in that market.
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internal; individual states have a primary duty to help their own people. It is not
consistent with human rights law to require other states to bare this burden when the state
with primary responsibility refuses to address its own internal problems effectively.
4. Require More Transparency and Due Process by International Agencies.
It is not surprising that certain NGO's, corporations, private industry groups and
other private lobbying associations have a bias and will present an issue in a manner that
is bias. Nor is this something to be condemned; but it should be considered. And it is to
be expected that such groups will utilize surprise tactics, such as bringing forth an issue at
a meeting with no advanced notice so as to catch the other side unprepared. However,
such tactics are unacceptable for international agencies such as the Sub-Commission and
any dispute resolution panel or court because these tactics undermine credibility and
fundamental concepts of due process.
Transparency has two major sub-components: external and internal
transparency.849 External transparency would require that international agencies increase
public education and awareness of their actions. While there have been attempts at this
through Internet web sites and availability of documents it is clear that these efforts have
had a minimal impact. Information overload has contributed to this problem making it
appear as though the goal is to hide the truth in an insurmountable amount of data written
in an obtuse manner.
Additionally, agendas need to be publicized well in advance so as to allow input
from all interested parties. Further, lobbying from special interest groups should not be
849 See Global Trade Negotiations Home Page, Center For International Development at
Harvard University, available at
http://www. cid.harvard,edu/cidtrade/issues/transparency. html.
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over indulged. Finally, meetings should be open and have timely notice as to their date,
time and location, there should be open access to all reports, hearing statements and other
relevant documents, and timely access to documents submitted by others to the agencies
suggesting certain action so opposition papers can be submitted and considered prior to
any decision. This would satisfy any due process requirement as well.
As for internal transparency, this would require open and timely information
being made available to delegates who are members of a particular agency. It would also
require that the delegates have sufficient notice of any agenda items, meetings and
hearings so there is an opportunity for meaningful input.
International agencies such as the United Nations are currently suffering from a
malaise that has undermined their relevance.850 They are viewed by some as tools for the
developed or developing states to force a collective will on the international community.
They are also criticized as being non-representative due to the nature in which delegates
are politically appointed.851 Removed from the general populace whom these politically
appointed representatives allegedly represent, these institutions risk failure if they do not
address these problems.
Resolution 2000/7 is an example of a non-transparent action that lacked due
process. While it is too early to predict its likelihood of success, the circumstances
850 For example see, Herbert D. Bowman, Letting the Big Fish Get Awat: The United
Nations Justice Effort in East Timor, 18 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 371 (2004); Michael
M. Gallagher, Declaring Victory and Getting Out [ofEurope]: Why the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization Should be Disband, 25 HOUS. J. INT'L LAW 341 (2003).
851
Joseph Keller, The Future ofAmicus Participation at the World Trade Organization:
Implications of the Sardines Decision and Suggestions For Future Developments, 33
INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 449 (2005).
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surrounding its passage increased its chance of failure. Continuation of such
inappropriate conduct will likely only exacerbate the problem.
5. Accept the Concept of "Mine."
There is a reluctance to accept the fact that creators view their creations as
"mine." Romantic notions of the altruistic, lone artist creating for the pure joy of it all
permeate societies even today. While these notions may have some basis in reality in
exceptional cases they do not reflect the reality of facts indicating a belief in a possessory
interest in intellectual property. History has shown that creators have viewed their
creations as "mine" going back to ancient times. Further, author's were the driving force
behind Berne; a convention that has as its focus author's rights, including the right to
make a profit from their creations. Altruistic notions of access are conspicuously lacking
in Berne. Additionally, the lone artist or creator is not the primary creator in modern
society; corporations are and corporations view intellectual property rights as a corporate
asset, the epitome of "mine." Finally, even cultures that claim more altruistic motives
due to collective or communal ownership in creative works are guilty of the concept of
"mine." Pressing the cause of traditional knowledge for these cultures reflects this desire
to own and exploit intellectual property. In fact, traditional knowledge advocates press
for perpetual ownership rights and economic profits.852
This concept of "mine" is so entrenched, to ignore it risks a reduction of access.
If creators are not compensated for their work they will have to seek other means to make
a living and, thus, have less time to devote to creating. Additionally, some may prefer to
keep their creations to themselves rather than allow others to exploit or benefit from
852
Cottier, supra note 715.
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them. Further, laws that require unfettered access may be viewed as unjust and lack
popular support. It is important that laws are viewed as just especially in a democracy
where politicians will suffer the wrath of the voting public. As we have seen time and
again, the will of the people will, ultimately, be heard.
Ifwe accept this concept of "mine" we shall have the beginning of the wisdom
necessary to resolve the problem of lack of access regarding intellectual property.
Recognize it, address it in the law and deal with it in a manner that is just. This would
include rights to attribution and the right to reap some economic benefit at a minimum.
6. Continue Applying Political Pressure.
So long as a majority of human rights remain aspirational, such as the right to
education, political pressure will be the most effective way to reach stated goals. Even
for human rights that are jus cognes, such as the right to be protected from crimes of
genocide, we have yet to see an effective international deterrent due to a lack of realistic
coercive powers. While there have been some instances of coercive powers in the shape
ofmilitary intervention being used to stop genocide, for example in Bosnia, Bosnia was
a NATO action not a United Nations action primarily due to the perception that the
United Nations would not take decisive action. This perception is not unfounded; one
need only look to the recent genocide in Rwanda in the 1990's and in Somalia today to
recognize the fact that even when international law is relatively clear regarding a legal
obligation in the human rights field, international consensus to intervene comes slowly if
at all. Therefore, it would be unrealistic to believe that even with a recognized and
accepted international legal obligation to provide educational materials to those who need
it there would be any international action of consequence directed towards those who
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deprive it to their own people or developed states that are deemed to have not done
enough.
Those who desire the security in the knowledge that there is a law written that
dictates conduct may find this one factor in the seven, this arrow in the quiver of
solutions, imperfect for its lack of certainty. But, as we have seen in history, societies,
such as the ancient Greeks, may thrive under such an imperfect system and, indeed, the
international community has achieved far more with such an approach. Political
pressure, stoked by popular support for the cause, brought down apartheid in South
Africa and provided relief aid with unprecedented speed and quantity for the victims of
the tsunami disaster ofDecember, 2004 to name but two recent examples. With the
apartheid example, political pressure was slow to act and did not act until the popular
conscious awoke to the problem and support for the cause. International law addressing
apartheid had been on the books for years but accomplished very little.853 With regards
to the tsunami relief, there was no international law that was required to extract money.
Accordingly, when the moral compass points in the direction of action, political pressure
together with popular support can be a very powerful tool.
7. Construct an Unambiguous Moral Compass For Balance.
Individual determinations ofmoral and ethical conduct require a moral and ethical
context. The problem for intellectual property law in general and the law of copyright in
particular, is the lack of such an underlying clear context. For example, the nature of
853
UDHR, supra note 3 at art. 2; ICESCR, supra note 3 at art. 2(2).
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copyright law in the United States makes it difficult to construct an unambiguous moral
854
compass.
Currently, the debate regarding access for education and the moral and material
interests in creators has contained much hyperbola and little substance. Those advocating
access ignore the burden quotient and those advocating moral and material interests of
creators ignore the probability of loss quotient. In short it would appear that there is a
conflict in defining the good at which to aim. Yet, this is so only because of the
inclination by some to define the good in absolute term; to see their good as the one with
an absolute priority and all other good as subservient or not as good. And in arriving at
this conclusion as to what is the chief good little to no historical or economic analysis is
engaged. Thus, there is a dearth of knowledge of good and we end up as archers taking
aim at different targets. But it is possible that the chief good at which to aim is not the
same for all people at all times. Inevitably, ifwe are to hit the proper mark we must have
knowledge of all relevant good and to balance any conflicting good or we risk shooting
our arrows into the air and they will fall we know not where.
SUMMARY
In the domestic context economic policy has directed the course of copyright law.
This basic principle should be applied in the international context as well. While some
states see a need for international copyright protection to achieve their political and
economic needs some oversight needs to be applied to avoid abuses. Both developed and
developing states need an economic policy that encourages the realization of human
854 Ann Bartow, Electrifying Copyright Norms andMaking Cyberspace More Like a
Book, 48 VILL. L. REV. 13, 25-26 (2003); (citing to Sheldon Halpem at Sheldon W.
Halpern, The Digital Threat to the Normative Role ofCopyright Law, 62 Ohio St. L.J.
569,572 (2001)
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rights such as education and the moral and material interests of creators, however, when
there is a conflict, internally or externally, some balance should be applied.
TheWTO has a unique opportunity, given its dispute resolution panel, to resolve
disputes such as the conflict education and copyright. Further, there are domestic court
decisions as well as WTO decisions that apply a balancing test in situations of similar
legal conflicts. Such a balancing test together with consideration of the benefits
domestically for an economic policy, economic analysis including market failure,
transparency, acceptance of the concept of "mine," political pressure and an
unambiguous moral compass will go a lot further in resolving the conflict than absolute
priorities that ignore economic realities.
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CONCLUSION
I can see you 're all waitingfor a peroration, but it's silly ofyou to suppose I can
remember what I've said when I've been spouting such a hotchpotch ofwords. There's
an old saying, "I hate a fellow- drinker with a memoiy, " and here's a new one to put
alongside it: "I hate an audience which won'tforget. "
And so I'll say goodbye. Clap your hands, live well, and drink, distinguished initiates of
[ECONOMIC POLICY]855
Perhaps the statement that human rights take a priority over economic policy
takes the moral high ground for some if economic policy is equated with greed. But is it
true that economic policy must always reflect such ignoble goals? History seems to
refute such a supposition. The creation of the United Nations, modem human rights
agendas as well as the domestic history of copyright laws evidences the utilization of
economic policy for the realization of human rights goals. Thus, it would not be folly to
praise economic policy as a catalyst for benevolence.
The problem faced domestically and by the international community of a conflict
between access for education and the moral and material interests of creators may be, in
part, due to domestic economic policy but the solution is also to be found in domestic
economic policy. The solution is not to be found in an attempt to interpret current
international law in such a fashion as to create a universal binding legal obligation where
none exist. In that regard, the right to an education, though critical for the realization of
other human rights, is an aspirational human right. Domestic economic policy should be
formed in such a fashion to realize this goal internally and to minimize negative effects
externally. The mechanism to achieve this economic policy absent consensus on the
issue is political pressure, flexibility and a balanced approach.
855
ERASMUS, supra note 1 at 134.
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Similarly, an attempt to define moral and material interests of creators as outside
the realm of human rights to resolve the conflict lacks legal basis. The moral and
material interest of creators are protected in the UDHR and the ICESCR just as the right
to education is. Further, such an interpretation of human rights ignores the
interconnectedness of human rights; to wit that the protection of the moral and material
interests of creators may, under a proper economic policy, provides more access thus
enhancing education.
A prioritization approach suggested by some commentators comes much closer to
the balance that must be achieved; however, even here we see some rigidity in an attempt
to articulate an absolute priority of the right to an education over the moral and material
interests for creators. Such a procrustean approach fails to recognize the varying
economic conditions of states which necessitate a flexible, balanced approach.
Perhaps even more critical to the solution of the problem is the lack of recognition
that human rights in many cases must be realized through economic policy. This was
perceived by the World War II allied powers after experiencing the devastation wrought
by a war started, in part, by economic instability. It was this interconnectedness between
economic policy and human rights that is reflected in the history leading up to the
creation of the United Nations as well as the creation of the UDHR. Given this history it
is to say the least ironic if not tragic that Resolution 2000/7 and subsequent commentary
was phrased in such a fashion as to separate the two.
An understanding of the history of copyright may help us move forward to
achieve a solution for this problem. In particular, the pre-history and history of copyright
law in the West is beneficial given its influence on international copyright law today.
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This history should be traced back to the ancient period as that period provides the basis
for the concept of a property right in a creation and, ultimately, in its copy. Based upon a
natural law philosophy, this property right is the comer stone for domestic economic
policy in some Western states and is reflected in international agreements dealing with
copyright. The domestic history of copyright also shows us that the natural law
philosophy in its pure form may be counterproductive to social needs, such as education.
Thus, a utilitarian philosophy allowing for a limited property right in a creation and its
copy was adopted by many Western states to allow for the benefits of an incentive
created by a property right, a Lockean fruits of their labour theory, but also to promote
access for education and other social purposes. Under the utilitarian philosophy, access
is promoted by an incentive to create through a monopoly limited in time and through a
public domain established by creations no longer protected under copyright law.
But the battle for access in the West was not solved by the enactment of copyright
laws. There has been and continues to be an internal struggle between natural law
advocates and utilitarian philosophy advocates. We see examples of this in the histories
of the battle for perpetual copyright, extension of term limits and the exception to
copyright law under doctrines like fair dealing. And what we also see in Western
copyright history is some attempt to balance these conflicting interests. This balance is
not perfect and is not absolute; at times more access was desirable due to needs perceived
of society such as education. Here, the history of the United States is insightful as we see
that the United States, as a developing state, had weak copyright laws with respect to
foreign creations to promote education. But the United States also had a domestic
copyright industry in its early history which was a large part of the justification for weak
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protection of foreign copyrighted works. When this copyright industry grew in economic
importance there was a shift in the United States' economic policy from less protection to
more protection.
Conversely, international copyright protection has remained premised upon a
natural law footing. This is understandable given the natural law history of copyright in
Western states and the fact that Western states were a driving force in the enactment of
international copyright law. Thus, we see in essence a property right in international
agreements such as Berne and later in international human rights documents such as the
UDHR and the ICESCR. But while Berne and, later, TRIPS reflects an emphasis on
natural law protecting creators as a primary function, human rights agreements such as
the UDHR and the ICESCR are more utilitarian reflecting a balance by also emphasizing
access.
In contrast to the Western experience in copyright history, non-Western states do
not seem to have developed an individual property right in a creation and its copy. This
is not to say that there was no economic benefit to a creator in non-Western culture;
rather we see an indirect benefit, at times communal in nature. This, coupled with
different levels of social need and economic development, was reflected in an economic
policy that did not look to copyright law as a means to realize human rights goals. As
with the United States as a developing state example, intellectual property goods, such as
copyrighted material, would be brought in from foreign sources with little to no domestic
protection thus providing an inexpensive source. However, unlike the United States
example no domestic copyright industry would be simultaneously protected and
enhanced. The Western states viewed this as a theft and perceived a greater need to
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correct this problem through an international agreement as their economies became more
dependent on the copyright industries.
While there may have been a large amount of copying with out remuneration
going on in non-Western states it is questionable that an agreement such as TRIPS would
have an effect of recapturing those losses due to a lack of a property right philosophical
basis in creations and market failure problems in developing states. Without the
philosophical basis for the property right status given creations and their copies in non-
Western states there is less of a social perception of the need to enforce copyright laws.
Further, even if these laws were enforced the market failure problem means that foreign
creations may not be copied due to TRIPS but they also will not be sold as the market can
not bear the cost. In essence TRIPS in and of itselfwill not recapture these losses with
the possible exception of the parallel imports problem.
Despite these philosophical and economic impediments the solution to the conflict
between access for education and the moral and material interests of creators is not
insurmountable and may even be achieved within the confines of the current system
which does, for better or worse, recognizes a property right in a creation and its copy.
The solution is one of balance. This is the course that history suggests and, indeed, is the
policy that has proven most effective in the domestic context. In achieving this balance,
economic policy would be implemented to attain the social goal of access for education
and protecting the moral and material interests of creators. In the domestic context, the
balance would be utilized to determine when one right should prevail over the other to
realize both the right to education and the moral and material interests of creators to their
fullest. At times one right may be more critical than the other but an absolute priority
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should never be suggested as facts and economic conditions may change requiring a
different perspective. A doctrine such as fair dealing may be the most practical tool to
utilize with a rather liberal fair dealing application be allowed when the state is lacking in
the field of education. Conversely, a more restrictive fair dealing policy should be
implemented in situations were the state has an adequate level of education but needs to
protect the copyright industry due to other economic and social considerations.
In the international context, a balancing test similar to the one implemented by the
WTO may be helpful in achieving the requisite balance and at the same time preventing
the assertion of the need to protect education or the moral and material rights of creators a
pretext. Here, as in the domestic setting, the needs of the parties involved should be
weighed and economic evidence, not mere conjecture and speculation need to be
provided. Ifwe are, as states, to direct our aim at the chief good of "the infinitely gentle,
or/:
infinitely suffering thing," then we must be diligent in requiring objective, unbiased
evidence and analysis in addressing this and other problems or we risk becoming "ancient
women gathering fuel in vacant lots."857
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